













































The Dissertation Committee for Sarah Shoshana Pollack certifies that this is the 




POETRY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BEING:  




































POETRY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BEING:  













Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
 
the University of Texas at Austin 
 
in Partial Fulfillment 
 
of the Requirements 
 
for the Degree of  
 














Rafael Cadenas, in his Dichos, wrote simply, “Nada es nuestro,” words befitting 
of this project about two poets whose works help us to understand our integral belonging 
to the world and others. For myself, I only wish to claim the privilege to thank: 
Professor Dolora Chapelle Wojciehowski, for her love of Foucault and selfless generosity. 
 
Professor Vance Holloway, a model of integrity, for his shared enthusiasm for literature and 
unwavering loyalty to his students. 
 
Professor Jaime Nicolopulos, for introducing me to the more hidden riches of colonial poetry and 
his good-natured assistance during the various stages of my studies. 
 
Professor César Salgado, for the unforgettable odysseys of his courses and his contagious passion 
as a scholar and teacher, an example I wish to follow. 
 
Jorge García, Francis Hernández, Ronald Flores, Jaime Marroquín, Álvaro Mayagoitia, Anna 
Nogar, Lucía Osa-Melero, Sarang Shidore and María Alejandra Zambrano, for their support and 
friendship. 
 
Irma Cantú and Cristina Carrasco, my “comadres creyentes,” for comadres and creyentes. 
 
Ida Vitale, for her poetry, vitality and the joy of being in her presence. 
 
My grandfather, Landrum Bolling, for his lifetime of learning and dedication to peace, and my 
grandmother, Frances Morgan Bolling, whose living embodies knowledge. 
 
My parents, Ron and Rebecca Pollack, my brothers Martin and Abe, my sister-in-law Anna and 
my extended family, Rosendo Zavala and María del Rosario Espinoza for their unwavering belief 
in me and patience during this long process. You are my rock. 
 
Juan Rulfo, whose memory is my Comala. 
 
Oswaldo Zavala, my husband, love, partner, inspiration and accomplice in all I do and am, 
without whom none of this would be possible. 
 
And finally, I humbly wish to dedicate this dissertation to Enrique Fierro, poet and professor, for 





POETRY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BEING:  





Sarah Shoshana Pollack, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2007 
 
Supervisor: Enrique Fierro 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to trace the philosophical inquiries of poets 
Alberto Girri (Argentina, 1919–1991) and Rafael Cadenas (Venezuela, 1930). For both 
authors, poetry offers a space for examining the relationship of modern subjectivity with 
the world by tracing new paths of understanding and consciousness. Neither poet 
proposes a closed philosophical system nor adheres to any set of pre-formulated 
postulates. Instead, they traverse various modalities of thought toward what Martin 
Heidegger has called the “limits of Western metaphysics,” and turn to an eclectic Oriental 
tradition as a response.  
      In the first chapter, I propose a tripartite theoretical framework of investigation, 
considering three conceptions of “Man” in relation to the world and language. I begin by 
reviewing Michel Foucault’s description of the modern episteme as a diagnositic and 
descriptive tool for comprehending the basis of modern subjectiviy. I continue with an 
exploration of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of how the question of “what is Being (Sein)” 
has been unattended, and “Man” (Dasein) has been overvalued as the knowing subject. I 
then review intersections in Heidegger’s work with Taoist and Zen principles. Following 
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Heidegger, Girri and Cadenas turn to a poetics of present-presence, exploring alternative 
means of conceiving the subject and discovering possible answers in Oriental texts.  
      In the second chapter, I examine Alberto Girri’s first poetic production as a 
denunciation of Man’s existential solitude, radical ignorance, and his failure to achieve 
through love, innocence, memory and art a means to overcome his contingency and state 
of orphanhood. The second half of his works is then studied as the reduction of the 
knowing subject, focusing increasing attention on the ethics of approaching the world 
through poetry. Rooted in the here and now, in the negation of the “I,” Girri draws on 
principles adopted from J. Krishnamurti and Taoist and Zen authors which elude the 
crisis of the subject —at the crux of Western metaphysics— and redefine the human 
being in relationship to reality. 
 Rafael Cadenas’s literary trajectory is examined in a parallel fashion in the third 
chapter. His early poetry seeks to recover a lost idyllic state of being and belonging to a 
“you” or “other,” which can be identified as a utopian state or origin. Declaring his 
failure, the subject undergoes a painful examination in which Man’s vital positions in 
regards to his own being and the world are deemed “false maneuvers.” A corrective 
poetry is adopted to free the self of a subjectivity that adjudicates “that which is,” thereby 
creating a therapeutic space for the abandonment of erroneous notions of self, the 
quieting of thought, and the opening of a receptive emptiness to “the other.” 
Understanding language as “that which speaks” and as the “house of Being,” Cadenas’s 
most recent works, as similarly evidenced in Girri’s latter books, suggest new routes for 
recovering an ethical lucidity of consciousness.  
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“La crítica tiene una función creadora: inventa una literatura (una perspectiva, un 
orden) a partir de las obras,” wrote Octavio Paz in 1967 (Corriente alterna 41), a task that 
he himself attempted in his classic study of modern Hispanic poetry, Los hijos del limo 
(1974). The desire to map tendencies, find order and trace patterns that elucidate poetic 
discourse in the context of modernity is a daunting task that inevitably brings unequal 
results. If I begin this study of the poetry of Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas with Paz, 
in his dimension as critic, it is due to his prodigious capacity for synthesis, and because 
Paz opens the door to a set of questions that prepare the stage for the analysis of the place 
of poetry, its language, purported purpose and epistemological grounding.  
In Los hijos del limo, Paz presents modern Hispanic poetry within the framework 
of the Western literary tradition, as the inheritor of German and English Romanticism but 
born of a series of continuous ruptures with traditional norms. Recognizing the 
heterogeneous poetic traditions of modern Hispanic poetry, Paz nonetheless signals two 
structuring principles that constitute the foundations of modern poetics: irony on one 
hand, and analogy on the other. Irony and its twin, anguish, portend the rupture of 
identity and the shattering of the “same”; they bring a sense of death, chaos, orphanhood 
and nothingness, and through them, life and language are inserted into contingency and a 
non-teleological history, ultimately causing the destruction of myth and “the holy” ("Los 
hijos del limo" 372). Working to opposite effect, the principle of analogy establishes a 
system of correspondences or universal rhythms within language and the world, initiates 
a new sacred myth and an extemporal transcendental space, recovers the original powers 
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of a language that names, and creates unity through the reconciliation of opposites. 
Following Paz’s division, poetry born of irony explores the realms of the grotesque, 
irrational, incoherent, fantastic, political and absurd through humor, paradox, disorder, 
the mixing of genres, prosody, colloquial language, the disintegration of the text and 
silence. Contrarily, through metaphor, rhythm, synesthesia, the expulsion of anecdote and 
the use of image to discover the secret relations between objects, poetry as analogy 
operates a verbal alchemy that incarnates a divine order, brings about the confluence of 
time and becomes the means for the metamorphosis of the world and man. Paz professes 
analogy’s power of transformation  in “Piedra de sol” (1957) when he writes:  “Todo se 
transfigura y es sagrado/ […]/ amar es combatir, si dos se besan/ el mundo cambia, 
encarnan los deseos” ("La estación violenta" 270-71).  
For Paz, the plurality of modern poetry can be located between these two poles 
that occasionally touch in an author’s work, as in the quintessential case of Mallarmé: 
“acepta la realidad de la nada —el mundo de la alteridad y la ironía no es al fin y al cabo 
sino la manifestación de la nada—, pero acepta asimismo la realidad de la analogía, la 
realidad de la obra poética. La poesía como máscara de la nada”  ("Los hijos del limo" 
399). Latin American poetry provides an ample palette to illustrate the various shades 
between these two extremes. From modernismo to social realism and conversational 
poetry, passing through the multiple proposals of the historic avant-garde, Paz outlines a 
history of modern poetry that is born of critique and criticism but whose parallel function 
is to act as an “other” voice with the “facultad de poner en relación realidades contrarias 
o disímiles,” creating a model of cosmic fraternity ("La otra voz" 591-92). Or as José 
 3 
Lezama Lima writes, and to whom Paz refers as an example of the act of poetic 
reconciliation, the Word incarnated in the poem is like “una casa iluminada/ nos prestaba 
un sencillo vestigio de la eternidad” (Lezama Lima 490). 
Paz’s account of Latin American literary history, in which the future of poetics 
privileges analogy over irony —a conclusion to which he arrives through his personal 
practice of poetry— is not without its critics. The purpose of my referring to Paz, 
however, is not to challenge his narration of the course of poetry nor question his binary 
division of modern poetic fundamentals. Instead, Paz’s literary history allows me to bring 
to the forefront certain underlying questions that are subsumed in his study. If one claims, 
as Paz does, that modern poetry —whose initiators are the Romantic poets of the late 18th 
century— is fundamentally different than that of previous generations, of what existential 
condition or epistemological arrangement is this poetry born? Paz’s essay is descriptive 
in that it identifies and explains the features, functions and effects that he understands to 
characterize modern poetry, but it does not attempt a prescriptive analysis as to the whys 
and wherefores of its being. It will be important to inquire if the dialectic between 
criticism and reconciliation that Paz elaborates is but a symptom of language’s modern 
epistemological and ontological status. We likewise must ask if modern poetry presents a 
privileged means of knowledge that differs from other modes of reflection. At the same 
time, we should question the relationship of the speaking subject with poetry and the very 
status and purported role of the poet today. 
Why do such questions appear in the introduction to this dissertation and is it 
necessary to ask them before introducing the poets to whom this study is dedicated? I 
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believe that in the case of Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas, one must answer with an 
unequivocal affirmative. Both authors’ poetry and essays implicitly and explicitly part 
from these same interrogatives, opening in the center of their works an intentional space 
for this manner of questioning. Their respective corpuses are representative 
manifestations of the doubts and tentative answers that are born of modernity, which 
defines and structures the very nature of their inquiries and responses.  
In order to bring order to the question of modernity and poetry’s status within it, I 
turn to Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist analysis of the human sciences, Les mots et 
les choses (1966). This now-classic study, one of the most important of Foucault’s 
“archeological” phase, offers a diagnostic of the three periods of human knowledge in the 
Western tradition, and the manner in which each is coherently structured. His work 
demonstrates the historic formation of epistemes that are organized and conditioned 
through the relationship that the human being sustains with what he1 knows to be reality, 
as well as his ordering and representing of knowledge through language. The concept of 
the episteme can be defined, in Foucault’s words, as “un ensemble de rapports liant 
différents types de discours” (Revel 25). It does not compose an overarching theory with 
pretensions to account for the sum of all knowledge of a given epoch. Rather, this term 
describes an open field where the many possible ways of ordering and articulating what is 
known —the so-called discursive domains— enter into play. 
An important “construction” for the analysis of the last episteme, as explained in 
Les mots et les choses, is its protagonist Man, and with it, the notion of the modern 
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subject. In the vein of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault presents modern Man as a 
historically constituted figure that since the inception of the modern era —at the 
beginning of the 19th century—became the object of his own knowledge. The subject’s 
experience of himself became the measure and axis of truth. The inauguration of the 
modern episteme deposits knowledge and representation in the figure of Man as subject 
and makes him his own target for study. While Man made possible the preeminence of 
new fields of knowledge, such as history and philology, he simultaneously discovered 
that his own existence was unfathomable and impenetrable. Foucault compounds the 
limits of knowledge and Man’s ignorance in the conceptual figure of the “Other.” The 
Other is at the heart of Man’s own being: it represents force that animates his search to 
know and master himself, but it also comprises all that eludes his comprehension. 
By conceptualizing Man and the Other, his dark twin, as products of the last 
epistemological order, Foucault brings to forefront the crisis of the modern subject who is 
unable to discover the adequate means to establish his knowledge on a positivistic 
foundation, despite the multiple routes and strategies he employs in pursuit of such a 
base. Man’s various discourses —from Hegel’s conception of history, to Marxism —that 
attempt to provide an inviolable foundation for himself as subject and object, inform 
much of 20th century literature. Nevertheless, Foucault identifies certain literary 
discourses as the privileged space where the figure of Man is not positioned at the center 
of knowledge and where it is language that “speaks,” allowing us to glimpse an 
                                                                                                                                            
1 I use the masculine pronoun as neutral and inclusive, without regards to gender, unless specified. 
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alternative form of conceiving and ordering our existence and ways of knowing, in which 
Man no longer is present. 
In his complete works, Foucault never offers or speculates about positivities 
outside of a purely historical framework; no essences or transcendent answers are to be 
found in his texts. The possible future disappearance of Man does not signify for 
Foucault the dawn of an all-embracing truth; this imminent mode of being will be but 
another historical posture adopted by the human being and his thought. To think “from” 
another arrangement in which Man is not the subject, opens other possibilities in the 
configuration of the relationships between knowledge and power. In this way, a space 
that Foucault denominates le dehors or “outside” can be accessed, in which the certitude 
of the subject, his manner of representation and the enunciations of his stable identity are 
no longer unquestioned. For Foucault, the opportunity for the alternative experience of 
thought and being is opened through writing:  “les lettres de noblesse d’une anti-
positivité de notre savoir sont d’abord littéraires” (Boubeker 30). 
Foucault’s analysis of the crisis of the modern subject and the figure of Man, as 
well as his parallel exploration of the literary “outside,” have an important antecedent in 
the work and thought of Martin Heidegger, a philosopher who Foucault recognized as 
fundamental for his own development. The lifelong project of the German thinker, 
through all the “Kehre” or turns that mark his work, can be summarized as the persistent 
questioning of Being. Heidegger considered this to be the most essential and imperative 
task for all thinking – a matter that he accuses Western philosophy of having skipped 
over, taken for granted, or assumed to be understood. Unlike Foucault, who shies away 
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from all pronouncements about essences or a priori “truths,” Heidegger constantly seeks 
paths to reach that which makes itself present and absent in all beings, but does not 
confine itself to them: Being. In Sein und Zeit (1929) Heidegger addresses this basic 
philosophical problem:  
…we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this 
understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the 
tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not know what ‘Being’ 
means. But even if we ask, ‘What is “Being”?’, we keep within an understanding 
of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies (Being 
and Time 25). 
 
For Heidegger, the question of Being is always that of Being in a world of time 
and space. The being capable of experiencing and revealing the various forms of Being to 
himself is the human being, Dasein. As Foucault later attempts, Heidegger historicizes 
the distinct ways in which the human being has approached the world and formulated his 
knowledge about it in discourse. As Joseph J. Kockelmans states,  
Being is shown as sending itself towards Dasein; it sends itself in different epochs 
in different ways which consign Dasein to its privileged destiny which is to be the 
‘shepherd of Being’. […] The totality of the different ways in which Being sends 
itself and to which different epochs of thinking correspond, is what we call 
‘history’ (76-77).   
 
We should recall that Foucault finds in literature the hopeful glimmers of a future 
alternative to the order of Man and his construction of knowledge, but declines to pass 
judgment on the intrinsic value of this contrasting means of organizing thought. 
Heidegger, on the other hand, strives to make the path of his thinking an aide to Dasein, 
with the assumption that there does exist an authentic relationship with Being in 
 8 
plentitude, and that people of different historical moments have been more or less attuned 
to Being’s call. 
As Heidegger writes in the works that follow Sein und Zeit, Dasein creates an 
aperture for the clearing and un-covering of Being. This revelation or opening receives 
the Greek name of aletheia meaning the true, sincere and real. Truth, for Heidegger, is 
not confined to a set of facts, representations or beliefs deemed “correct” (Inwood 13-15). 
Rather, without the trappings of interpretation and judgment, truth encompasses the 
world in its entirety —the reality of beings and of Being— through the revealing of itself 
to Dasein in the fulfillment of the movement of aletheia.  In Heidegger’s writings, art, 
and poetry in particular, plays a fundamental role in the opening of truth and in the 
realization of the human being’s relationship with Being: “Truth, as the clearing and 
concealing of what is, happens to be composed, as a poet composes a poem. All art, as 
the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry” 
(Heidegger "The Origin of the Work of Art" 70).  
The knowledge that poetry delivers is an experience of the relationship with 
Being and beings that Dasein generally cannot access in the modern era. Heidegger does 
not employ the word “episteme” in his accounts of the history of the human being and his 
relationship with Being. Nevertheless, his description of Gestell (enframing) —modern 
Dasein’s “technology” that structures his form of approaching, knowing and controlling 
his reality (Heidegger "The Question Concerning Technology")— finds its echo in 
Foucault’s posterior diagnostic of the episteme of modern Man. For both philosophers, a 
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certain strain of literature reveals to the human being an alternative (and, in Heidegger’s 
appreciation, better) mode of conceiving himself, his knowledge and reality. 
The second half of the 20th century has been classified, not only by these two 
philosophers, as a moment of crisis and of transformation in terms of traditional notions 
of the subject, the demarcations of knowledge, the means of determining these limits, and 
conceptions of the instrument of human expression, language. Within the long history of 
Western cogito, philosophical thought has at times turned to other forms of knowledge, 
originating from non-Western traditions. Heidegger (Parkes Heidegger and Asian 
Thought) as well as Foucault (Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988 618-24) and their 
contemporaries (Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Sontag and others) were familiar with certain 
elements of Oriental philosophies with which their own thought shared direct and indirect 
affinities. Critics have perceived and studied parallels in their philosophical proposals and 
certain branches of the vast and varied corpus of Oriental philosophical and religious 
writings.  
It has been observed that in the case of both Foucault’s and Heidegger’s works, 
there are some striking similarities with elements of Zen Buddhist principles (Ch’an 
Buddhism, in the China), a tradition in which both philosophers were well-versed. For 
example, Uta Liebmann Schaub discovers in Foucault’s works an “Oriental subtext” in 
which the concepts of sunyata (emptiness, the void), “nonpositive affirmation,” the 
disappearance of the subject and “dialogical Man,” and a “non-dialectical language of the 
limit” are influential (Schaub 310-13). Likewise, numerous articles have been dedicated 
to studying what Elisabeth Feist Hirsch simply calls “Martin Heidegger and the East” 
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(247) or what the editor of a broad collection of essays refers to as “Martin Heidegger 
and Asian Thought” (Parkes Heidegger and Asian Thought). Heidegger’s writings have 
elicited comparisons with very different branches of “Asian thought,” among them Zen 
Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism. The most frequently cited 
similarities, however, are undoubtedly encountered in Zen Buddhism and Taoism. After 
reading an essay by D. T. Suzuki, Heidegger is purported to have remarked that “[I] was 
trying to say exactly what Suzuki had said in his writings on Zen” (Jung 217). Although 
certain critics question the extent of this claim and underscore the inevitable limits of 
such comparisons, it is fascinating to observe that many others agree that Zen and Taoist 
principles express a more radicalized position of many of Heidegger’s claims (Steffney 
331-32). 
Within the scope of the present study, these lines connecting Foucault, Heidegger 
and finally elements of Oriental thought are not simply fortuitous. This dissertation seeks 
to follow the road opened by Foucault and Heidegger in their treatment of poetry as 
potentially a philosophical activity that gives space to the exploration of certain basic 
questions about the human being, his relation with reality, knowledge and Being. This 
experience of literature is thought to generate new possibilities in the manner in which 
the human being knows himself and his world — an ethical and ontological mode of 
literature whose presence in the Latin American tradition can be traced back to Sor 
Juana’s Sueño.  Returning to the questions that Paz’s Los hijos del limo evokes, this 
dissertation proposes to study the poetry and essays of Alberto Girri (1919 – 1991) and 
Rafael Cadenas (1930) as belonging to and being born of an epistemological moment in 
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which the predominant constructions of the modern subject, discourses of knowledge and 
reality are questioned, and poetry proposes tentative alternatives that find echoes in 
Heidegger and further answers in Oriental thought. Although such parallels could be 
drawn for certain phases of the works of other 20th century Latin American authors, 
Argentine Alberto Girri and Venezuelan Rafael Cadenas are unique in that they have 
consecrated their life and work to the tireless task of tracing paths of knowledge in their 
verses.  
Individually, Girri and Cadenas have pursued the long and solitary poetic road for 
analogous reasons. When Vilma Colina asked Girri his opinion about the function of the 
poet, he explained: 
Decir que su objeto es el de realizar a través del poema una indagación de la 
realidad, una puesta en práctica de un método de conocimiento muy peculiar, 
distinto del científico pero igualmente atendible. Podría, asimismo, afirmarse que 
la función del poeta, del poema, es la de intentar darle una existencia permanente 
a la realidad aparencial en la que nos movemos: la tesis de que todo lo dado 
existe, pero a la vez no existe sino por medio del artista que lo va creando. Pero, 
fundamentalmente, creo que en última instancia el fin del poema es dar cuenta del 
compromiso que su autor tiene con la lengua, o sea lo más vital de la comunidad 
donde ese poema fue escrito. (Notas sobre la experiencia poética 183-84) 
 
Similarly, through the cycle of essays, Cadenas explicates his dedication and constancy to 
poetry with analogous words. In “Realidad y literatura” Cadenas writes: “Nuestro reino 
es el fatigado reino de lo sabido. La poesía está llamada a arrancarnos de él y conducirnos 
a la novedad, que es lo ordinario, pero como si lo viéramos por primera vez. El nombrar 
poético estaría encargado de acercarnos a la cosa y dejarnos frente a ella como cosa, con 
su silencio, su extrañeza, su gravedad” ("Realidad y literatura" 524-25). 
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 In the interviews and essays that accompany the poetic works of Girri and 
Cadenas, time and time again both authors emphasize poetry as a vital means of arriving 
at a different and essential knowledge of self and the world. If posed with the 
fundamental question that Rilke suggested his young interlocutor ask himself —“must I 
write?” (Rilke 19)— Girri and Cadenas would answer with a resounding “Yes.” Poetry is 
their only imperative, although the fruits of their labors may be uncertain. Neither 
espouses a vision of poetry as objective truth nor as a categorical answer to the questions 
of the human being in the world. With great modesty, attention and care, they offer 
poems as conjectures, paths to follow and ethical and existential acts. In this manner, they 
dare to think differently, without the naïveté that poetry possesses a saving grace, but 
with the belief that a poem offers the attentive reader an aperture to a different and 
otherwise inexistent experience and knowledge. In their respective essays and interviews, 
both poets opine that the gravest danger facing the human being is his present existential 
stance in relationship with the world. They observe that the human being tends to cloak 
himself in what Foucault would term reduced and dominant “discursive strategies” that 
inform and condition his definition of and approach to reality —his own being, his 
language, the people and world that surround him— so that he may dominate it, utilize it 
and put it to his service.  Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetry attempts to re-house the human 
being within a state of radical ignorance in order to permit him the experience of 
amazement, mystery and the unfathomable infinitude of what is. 
 If literature (outside of the bestseller phenomenon) is the affair of a small 
minority, the readers of poetry are, among these few, the scarcest. Poetry is ignored more 
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every day, treated as a strange and incomprehensible anachronism that requires too much 
time and attention and yields no facile fruits. Contemporary trends in literary criticism 
tend to approach poetry principally to illustrate sociological issues of cultural, sexual, 
national, class and racial identities —all topics worthy of study— but without 
concentrating on the poetic happening, on how and what language articulates and thus 
becomes “el lugar en el que lo que es es lo que es” (Cueto "Girri: Un ejercicio de lectura" 
150).  
In the last prose reflections that he was to write, Girri pokes fun at those of us 
who dedicate ourselves to the study of poetry: “El tiempo que demasiados críticos gastan 
en teorías, voluntad de interrelaciones, correspondencias, frenético desmontar lo escrito. 
Acaso una forma de disimular su invencible pereza de leer” (Girri "El motivo es el 
poema" 138). It is my intention and desire that the present dissertation not fall into the 
same snare. Although the nature of this type of study inevitably does require a certain 
will to draw correspondences and interrelationships, it is my intention to draw these lines 
through readings that fraternally lead to other readings through a common aim of 
understanding the human being’s being in the world and the role that poetry and language 
play in this relationship.  
 In honoring Girri’s remarks, this study seeks to draw more attention to and open a 
greater space for two poets whose works have not received the corresponding critical 
study, dissemination and readers that they deserve. Although the reference to literary 
prizes as an indicator or the intrinsic value of a text is often dubious, it is interesting to 
note that both authors, who shied away from public engagements and self-promotion, 
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have been decorated with considerable honors and recognitions2 and were openly held in 
high esteem by authors such as Borges and Paz. There are various monographic book-
length studies about both poets, among which the most important are those by Sergio 
Cueto, Muriel Slade Pascoe, María Victoria Suárez, Alberto Villanueva and Luis Alberto 
Vittor in the case of Girri and those by Ilis Alfonzo Luis, José Balza, Miguel Isava 
Briceño, Elena Dorante and the collection of critical articles edited by Omar Astorga with 
respect to Cadenas’s works. The contributions of these books are of varying interest, but 
considered as a whole, they help to contextualize the writing of both authors, understand 
salient biographical elements informing certain texts, identify recurring themes and 
motifs in their works and trace the “fases de su creciente,” to borrow the metaphor of 
Saúl Yurkievich (99).  
In the most noteworthy examples, the authors of these studies orient the interested 
reader in an understanding of the poetic trajectory of Girri and Cadenas, demonstrating 
points of contact between their works and that of U.S. writers including Aldous Huxley, 
e.e. cummings, Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot and William Carlos Williams, as well as 
similarities with certain aspects of thought of Ludwig Feuerbach, George Steiner, Gérard 
                                                
2 Muriel Slade Pascoe recalls that Girri was honored with the following accolades among others: “la faja de 
Honor de la S.A.DE., el Premio ‘Leopoldo Lugones’, el Premio ‘César Mermet’, el Premio Municipal de 
Poesía, el Premio Nacional de Poesía, y premios de la Fundación Argentina para la Poesía, la Fundación 
Lorenzutti y la Fundación Dupuytren. Ha recibido una Medalla de Oro y ha sido condecorado como 
Caballero Oficial de la Orden al Mérito por el gobierno de Italia” (11). Girri also received two J. S. 
Guggenheim Fellowships (1964, 1977) and was awarded the Réne Barón Prize (1982) and the Premio de 
Poesía de la Fundación Fortabat (1985). For his part, Rafael Cadenas was awarded the “Premio de Ensayo 
de CONAC” (1984), the Venezuelan “Premio Nacional de Literatura” (1985) for his complete works, the 
“Premio San Juan de la Cruz” (1991), the “Premio Internacional de Poesía J.A. Pérez Bonalde” (1992), the 
Venezuelan “Premio de la Fundación Mozarteum” (1993), a Guggenheim Fellowship (1986) and honorary 
doctoral degrees from the Universidad de los Andes (2001) and the Universidad Central de Venezuela 
(2005).  
 15 
Genette, Gilles Deleuze, Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin, J. Krishnamurti and D. T. 
Suzuki. Nevertheless, no critic has undertaken the systematic study of either Girri or 
Cadenas as representative of the modern discourse of exception in which their poetry and 
thought respond to the contemporary crisis of Man as subject and object of knowledge 
such as what Foucault describes as the result of the modern episteme, Heidegger attempts 
to overcome through an attentiveness to Being, and Oriental philosophies seek to 
transcend altogether. 
The most widely held opinion of Girri and Cadenas is that they are two solitary 
poets, independent of the dominant aesthetics and literary practices of their 
contemporaries. Chronologically, Alberto Girri coincides with the Argentine “generación 
del 40”3 whose poetry is characterized by three currents —neo-romanticism, surrealism 
and imagism (Ara 108). Rafael Cadenas began writing in 1958 in the company of 
ideologically revolutionary authors denominated the “Tabla Redonda4” group, which 
published ten numbers of a eponymous magazine (Vera 45-48). In both writers’ early 
poetry, certain aesthetic overlap exists with other poets of their respective generations, 
but these similarities soon dissolve.  Girri’s first books, Playa sola (1946) and 
Coronación de la espera (1947) share with “generación del 40” authors a romantic tone 
and a turbulent, grandiloquent and verbose first-person poetic voice, but this 
                                                
3 The authors referred to as composing the “generación del 40” include Vicente Barbiere, Enrique Molina 
and Olga Orozco. 
4 “Tabla Redonda” was founded with the purpose to “1. Denunciar con voz revolucionaria la realidad 
venezolana. 2. Oponerse a las tendencias intelectualistas de algunos grupos literarios. 3. Defender la 
libertad del creador” Elena Vera, Flor y canto: 25 años de poesía venezolana (1958-1983) (Caracas: 
Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1985) 43.  
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characteristic fades in his following books. Similarly, Una isla (1958) and Los cuadernos 
del destierro (1960), Cadenas’s poetic debuts, partake in a personally subjective and 
expansive tone in which the first-person poetic voice and persona grow to mythic 
proportions. However, Cadenas’s following works initiate a conscientious process of 
verbal and subjective reduction that takes him in a different direction than his 
contemporaries. After this early phase in both authors’ trajectories, critics agree in calling 
Girri and Cadenas exceptions or anomalous individuals who forged their own personal 
literary path almost as an ascetic practice. 
Few readers have articulated the extraordinary parallels that exist between both 
authors’ thought and works. A notable exception is Guillermo Sucre, who reveals their 
shared parentage under the designation “la metáfora del silencio,” together with Roberto 
Juarroz, Gonzalo Rojas, Cintio Vitier, Juan Sánchez Peláez, Reynaldo Pérez-Só, Eugenio 
Montejo, Homero Aridjis and Alejandra Pizarnik. Sucre refers to a crisis in language’s 
powers of representation and finds in the aforementioned poets a common effort in poetry 
to “llegar a una lógica verbal que fuese la transparencia del mundo” (294). I believe that 
although such groupings are helpful to discern unifying elements across a wide spectrum 
of poets and works, the coupling of Girri’s and Cadenas’s works in the pages of this 
dissertation is particularly justifiable and illuminating. In addition, it is apparent that the 
criticism written about either poet has taken a descriptive approach to their works; there 
has yet to be written a study that attempts to elucidate the epistemological and ontological 
raison d’être of this writing and from what fundamental circumstances these works are 
born.  
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The central theme of this investigation is to study how the predominant discourses 
that constitute the modern subject and his way of approaching himself, language and 
reality are questioned at their foundation, constituting an epistemological crisis to which 
Girri and Cadenas respond through tireless poetic projects that seek new paths of 
understanding and consciousness beyond the figure of Man and traditional Western 
metaphysics. Neither poet proposes a closed philosophical system nor adheres to any set 
of pre-formulated postulates. Instead, they traverse through various modalities of thought 
and philosophical inquiry, which I attempt to trace, particularly considering their 
evolving formulations and/or disbanding of their poetic subjects. 
In the first chapter, I propose a tripartite theoretical framework of investigation, 
considering three conceptions of the human being in relation to the world and language. I 
begin with Foucault’s description of the modern epistemological arrangement of 
knowledge in which the figure of Man appears. Foucault’s historical approach to 
knowledge systems and discourses serves as a diagnostic of the positivities over which 
Man was erected and how his very being is a conundrum constructed over fundamental 
contradictions. It also opens the possibility to alternative forms of knowing and being, as 
both are understood to be temporally based modes of existence. This reading of 
Foucault’s episteme provides a philosophical basis for understanding the first half of 
Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetic production in which a conflated poetic subject articulates a 
condition of crisis, fallenness, and loss of origin and identity. The manner in which the 
poetic subjects articulate their experience and knowledge (or often the lack thereof) is 
also indicative of the discursive practices of Man that Foucault demonstrates to be born 
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of the modern episteme. The denunciation of a state of contingency and orphanhood as 
well as the poetic subjects’ proposed “solutions” to this crisis that are tried and 
abandoned within the poems are considered here to be symptomatic of Man’s self-
conception.  
With an understanding of the construction of the modern episteme and the subject 
and object of its knowledge (Man), I turn briefly to Foucault’s discussion about a certain 
literature that functions as an “outside” to modern episteme, and a possibility for a 
different type of relation between the human being and his reality. In Girri’s and 
Cadenas’s poetry, this philosophical turn is evidenced in a drastic reduction of the first-
person poetic subject and his denunciation of his existential condition. Heidegger’s return 
to the question of Being shifts the focus away from Man and privileges works of art, 
especially poetry as an opening for Being to presence. Although neither poet directly 
espouses Heideggerian philosophy, I believe that their poetry follows a path similar to his 
in which the human being encounters a non-instrumental way of being here/there and 
open to Being and the world— Da-sein — which leads to an experience of present 
presence through poetry. Heidegger saw in Zen and Taoist thought a reflection of what he 
aspired to say through other means, and as Girri and Cadenas themselves refer directly to 
these same concepts and texts, I conclude the first chapter with a discussion of ideas like 
sunyata, satori and the transcending of metaphysical categories. 
In chapters two and three, I follow the chronological order of Girri’s and 
Cadenas’s texts, dividing each poets work into two phases. In the second chapter, I begin 
with Girri, who is 11 years Cadenas’s senior, and examine representative poems from the 
first half of his literary production (1946-1963). I seek to demonstrate how this earlier 
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poetry is the product of thought informed and shaped by the crisis of the modern 
episteme and Man, in particular the recurring theme of existential solitude and loss. In 
this phase of his poetry, Girri attempts to resolve this crisis through solutions born of 
Man: the recurrence to memory, the quest for love, a return to innocence and origin. As 
these strategies successively fail, Girri denounces the state of Man and adopts ironic 
personas and postures that spoof all attempts to establish a transcendent order through 
Man himself. A schism lies at the foundation of subject, splitting world and word, and 
Girri’s poems are erected as empty mirrors incapable of projecting a solid structure of 
unity.   
As most of his critics note, Girri’s poetry evolves through different paths of 
thinking which take a turn with the publication of El ojo (1964). The second half of 
chapter 2 is dedicated to Girri’s middle and later writings, as well as his annotations and 
accompanying essays. I study the reduction of the knowing subject and the increasing 
attention to the ethics of approaching the world through poetry. Girri cultivates a poetics 
of present lucidity in which the hacedor’s (doer or maker’s) language, through contact 
with the “real,” connects with an original intuition that becomes, in the poem, another 
element of the world. Rooted in the here and now, and through the negation of the “I,” 
Girri draws on principles adopted from J. Krishnamurti and Taoist and Zen authors which 
offer alternative solutions to the crisis of the subject in Western metaphysics. 
Rafael Cadenas’s literary trajectory is examined in a parallel fashion in the third 
chapter. His early poetry (1958-77) seeks to recuperate a lost idyllic state of being and 
belonging to a “you” or “other” which can be identified interchangeably as Being, the 
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world, the beloved or the true self. Stating its failure, the subject undergoes a painful 
examination in which Man’s vital positions in regards to his own self and the world are 
deemed “false maneuvers.” A corrective poetry is assumed to free the self of a 
subjectivity that adjudicates “that which is.” The poem is a therapeutic space for the 
abandonment of erroneous notions of self, the quieting of thought and the opening of a 
receptive emptiness to “the other.” 
In the second part of the third chapter, I study the successive attempts by Cadenas 
to discover an ethics of being and writing. The marks of aforementioned Oriental texts as 
well as of Spanish mystic poet San Juan de la Cruz are considered. Different 
demarcations of “that which is” proposed in Cadenas’s essays about language, “reality” 
and literature are used in analyzing the poetry of corresponding years. Understanding 
language as “that which speaks” and as the “house of Being,” Cadenas’s latest works, as 
Girri’s, suggest new routes for recovering an ethical lucidity of consciousness. In his 
introduction to the complete works of Cadenas printed in the year 2000, José Balza states 
that despite similarities with certain moments in the poetry of Huidobro, Paz, José 
Antonio Ramos Sucre and Sánchez Peláez: “No sé de otros autores que hubiesen 
escogido la ‘ruta del instante, la ruta de la atención’ como destino” (12-13).  It is my hope 
that the following pages demonstrate that through poetry, Cadenas and Girri participate in 








CHAPTER 1: FROM MAN TO BEING  
1.1 THE POETIC EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY 
The title of this dissertation, Poetry of Knowledge and Being: The Parallel Paths 
of Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas makes several claims that should not be taken for 
granted or left unchallenged. First, it characterizes the poetry of two poets as being 
epistemological and ontological in essence or as striving to address queries about 
knowledge and Being. “What knowledge?” one may rightly ask, and likewise question 
the scope and usage of the word “Being.” What is poetry’s relationship this knowledge 
and Being? Is poetry a product of, vehicle for or means to knowledge and Being? 
Implied, as well, is view that the poetic works of both authors form paths, a word that 
whose varied meanings express important and dissimilar nuances: a path can be a track 
that has been made evidencing movement; a route along which something moves; a 
course of action or way of living; a route or sequence followed for a particular end. 
Should the word “path” be read as signifying a type of progression towards a fixed 
destination or final goal? Or does “path” mean the movement of path-making itself? 
Finally, the title reveals the optic of the author by reading Girri’s and Cadenas’s works as 
parallel expressions. What coordinates are plotted and graphed in each and through each 
author’s works so that such a claim can be substantiated? Parallel styles? Themes? 
Guiding questions? Up to what point can one justify the yoking of two authors together 
under the same banner? I purposefully state these questions at the beginning of this first 
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chapter so as to serve as a constant sounding board for the ideas proposed throughout this 
study.  
In responding to these interrogatives, I would like to begin with what I consider to 
be several representative examples of the striking similarities in the tone, theme and voice 
of both authors at different moments in their respective works, which was the original 
inspiration for this study. A methodical examination of the works to which I presently 
refer is offered in the following chapters; what follows here is a quick glance at the type 
of material at hand.  In the early pages of both authors, a confessional, subjective voice 
denounces the existential problems of time, love, death, solitude and memory. In his 
fourth book, El tiempo que destruye (1950), Girri writes the following verses in “El 
engañado”: 
Ni siquiera la duración del momento 
Es cosa que recuerde bien […] 
Un darse cuenta que el salir de sí mismo 
Para verse vivir en otro rostro 
No es comunión, es desunión […] 
Y al terminar la pugna 
Devorada ya la imitación que busca, 
Vuelve a estar en el sitio de partida, 
Y solo. ("El tiempo que destruye" 105) 
 
Nine years later, Cadenas’s second book, a long poem in prose titled, “Los cuadernos del 
destierro,” addresses the same themes: 
Amor sin resonancia, llevo al cinto tu cadáver pero es tarde y cuando suena el 
teléfono mis nervios ya están desnudos. Si fuese posible compartir todo. Si fuese 
posible compartir pero como las estaciones llega el olvido, todo se echa a perder, 
sale rodando, se encabrita, se despoja y sólo quedan los huesos ocultos por humus 
demente de falsas entonaciones ("Los cuadernos del destierro" 89). 
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Not long after these respective books were published, both authors begin to 
undergo a profound literary change as can be evidenced by their verses and para-poetical 
texts.  A repeated questioning of Western constructions of knowledge and subjectivity 
can be read in statements such as Girri’s following reflection: 
Es ocioso, también, aclarar que por espíritu de la época significamos la cada vez 
más aguda situación conflictiva del hombre en nuestro siglo, consigo mismo y 
con las circunstancias: sociales, económicas, morales, tan cambiantes y 
dramáticas (Pezzoni "El hacedor en su crítico" 153-54). 
 
Cadenas course of reasoning echoes similar thoughts: 
 
La propia actividad de dominio sobre la naturaleza que realizan los hombres los 
ha alucinado haciéndolos olvidar el fundamento. […] No sabían que cuando se 
olvida el fundamento, la esfera de lo humano se torna ingobernable, pierde sus 
proporciones, se desmide, se vuelve pesadilla —la que vivimos hoy— 
("Anotaciones" 538). 
 
The criticism leveled at Western man and his relationship with knowledge and his 
world contrasts greatly with the task assigned to poetry and the opportunity it affords for 
a different type of thinking and a reformulation of the subject. Girri and Cadenas 
meditate throughout their respective works about literature’s status as a means to 
approach the world, not bound by the vision and discourse structures of Man as subject 
and object of knowledge. Girri proffers the following image for his poetic projects: 
“Palabras en su justo lugar. Ni miran ni hacia atrás ni hacia delante. Son puro presente del 
poema, eso transmiten” ("El motivo es el poema" 275-76). Cadenas offers similar 
thoughts: 
  
La poesía lo pudiera llevar [al ser humano] al espacio del silencio, donde se 
quedaría a solas con la realidad, con el pensamiento también callado. Hacia ese 
silencio apunta la poesía que no está llena de sí misma. La tarea es elíptica: la 
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obra parte de un espacio y a ese mismo espacio conduce ("Realidad y literatura" 
524). 
 
Girri writes, in a characteristic aphorism: “La ausencia del pensamiento no consiste en no 
pensar en nada, que ya sería un tomar contacto, apegarse a esa nada, sino un pensar en 
todas las cosas instante a instante, en perpetuo desapego” ("El motivo es el poema" 265) 
and Cadenas employs the same form in commenting  :  
El misterio acalla el pensamiento, lo hace bajar la cabeza, lo obliga a admitirlo. 
Derrota espléndida la de este rey lleno de aflicciones. 
Al abdicar queda lo que existe, lo que se manifiesta. ("Dichos" 658). 
 
This exercise of tandem citations could be repeated almost indefinitely, and a 
reader may question the greater context of these words and demand a critical reading of 
their significations. These reservations are certainly legitimate, and it is precisely out of a 
desire to demonstrate the need for a unifying theoretical framework that I begin in this 
manner. A study that seeks, among its other goals, to establish points of contact between 
two poets and to trace their parallel paths in the exploration of their being, world and 
language, requires a common ground on which to tread. Beyond the coincidences of 
certain similar vital experiences and the comparable maps we can sketch of readings that 
inform the course of the writings of Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas, what is it that 
brings both authors to write these analogous words about poetry? What greater conditions 
can be identified that generate and make possible these questions and answers? How can 
we claim that this literature is born of Western modernity, at the same time that it seeks to 
contest its defining tenets through poetry?  
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1.2 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL “DIAGNOSIS” 
An attempt to answer these questions can be inaugurated by turning to the Michel 
Foucault’s book, Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines (1966), 
a fundamental piece in post-structuralist theory that articulates a diagnosis of three 
historical arrangements and articulations of knowledge in the Western world. By 
recalling Foucault’s examination of the modern period, we can begin to understand the 
complex space in which Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas inscribe their thoughts and 
poetry. As two men who belong to what Ángel Rama has called the Latin American 
“ciudades letradas,” it is a basic assumption of this thesis that both poets should be read 
as being born of and participating in the western tradition of literature and philosophy 
despite their questioning of its results and their corresponding turn to Oriental literature 
and philosophy. As Girri explains in an interview: “Naturalmente, soy un occidental, 
estoy entonces inserto en una sociedad con determinadas características, y me someto a 
ellas porque no hacerlo sería un acto de megalomanía del que no me considero capaz” 
(Torres Fierro 18). Similarly, Cadenas ascribes to a certain line of Western writers, some 
of whom he has translated such as Cavafys, Lawrence, Pessoa, Nijinski, Segalen and 
Whitman, and others to whom he makes frequent reference, especially Eliot, Goethe, 
Heidegger, Hesse, Huxley, Kafka, Keats, Mallarmé, Nietzsche, Pound, Rilke, Salinas, 
San Juan de la Cruz, Steiner, Tennyson, Valéry and Wordsworth, to name a few. Thus, an 
overview of the modern Western episteme can assist us to understand the nature of both 
poets’ lines of questioning and the tentative answers to which the two arrive. If Girri and 
Cadenas question Western thought and especially its notion of the human subject, it is 
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from within this same tradition that their questioning is born. It is Michel Foucault who 
perhaps most clearly has understood how Western modernity and its eventual crisis is 
structured in discourse and the manner in which certain literature responds to its 
paradoxes and contradictions.  
One of the exegetes of Foucault’s works, Fréderic Gros affirms that: “La 
connaissance des structures devient savoir de ce qui régit nos pensées et nos actes. 
L’enjeu des recherches n’est plus de retrouver le <<savoir>> qui sous-tend l’archive 
d’une époque, mais de formuler le <<diagnostic>> de ce qui secrètement nous agit” 
(195). The diagnosis to which Gros refers, takes the form of an episteme, a concept that 
corresponds to Foucault’s second or archeological phase —from Histoire de la folie à 
l’âge classique (1961) to L’Archeéologie du savoir (1969)— and designates the lateral 
relationships and regularities that can be discovered between discursive practices, the 
sciences, epistemological figures and positivities in a given period. The philosophical 
activity of interrogating the thought’s structure in relationship to the contemporary 
moment belongs to modernity and perhaps began with Kant (Dekens 55-57). Unlike other 
philosophers who seek to understand and conceptualize the present systematically, 
Foucault warns in L’archéologie du savoir that his use of the concept of the episteme 
does not have the objective to “reconstituer le système de postulats auquel obéissent 
toutes les connaissances d’une époque, mais de parcourir un champ indéfini de relations” 
(Foucault L'archéologie du savoir 250). This “undefined field of relationships” can, 
nevertheless, be sketched by the Foucauldian archeologist because the conditions of 
enunciation and means of appearance of discourse are limited, and the most recurring 
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relationships form the most solidified strata of what is considered to be knowledge, at any 
given time. In this sense, an examination of the modern episteme can provide an 
overview of the rules of formation of discourse practices and structures of knowledge in 
which Girri and Cadenas participate and to which they endeavor to respond. 
The Foucauldian understanding of the episteme is advantageous for a study like 
the present one because it analyzes discursive practices as the place where the conditions 
of knowledge are revealed. Discourse practices can be understood here as an ensemble of 
anonymous historical rules from a given time and place that define, through social, 
economic, geographic and linguistic factors, the conditions and practices of enunciation 
(L'archéologie du savoir 153-54).   As discourse is seen to be a discontinuous practice, 
Foucault refuses, by definition, to adopt a form of positivism or a vantage point of “truth” 
from which to judge the disparate forms that knowledge has adopted throughout the 
course of time. Foucault avoids all implicit or explicit judgments about the inherent value 
of the epistemes he describes, offering, instead, critical readings of the reaches of each 
episteme, viewed as historic phenomena devoid of essences. Neither do Foucauldian 
epistemes arrange themselves according to a eschatological vision that procures the 
perception of a continuous history that draws ever closer to its resolution (De Certeau 
350). Rather, Foucault limits himself to articulate two moments of radical discontinuity in 
which Western culture has reconfigured its manner of conceiving the “order of things” 
(Les mots, xxii). As he clarifies in the “Preface,”  
c’est plutôt une étude qui s’efforce de retrouver à partir de quoi connaissances et 
théories ont été possibles; selon quel espace d’ordre s’est constitué le savoir; sur 
fond de quel a priori historique et dans l’élément de quelle positivité des idées ont 
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pu apparaître, des sciences se constituer, des expériences se réfléchir dans des 
philosophies, des rationalités se former, pour, peut-être, se dénouer et s’évanouir 
bientôt (Les mots et les choses 13). 
 
This impartial, descriptive method is most appropriate for the present study, as it makes 
evident the historical a priori positivities that our poets grapple with in their works. In 
addition, it methodologically demonstrates how Girri’s and Cadenas’s questioning of the 
modern Western subject and its relationship to the world coincides with Foucault’s 
suggestion that the present manner in which knowledge is structured around Man will 
also eventually cede its place to other arrangements. 
Les mots et les choses spans three periods in Western history and describes three 
corresponding epistemes: the Renaissance and its system of resemblance; the classical 
period and the order of representation; the modern period and the rule of Man. This 
temporal division is not new, but what is surprising is Foucault’s demonstration of the 
radical reconfigurations of each episteme that permit us to glimpse the future 
disappearance of the figure of Man —axis of modernity— and the dawning of another 
arrangement for knowledge (398). In order to argue this, Foucault examines the parallel 
formation of knowledge about life, work and language in the three aforementioned 
periods. By approaching the configuration of knowledge in this manner, he also 
delineates the place or posture of the human being with respect to what is considered to 
be the historic being of things, the way in which order is established and identity is 
constituted in each episteme. 
 For the purposes of this study, it is relevant to review the places and roles the 
human being has occupied and his relationship to the configuration of knowledge with a 
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particular focus on the figure of modern Man and the problematic that his “appearance” 
implies. Foucault’s observations about the role of language and literature will be of equal 
importance as a point of departure for the examination of Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetry. 
The convocation of Foucault’s ideas for this end are justified by the French philosopher’s 
own words: “Si quelqu’un utilise différemment ce que j’ai écrit, cela ne m’est pas 
désagréable, et même s’il l’utilise dans un autre contexte pour une autre chose, je suis 
assez content. En ce sens, je ne pense pas que je suis l’auteur de l’oeuvre et que la pensée 
et l’intention de l’auteur doivent êtres respectées” (Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988 620). 
Besides, as should be recalled, in his most memorable explanations of each episteme’s 
functions and limitations, Foucault turns to literature —Borges, Cervantes, Sade5— as an 
“outside” space capable of contesting the knowledge therein demarcated. In his book on 
Foucault and literature, Simon During elucidates this point: “They [certain artists and 
authors] escape the full force of the episteme which preconditions their moment (and thus 
they can fulfil a liberating role) at the same time as they show those pressures at work 
most succinctly and clearly (and thus they have an exemplary role)” (114). 
 Before turning our gaze to this unique role that literature plays in the modern 
episteme, we will trace the place the human being occupies in the three epistemes 
identified in Les mots et les choses. The distinction that Foucault makes between the 
human being and the conceptual figure of Man, born of modernity, is of utmost 
importance. Man is the figure that sets modernity’s stage, and it is under his shadow that 
                                                
5 For a thorough study of Foucault’s thought in relation to literature —both his own use and analysis of 
literary texts as well as the subsequent application of his ideas in literary criticism, see: During, Simon. 
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Girri’s and Cadenas’s first poetry is composed. By briefly reviewing the wherefores of 
his previous inexistence, we can better understand the rupture and fundamental shift in 
knowledge that his appearance signifies. In the first two historic phases that Foucault 
studies, the human being is allocated a privileged position in the order of things and the 
configuration of the “known,” but he was not the sovereign subject and object of 
knowledge, as he is in the modern episteme. 
The first episteme that Foucault analyzes, starting in the 16th century, belonged to 
the “order” of similitude, analogy, emulation and sympathies. God, the giver of a sublime 
and secret order, revealed to the human being knowledge about the visible and invisible 
through infinite signs, signatures and ciphers imprinted on all things that the human being 
“read,” deciphered and accumulated. Creation’s order was thus decoded by interpreting 
the great text of the universe written by the Creator. These signs, through an infinite 
spiral of visible similarities among themselves, organized knowledge’s form (32) and 
manifested the power, wisdom and will of God6.  In a cosmos that folded and unfolded 
itself through the laws of similitude, the human being embodied one more element ruled 
by the same principles as the rest of creation. At the same time, however, the human 
being was doubly privileged; he embodied the locus where all sympathies were 
conjugated and was the only creature whose role it is to unveil, interpret and utilize the 
work of God. The entire cosmos —heaven, hell, earth, flora and fauna— could be “read” 
                                                                                                                                            
Foucault and Literature: Towards a Geneology of Writing. London: Routledge, 1992. 
6 Foucault identifies four forms of establishing similitude — convenientia, aemulatio, analogy and 
sympathy— that constitute the forms through which man can discover the order of the world. For a detailed 
description of the way knowledge was structured through these “laws,” see the chapter “La prose du 
monde,” and in particular pages 32-40. 
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by man through analogy and similitude to discover God’s perfect order. As Foucault 
explains: 
L’espace des analogies est au fond un espace de rayonnement. De toutes parts, 
l’homme est concerné par lui; mais de ce même homme, inversement, transmet 
les ressemblances qu’il reçoit du monde. Il est le grand foyer des proportions, —
le centre où les rapports viennent s’appuyer et d’où ils sont réfléchis à nouveau” 
(Les mots et les choses 38). 
 
The hermeneutic process of reading and interpreting the signs inscribed in and over 
himself, other things, and contained in the sacred scriptures constituted the human beings 
labor in knowledge. “Savoir consiste donc à rapporter du langage à du langage. A 
restituer la grande plaine uniforme des mots et des choses. A tout faire parler. C’est-à-
dire à faire naître au-dessus de toutes les marques le discours second du commentaire” 
(Les mots et les choses 55). The positivistic ground underlying all knowledge was the 
perfect order of the Creator that the human being, with his imperfect language attempted 
to articulate. Copious commentaries, glosses and interpretations formed the discourse that 
corresponded to these conditions of enunciation of knowledge. In the Renaissance 
episteme, the human being played no role in the creation of order. His task was simply to 
perceive and articulate God’s perfect design. “Les choses, rassemblées en une seule 
grande plaine uniforme, parlent d’elles-mêmes, signant leur similitude, suscitant leur 
propre commentaire: nul espace pour une figure de l’homme qui n’est nécessaire que 
comme lieu d’articulation entre mots et choses”(Dekens 14).  
A major shift happens at the beginning of the 17th century in which other rules 
established the cartography of knowledge that formed the classical period’s episteme. 
Whereas similitude had before determined the forms through which the discourse of truth 
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was articulated, now the theoretical determination of objects operated by means of 
representation. Instead of pursuing similitude among the infinite signs in the universe, 
representation was grounded in the positivities of identity and difference. Within the 
system of representation, signs no longer belonged to the same level and order as the 
things, but rather formed a perfect, neutral and transparent language that corresponded 
exactly to the things that it represented. As the key instrument of knowledge, the sign 
itself was governed by the laws of its content, because there did not exist any element 
that mediated between the two (Les mots et les choses 80). Through the analysis and 
combination of signs, the human being sought to organize the totality of knowledge in an 
immense table of series, ordered through the measured differences that established the 
identities and place of each element of knowledge. To say a name, therefore, was to also 
convoke the thing itself and its place in relationship to all other signs: representation’s 
power was unbounded and it allowed for its infinite and ordered accumulation of 
knowledge. Representation made possible a totalizing and unified history of all aspects of 
knowledge in which the human being’s life, labor and language simply occupied another 
integral place in its cosmic account. 
In the classical episteme, the positivistic ground that guaranteed order was 
representation itself that assured the unequivocal identity of things and their place in 
relationship to all other things capable of being represented.  
Les <<choses>> disparaissent de l’horizon épistémologique pour laisser place aux 
<<mots>>, mais ces mots nouveaux ont un statu de certitude transparente, 
condition de leur appartenance au <<représenter>> cartésien: un <<représenter>> 
rectifié, épuré, corrigé. […] le nouveau langage transparent comporte sa propre 
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assurance, ne tire sa certitude d’aucun autre niveau que le sien propre (Kremer-
Marietti 62-63). 
 
1.3 THE EMERGENCE OF MAN 
As representation was self-sufficient, the role of the human being was simply to 
act as the place of clarification, and not the transcendental source of meaning. The human 
being constructed an artificial system of language, but this language, by virtue of its own 
nature, assured the possibility of representation. As a creature capable of using language, 
the human being simply fulfilled the role of being the place through which representation 
passed and was transformed into signs. “There was a place for the human knower as a 
rational animal, high in God’s hierarchy, but not for the representer per se; for man as a 
special different kind of being, man as ordering subject could find no place on the table 
he organized”  (Dreyfus Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, With 
an Afterword by and an Interview with Michel Foucault 20). In the classical episteme, 
there was no space to question the existence of the human being himself. Only later, in 
what Foucault calls the figure of Man does the human being appear as the subject that 
posits and makes possible representation, disposes of the objects of representation for 
himself, and questions his own nature as knower. 
In the third episteme, that emerges at the end of the 18th century and whose 
formulation and structure extends to the present day, the conceptual figure of Man is 
“born” and the identities made possible by the act of representation no longer express the 
complete order of beings. Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetry is written in the shadow of Man, 
as is this dissertation itself. However, as made evident by the radical differences 
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operating in the Renaissance and classical epistemes, it is worth emphasizing that this 
new appearance of Man as the principle actor in the stage of knowledge should 
simultaneously remind us that, as with the other figures of knowledge, Man will also 
inevitably disappear. Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetry, therefore, can be read as pertaining to 
the exploration of other forms of articulating knowledge and a critique of Man’s present 
dominance. Before approaching the fault lines that promise to bring the next 
epistemological break, we will examine the contradictory terms of the reign of Man and 
the episteme that is created along his possibilities and limitations so as to best situate 
Girri’s and Cadenas’s first poetry as a reaction against the conundrum of Man’s position 
in the current episteme. 
Classical representation, because of its sovereign transparence, established a 
continuous taxonomic table in which and through which knowledge could be founded 
and apprehended: “Knowledge is signification and signification is both representation 
and analysis” (Cousins 47). In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant was the first to question 
the homogeneous space of classical representation, its foundation, origin and limits, as 
well as to scrutinize the conditions that made this representation possible. When the 
general domain of representations fractured, a space was opened for a new set of 
relationships of knowledge. The sign detached from the object it represented, losing its 
unequivocal identity and becoming contaminated by a historicity that fragmented the 
fields of empirical knowledge. Language no longer was bound to things themselves, but 
rather to human will.  
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It was in the interstices between things and language that Man appeared, the finite 
subject that modern philosophy —by virtue of Man’s same finitude— has attempted to 
establish as the knower and base of truth. Man, as the central subject, occupies what 
Foucault has denominated as “the place of the king” (Les mots et les choses 318-23) as 
he is the holder of knowledge as well as the paradoxically preferred object of his own 
knowing gaze. Man seeks to exert his will and power over all things that come into his 
gaze and his presence reconfigures the episteme: the relationship between words, things 
and order are made evident through his consciousness and not through the autonomous 
system of representation. The knowledge of things is no longer determined by 
mathematically establishing and tabulating identities, but through their external 
connection with the human being. Man’s reasoning gaze conditions the way in which all 
knowledge is determined and modern discourse practices are conditioned. 
 Man is the point from which knowledge proceeds, but this is not his sole function. 
Through his figure, new fields of knowledge are glimpsed that he makes possible: the 
human sciences such as psychology, sociology, philology and literature. These 
disciplines examine Man himself as a being that lives, labors and speaks. Understood 
thus, Man is a space over which biology, economy and linguistics operate. Behind every 
living being, one can glimpse long chains of independent processes with their own 
histories and governing forces —completely antithetical to the general chronicle of all 
things written in the classical period. These processes, in which Man participates, 
overwhelm him; they alienate him from himself and define him without his ever attaining 
the origin of these forces or understanding and controlling their development. The human 
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being that lives, works and speaks is “governed” by an organism that obeys its own 
organic laws, that produces and exchanges goods through gestures established by 
historical processes, and employs a language that preceded him and whose words stand 
over the chaotic strata of meanings sedimented over time. These three aspects that 
determine the concrete existence of Man, concurrently prove his finitude by manifesting 
their incoercible anteriority to his person. He is left as an alienated subject with the 
insurmountable task of mastering these independent histories that define but elude him. 
The figure of Man always possesses a double face. Critics Mark Cousins and 
Athar Hussain summarize:  
At one level Man is considered as the locus of a series of effects, determinations 
which are imposed upon him by life, labour and language, which define him in his 
finitude as Man. Yet at the same time there is a perpetual opening of the question 
of what Man is in terms of being the locus of knowledge (Cousins 52). 
 
Man, in his fundamentally dual role as subject and object of knowledge, determines two 
contrary means for this knowledge that constitutes the modern episteme. On the one 
hand, knowledge is sought as empirical contents, defined in positivistic terms as an object 
of Man’s cogito and its corresponding representation. At the same time, a dialectical 
knowledge erupts through a critical and undefined thought that questions the conditions 
that make possible any empirical contents. Man lends himself to both forms of 
knowledge, forming what Foucault will call a “doublet empirique-transcendental” (329): 
he conceives himself in terms of a finite knowledge of his life, labor and language, at the 
same time he strives to establish himself as a transcendental being to whom essential and 
imminent “truth” is ascribed. Foucault terms this modern, paradoxical condition of 
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knowledge the “analytic of finitude,” (Les mots et les choses 328), and it forms the 
foundation for modern positivity. The modern episteme is born of an inherent crisis: 
modern Man’s finitude makes possible his knowledge, but also requires that he overcome 
its limits. 
1.4 THE CRISIS OF MODERN SUBJECTIVITY 
 The analytic of finitude heralds the modern episteme’s internal contradictions, 
which constitute the base of the problems that Girri and Cadenas grapple within their 
early works. Both poets experience the immediate results of Man’s enthronement and 
seek unsuccessfully —within the terms of discursive practices— to find a resolution to 
this crisis. This crisis has been described by Dreyfus and Rabinow in terms of three pairs 
of opposing “doubles,” each of which has been adopted —to the detriment of its 
counterpart— by modern philosophers as the ground of their thought: transcendental/ 
empirical; cogito/ unthought; retreat/ return of the origin. The first set refers to the 
irreconcilable positions that define Man through the empirical study of his life, work and 
language, while simultaneously considering him to be the conditioner of all knowledge, 
as a transcendental subject. Concretely, this set of conditions manifests in the early works 
of Girri and Cadenas through the existential oscillations of the poetic subject that 
unsatisfactorily seeks to know itself through the elements that compose his person and his 
being as a knowing subject.  
The second set of doubles contends that Man’s cogito, though considered the 
force behind the progress of reason, is incapable of penetrating the totality of knowledge; 
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some element of darkness or “unthought” —be it the subconscious, dreams, madness or, 
most fundamentally, the very being of the self and all others— eludes all attempts of the 
cogito to illuminate and make speak its dark silence. Human cogito, as described by 
Descartes, no longer is grounded in the representation of the classical episteme. Modern 
cogito is not a guarantee of reason’s knowledge — defined as sovereign and conscious 
thought that assured the transparency of knowledge and the existence of the thinker. With 
the emergence of Man, cogito is reevaluated and treated like all other thought —
conscious or unconscious— that passes through a subject. The modern study of the cogito 
is “the beginning of an investigation of what in ‘thought’ escapes consciousness of 
thought” (Cousins 55). Consequently, the postulate “I think” no longer results in “I am” 
because Man is always radically alienated from the being that his consciousness attempts 
to reach, by overcoming its own limits. In Girri’s and Cadenas’s first works, the poetic 
voice often refers to the fundamental unknown that lurks in all thought that attempts to 
explicate either the self or its world, undermining any sense of positivistic knowledge.   
Lastly, the third pair, the “retreat/ return of origin,” summarizes the paradox that 
situates Man as the source of a history whose origin he never can attain or fully 
comprehend. Modern thought, in its foundation, recognizes that Man is inscribed in a 
world, society and language that antecede him. As a consequence, he finds himself 
excised from his origin and that of the very practices that define him. The elements of his 
being have their own internal foundation, history and measuring standards and they 
abscond within themselves their truth and origin. As a result, Man is continually 
reminded that because he is limited by the very things that define him, it is impossible to 
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assign him an origin. Nevertheless, Man’s thought endeavors to reach what he conceives 
to be his origin —that unreachable and impossible point that Foucault describes as “le 
sommet virtuel d’un cône où toutes les différences, toutes les dispersions, toutes les 
discontinuités seraient resserrées pour ne plus former qu’un point d’identité, l’impalpable 
figure du Même, ayant pouvoir cependant d’éclater sur soi et de devenir autre” (Les mots 
et les choses 340-41). The strategy and task of modern thought is to reach the figure of 
the Same, to name being and make it visible. 
The idea of an origin is an important part of the modern episteme’s cartography; 
as a hidden fountain that always lies beneath the surface, it is paradoxically present but 
remote, and Man attributes it to a past or future, always beyond his grasp. The diverse 
paths of modern philosophy make incursions in time to attempt to make visible that 
unreachable origin. The positivistic route attempts to place Man’s origin within the 
chronological series of the evolution of other beings; in contrast, the transcendental path 
seeks to make of Man’s experience and knowledge of things, the origin of the truth about 
them. These chronologies are irreconcilable, as one subordinates Man to things and the 
other, things to Man. Within these options, philosophers such as Hegel, Marx and 
Spengler strove to make thought the eschatological route to a future plenitude, an 
attainable totality, the resolution of history, the perfection of thought and Man’s meaning. 
This illusive origin also seemed to retract in time, and Man required strategies to operate 
its return. Hölderlin, Nietzsche and Heidegger, for example upon conceiving the origin’s 
extreme recession and its implied loss for Man, suggested the notion of the origin as pure 
void. These visions hold in common the ultimate end of Man and of history because in 
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their thought, “s’efforce de retrouver l’homme en son identité – en cette plénitude ou en 
ce rien qu’il est lui-même” (Foucault Les mots et les choses 345). In Girri’s and 
Cadenas’s works, both notions of the origin recur frequently: sometimes as an 
irrecoverable past where identity and meaning were transparent and at others as a future 
moment of complete reconciliation. Both means of conceiving the origin and its 
relationship with Man are discarded as fallible answers to a problem that lies in the figure 
of Man himself. Girri and Cadenas, as we will observe shortly, coincide with Foucault’s 
analysis that none of the elements of the doubles is capable of satisfying and accounting 
for the opposing epistemological conditions that makes its double, through Man, possible.  
It is logical that the birth of Man coincides with that of his dark twin, the Other, 
that represents Man’s limits. In its absolute form, the Other is death —Man’s 
fundamental finitude— but its presence as the boundary of human existence is felt in all 
aspects of Man’s being: his life, work and language. The Other resides in the dark and 
hidden limits of human knowledge where Man bumps up against his own finitude. In 
modern philosophy, the Other has been heralded under different names, according to the 
conceptions and analysis of its thinkers: for Hegel the Other was An sich (in opposition to 
Für sich); for Schopenhauer, the Ubenwusste; for Husserl, the implicit or inactual; for 
Marx it was alienated man (Foucault Les mots et les choses 338). In the section, 
“L’homme et ses doubles,” Foucault further develops this idea: 
L’homme n’a pas pu se dessiner comme une configuration dans l’epistémè, 
sans que la pensée ne découvre en même temps, à la fois en soi et hors de soi, 
dans ses marges mais aussi bien entrecroisés avec sa propre trame, une part de 
nuit, une épaisseur apparemment inerte où elle est engagée, un impensé 
qu’elle contient de bout en bout, mais où aussi bien elle se trouve prise. 
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L’impensé comme une nature recroquevillée ou une histoire qui s’y serait 
stratifiée, c’est, par rapport à l’homme, l’Autre: l’Autre fraternel et jumeau, né 
non pas de lui, ni en lui, mais à côté et en même temps, dans une identique 
nouveauté, dans une dualité sans recours (Les mots et les choses 338). 
 
In the modern episteme, the Other is what constitutes Man’s consciousness, and that 
which escapes him.  
 In the modern episteme, new forms of knowledge, organized as the human 
sciences, are inscribed in a continuous movement committed to vanquish and elucidate 
this Other, in order to transform it into the Same: part of the empirical knowledge of 
Man. The distinct branches of modern knowledge about Man seek to elaborate systems to 
clarify and grasp that part of thought that eludes consciousness. As Dieter Freundlieb 
comments, for Foucault “these sciences are ultimately impossible because their objective 
is the complete self-transparency of man, which they try to achieve by turning the 
conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge into objects of empirical knowledge” 
(Freundlieb 320). Modern thought, in this sense, is a mode of action that is adopted as an 
ethic —to elucidate, apprehend and illuminate what is silent, un-thought and obscure. 
Thought is no longer strictly theoretical because all thinking is, in itself, an act that 
advances “dans cette direction ou l’Autre de l’homme doit devenir le Même que lui” (Les 
mots et les choses 339). In Girri’s and Cadenas’s early poetry, the question of the 
subject’s fundamental and invariable alienation from himself and others is mulled over in 
multiple contexts. Through love, dreams, memory and incantation, there is a common 
search to bring all that is distant, dark, separated and unknown into the subject’s knowing 
and possessive conscious. After repeated failure to make the “Other” into the “Same,” 
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both poets begin to denounce and renounce the very foundation of this fallible system of 
knowledge: Man himself. 
With this basis, it is now possible to review those characteristics that define Man 
as the conceptual place where the possibilities of knowledge manifest, and that 
distinguish the contemporary episteme. In the first place, Man is raised up as the 
sovereign subject who attempts to apprehend the laws that govern his existence and to 
compel them to become completely transparent. However, this mastery of knowledge and 
of himself is automatically checked because of his contradictory construction. We can 
recall the pairs of factors mentioned above that determine the finitude of Man’s being and 
knowledge: “le lien des positivités à la finitude, le redoublement de l’empirique dans le 
transcendantal, le rapport perpétuel du cogito à l’impensé, le retrait et le retour de 
l’origine” (Foucault Les mots et les choses 346). Given that language as representation no 
longer suffices as a positivistic base for knowledge—as it did in the classical episteme— 
in each one of these descriptive pairs, the work of establishing and articulating the 
positivistic structures of modern knowledge becomes problematic. Man attempts to 
restore the positivity of representation through himself. The “Other” within each element 
of his discourse subverts his role as sovereign and master of knowledge.  The conditions 
of finitude become, in fact, the very ground that legitimizes and facilitates Man’s 
knowledge. As Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, “Modernity begins with the incredible and 
ultimately unworkable idea of a being who is sovereign precisely by virtue of being 
enslaved, a being whose very finitude allows him to take the place of God” (Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, With an Afterword by and an 
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Interview with Michel Foucault 30). The inherent limitations of Man provide him with 
the impetus and ethical motivation to overcome them, to ground himself in his finitude in 
order to reach beyond it. 
 Foucault appraises Man’s various discourses as  “gauches et gauchies” (Les mots 
et les choses 354) and concedes a mute, philosophic laugh to the modern episteme. This 
is, interestingly, the same conclusion to which Girri and Cadenas arrive in their poetry 
and essays: an ironic gaze distances them from the discourses of Man which, in 
Foucault’s terms includes everyone who: 
veulent encore parler de l’homme, de son règne ou de sa libération, à tous ceux 
qui posent encore des questions sur ce qu’est l’homme en son essence, à tous ceux 
qui veulent partir de lui pour avoir accès à la vérité, à tous ceux en revanche qui 
reconduisent toute connaissance aux vérités de l’homme lui-même, à tous ceux 
qui ne veulent pas formaliser sans anthropologiser, qui ne veulent pas 
mythologiser sans démystifier, qui ne veulent pas penser sans penser aussitôt que 
c’est l’homme qui pense (Les mots et les choses 353-54). 
 
Man, as we have seen through Foucault’s analysis, is only one of three configurations of 
knowledge that the Western world has experienced since the Renaissance. For over 200 
years, philosophical thought has been dedicated to defining what Man is in his essence 
and, to analyze all that can be presented to his experience as Man. Conceiving all 
knowledge as parting from Man and his experiences, leads to what Foucault calls the 
“sommeil anthropologique” of philosophy, when Man’s empirical characteristics are 
conceded transcendental functions, and vice versa (Les mots et les choses 351-54) — a 
characteristic of modern Western metaphysics whose roots reach back to Plato. In the 
circularity of this thought, all knowledge —both transcendental and empirical— is 
compounded in Man, the privileged subject that seeks to find the Same in all figures of 
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alterity. The human being’s knowledge is at the present time so strongly rooted in the 
figure of Man that it is difficult to think in a manner different from dialectical humanism 
—understood here as the metaphysics of subjectivity that, like a double helix, binds 
alienation to reconciliation, with the trust and expectation that Man will, with time, attain 
complete authentication. Foucault, in contrast, views this and all philosophical discourse 
as an irregular, historical praxis without an essential truth, capable of being reverted and 
rearticulated. 
The possibility of modifying the contours of knowledge drawn by Man would 
announce what Foucault denominates his “death.” “Dès lors, les chances de penser 
autrement, hors du lieu anthropologique dessiné par le XIXe siècle ne peuvent surgir que 
de l’annonce d’une disparition prochaine de l’homme” (Gros 44). One should not 
misunderstand the pronunciation of Man’s expiration: it does not suppose the 
disappearance of the human being nor his omission in the configuration of the episteme. 
Rather, another role or place is allocated to him within the relationships and forces that 
make possible and determine his cognition. We can recall that the human being did not 
exist as Man in the Renaissance or classical formations and representations of 
knowledge. Similarly, the death of Man heralds his separation from the epistemological 
center, the abandonment of his protagonism in the creation of order, and his incorporation 
into language. Foucault poetically describes this possibility in the last paragraphs of Les 
mots et les choses: 
L’homme est une invention dont l’archéologie de notre pensée montre aisément la 
date récente. Et peut-être la fin prochaine.  
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Si ces dispositions venaient à disparaître comme elles sont apparues, si par 
quelque événement dont nous pouvons tout au plus pressentir la possibilité, mais 
dont nous ne connaissons pour l’instant encore ni la forme ni la promesse, elles 
basculaient, comme le fit au tournant du XVIIIe siècle le sol de la pensée 
classique, —alors on peut bien parier que l’homme s’effacerait, comme à la limite 
de la mer un visage de sable (Les mots et les choses 398). 
 
It is in the space of certain literature that Foucault discerns the heralds of a new 
form of organizing knowledge that forms the base of a new episteme. We should recall 
that Foucault’s reading of “El idioma analítico de John Wilkins” by Jorge Luis Borges 
served “para señalar a Foucault un camino del pensamiento” (Rodríguez Monegal 187) 
that became the guiding premise behind Les mots et les choses. In Cervantes’ Quijote 
Foucault identifies and reads the transition and conflict between the Renaissance and 
classical epistemes. The Marquis de Sade’s Juliette and Justine are the motive of 
Foucault’s observation about the twilight of classical representation and the ascent of 
Man. It is not surprising that for the modern period that interests us, it is to literature, 
again, that Foucault returns with hopeful expectations to divine the fortunate death of 
Man and the coming of a different, more propitious principle for thought. For Foucault, 
certain literary experiences from Stéphane Mallarmé and on, like those of Antonin 
Artaud, Raymond Roussel, Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Pierre Klossowski, 
capture an experience of language in which Man ceases to exist. 
The example of Mallarmé that Foucault offers sheds light on literary language’s 
privilege and anticipates a new episteme and the disappearance of Man. As we have 
already seen, when the unity of classical discourse shattered, so did the fields of 
knowledge as well as language itself. Modern Man strives to free his enigmatic and 
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fragmented language from its silent and unfathomable content and render it manageable 
cognition. Before Mallarmé, the modern work was inserted in the interior of this 
language pertaining to human knowledge and formed with rhetoric, the subject and 
images. As Nietzsche observed, the standard use of language makes modern knowledge 
hinge on the subject (Man) who formulates the discourse (Les mots et les choses 316-17). 
Nietzsche’s criteria, however, is not sustained in Mallarmé’s work, because when the 
former questions “Who speaks?” the latter’s response is “ce qui parle, c’est en sa 
solitude, en sa vibration fragile, en son néant le mot lui-même — non pas le sens du mot, 
mais son être énigmatique et précaire” (317). Mallarmé’s project sought to return 
language to its plenitude and is universal unity in that single Book, page and word where 
he himself would be erased in the process.  
For Foucault, this type of literature is the reverse of modern discourse. It is the 
“silencieuse, précautionneuse déposition du mot sur la blancheur d’un papier, où il ne 
peut avoir ni sonorité ni interlocuteur, où il n’a rien d’autre à dire que soi, rien d’autre à 
faire que scintiller dans l’éclat de son être” (Les mots et les choses 313). The mode of 
literary language, unlike other forms of discourse, is folded over itself, becoming its own 
origin and form. In his essay, “La folie, l’absence d’œuvre” de 1964, Foucault 
demonstrates the strange proximity between literature and madness, because both are 
prodigious reserves or matrixes of sense that lead to the instauration of a void where 
meaning’s infinite possibilities could be lodged. For Foucault, the “being” of literature, 
like that of madness, is “quelque chose sans doute qui a affaire à l’auto-implication, au 
double et au vide qui se creuse en lui” and that “il en a fait remonter les mots jusqu’à 
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cette région blanche de l’autoimplication où rien n’est dit” (Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975 
446-47).  
Literature’s “being” lies outside of its representative function, where Man is not 
edified as the speaking subject.  In literature, language is not the tool for the self-
expression and self-edification of the speaker or of his dialectical knowledge. In fact, 
literary language surmounts dialectics and separates Man from the epistemological center 
where he had reigned since the beginning of the 19th century.  Literature demonstrates its 
complete autonomy from Man: “Ce que Nietzsche tentait quand il appelait de ses voeux 
le surhomme, ce à quoi Foucault s’essayait aussi quand il décrivait l’expérience littéraire 
comme fondamentalement inhumaine (irréductible bien aux principes d’un sujet 
constituant qu’aux donnés des savoirs positifs” (Gros 44). There is no authoritative 
subject of literature, no reflection of external objects and states for him to grasp. The 
author, as the originator and composer of thought through language, represents a parallel 
discursive figure to the construction of Man. Both author and Man are dispersed in 
literature, brought inside its folds.  Literary language comes to possess its own 
ontological category as a place of self-representation where only its own being is named: 
“literature itself is regarded as more transgressive, closer to Being […] literature quests 
for an autonomous space ultimately based, as we have seen, on the materiality and 
functionlessness of language” (During 114-15). In the void of a naming subject, literature 
offers a unique means of thought, born of and always leading back to itself. Foucault 
comments in an essay published in 1966, the same year as Les mots et les choses: 
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“Depuis, on peut dire que la littérature est le lieu où l’homme ne cesse de disparaître au 
profit du langage. Où ‘ça parle’, l’homme n’existe plus » ("L’homme est-il mort ?" 572). 
It should seem clear now, that Foucault’s turn to literature is a move meant to: 
“regain access to a fundamental thinking, a thinking from without (la pensée du dehors) 
that could break with the traditional philosophy of consciousness and the subject” 
(Freundlieb 307). In fact, his 1970 inaugural address at the Collège de France begins with 
an invocation of desire for that particular kind of thought, language and speech and the 
position he yearns to adopt through it:  
Plutôt que de prendre la parole, j’aurais voulu être enveloppé par elle, et porté 
bien au-delà de tout commencement possible. J’aurais aimé m’apercevoir qu’au 
moment de parler une voix sans nom me précédait depuis longtemps : il m’aurait 
suffi alors d’enchaîner, de poursuivre la phrase, de me loger, sans qu’on y prenne 
bien garde, dans ses interstices, comme si elle m’avait fait signe en se tenant, un 
instant, en suspens. De commencement, il n’y en aurait donc pas ; et au lieu d’être 
celui dont vient le discours, je serais plutôt au hasard de son déroulement, une 
mince lacune, le point de sa disparition possible (L'ordre du discours 7-8). 
 
To write as if enveloped in words, to be a slender gap from which the speech of a 
nameless voice proceeds and disappears is, for Foucualt, the ideal form of discourse that 
can exist precisely because Man is absent. If Foucault’s own writing actually achieved 
this type of self-effacing enunciation is a point of debate. However, he did repeatedly 
encounter and analyze certain literature as privileged examples where this fundamental 
thinking beyond the Man is evident.  
  In the works of Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas, an evident transition occurs, 
moving from a poetry inscribed in the shadow of Man – that of the subject’s 
denouncements of and repeated attempts to resolve the fundamental contradictions we 
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have reviewed, inherent to his being and knowledge —to a practice of writing as the 
space where language speaks, manifesting an alternative knowledge. It is logical to 
inquire at this juncture, the precise meaning of this “being” ascribed to language. This is 
a question that haunts Foucault and which he never does answer in unequivocal terms. In 
the final chapter of Les mots et les choses, Foucault repeatedly insists that the question of 
the being of language is fundamental to understanding what could be a new 
epistemological arrangement without Man. He states: “la question du langage se pose, 
prouvant sans doute que l’homme est en train de disparaître” and later emphasizes the 
inconclusive nature of his ponderings:  
Bien sûr, ce ne sont pas là des affirmations, tout au plus des questions auxquelles 
il n’est pas possible de répondre; il faut les laisser en suspens là où elles se posent 
en sachant seulement que la possibilité de les poser ouvre sans doute sur une 
pensée future (Les mots et les choses 397-98). 
 
The nature of this “future thought” that is opened through posing the questions of 
language’s being, is hinted at as an imminent promise where Man’s death is announced 
—as Nietzsche had proclaimed that of God’s— and a new light begins to shine.  
1.5 THE PRIMORDIAL ORDER OF BEING 
 “L’être du langage,” however, is a slippery term, and a potentially contradictory 
one for a philosophy grounded in the rejection of all essentialisms and non-historically 
based discourses. As Béatrice Han observes, some of Foucault’s initial statements as 
well, lead the perspicacious reader to believe that underlying all culturally-based 
temporal orders, order exists as itself:  
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de sorte qu’elle se trouve devant le fait brut qu’il y a, au–dessous de ses ordres 
spontanés, des choses qui sont en elles-mêmes ordonnables, qui appartiennent à 
un certain ordre muet, bref qu’il y a, de l’ordre. […] antérieure aux mots, aux 
perceptions et aux gestes qui sont censés alors la traduire avec plus ou moins 
d’exactitude ou de bonheur (c’est pourquoi cette expérience de l’ordre, en son être 
massif et premier, joue toujours un rôle critique) plus solide, plus archaïque, 
moins douteuse, toujours plus <<vraie>> que les théories qui essaient de leur 
donner une forme explicite, une application exhaustive, ou un fondement 
philosophique (Les mots et les choses 12).  
 
Whatever it may be, the important fact is that Foucault postulates an intermediary but 
fundamental domain that is distinguished as the bare, first, mute and “true” order that lies 
below all conscious “ordering” activity. Is it this “true” order that the “being of language” 
articulates in literature? Does this discussion of the death of Man, the glimpsing of a new 
knowledge made possible through the being of language, and the idea of a pre-epistemic 
order, point to the thesis that Han adopts as the title of her book, L’ontologie manquée de 
Michel Foucault? 
 The “ontology” around which Foucault dances in the most poetic of his passages 
(but never proffers itself in unhesitant terms) does appear in the poetry of Alberto Girri 
and Rafael Cadenas as that which literary language points to and from which it is derived. 
In their middle works, the elimination of the dominant poetic subject and the 
abandonment of the quest to reconcile the contradictory terms of Man’s being, open to 
language the possibility to speak the truth of an order more fundamental, archaic and 
original than that of Man. Although neither poet systematizes his thought in philosophic 
treatises, the second poetry of both authors communes with the writing of a philosopher 
who dedicated himself singly to the task of “thinking” Being and its relationship to 
language. In order to explore the nature of this ontological poetry, this thesis will now 
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turn to German philosopher Martin Heidegger as a means to enter fully into the 
discussion of Being, its means of “presencing,” and what it speaks. 
 Foucault’s reticence to speak further about language’s being —the original order 
that historical epistemes belie— and his avoidance of Heideggerian ontology in his 
philosophical works, can be read as “l’impensé de l’oeuvre de Foucault — non pas ce à 
quoi elle n’aurait pas pensé, ou ce qu’elle aurait oublié, mais ce qui travaille en elle sans 
qu’elle puisse le formuler clairement, et nécessite donc une élaboration extérieure” (Han 
27). In fact, although Foucault does not dedicate a single essay to Heidegger’s works, the 
German philosopher’s thinking profoundly influenced his own, as evidenced in the 
frequently cited lines transcribed from an interview with Gilles Barbedette and André 
Scala in 1984, and published just three days after Foucault’s death. The interviewers 
suggest that “c’est Heidegger qui, à partir de là, fonde la possibilité d’un discours a-
historique,” to which Foucault responds: 
Heidegger a toujours été pour moi le philosophe essentiel […] Tout mon devenir 
philosophique a été déterminé par ma lecture de Heidegger. […] Tandis que 
Nietzsche et Heidegger, ça a été le choc philosophique !  Mais je n’ai jamais rien 
écrit sur Heidegger et je n’ai écrit sur Nietzsche qu’un tout petit article ; ce sont 
pourtant les deux auteurs que j’ai le plus lus. Je crois que c’est important d’avoir 
un petit nombre d’auteurs avec lesquels on pense, avec lesquels on travaille, mais 
sur lesquels on n’écrit pas ("Le retour de la morale (entretien avec Gilles 
Barbedette et André Scala)" 1522).  
 
I would assert that for the contemporary study of poetry, Heidegger is, as 
Foucault opines about his own philosophical development, the “essential” philosopher. 
Heidegger, more than any other modern thinker, sees in poetry the place where Being’s 
truth —not that of Man’s assertive cogito, his accurate perception and verifiable 
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certitude— is established, originating from its house in language. Heidegger’s spiraling 
thinking lodges itself in the heart of Being’s question, daring to repeatedly ask and seek 
answers to the interrogatives Foucault’s writing poses. Although Heidegger’s critics 
observe in his work a turn (Kehre) between Being and Time (1927) and his “Letter on 
Humanism” (1947), the entirety of his works and arguments is dedicated to the 
underlying examination of the being of Being (Inwood 231-32). “The being of Being” is 
a postulate of existence that interrogates the word “is” as the true question that must be 
answered before all others. In Heidegger’s later writings —the period that most interests 
us here— the question of Being is examined in direct conjunction with language, and 
more specifically with poetry, where “one may hear the call of the language that speaks 
of the being of all these beings and respond to it in a mortal language that speaks of what 
it hears” (Hofstadter x). 
Before we turn to Heidegger’s view on poetry and its role in revealing Being, it is 
relevant to recall his evaluation of modern man in relationship to his world and language. 
We find notable parallelism between Heidegger’s discussion of “Enframing” (Gestell) 
and Foucault’s description of the modern episteme. In the chapters that follow, where 
Girri’s and Cadenas’s critique of modern man and his relationship to his reality is 
examined, Heidegger’s perspective will be a complementary to that of Foucault’s 
diagnosis of modernity. Heidegger’s 1954 essay, “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” predates Foucault’s 1966 diagnosis of Man’s manner of forming discourse 
and, through such practices, approaching and understanding his world.  This essay will 
take us to the threshold of the question of Being and poetry. 
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  In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger is concerned with reaching 
a critical comprehension of Western history and thought in the modern age, an era he 
defines as dominated by science and technology. Heidegger discovers the etymological 
and functional roots of technology in the Greek practice of techne, a type of instrumental 
“bringing forth” of things (originally handcraft and art) into unconcealment, not in and of 
themselves and revealed as such to the human being, but through a controlling mastery 
and “fixing” of things, seeking to dominate them and secure them for himself. It is a 
knowledge that seeks mastery over that which rises and comes to presence on its own. 
Techne signals the incipient distancing of man from Being, in action as well as in 
thought; from techne, philosophy learns to approach the things of the world as objects 
that thought should grip and set in order.  
Like Foucault will do later in his epistemic descriptions, Heidegger historicizes 
forms of knowledge, a practice that he terms manners of “revealing Being.” Heidegger 
actually states that “the word techne is linked with the word episteme. Both words are 
names for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in something, 
to understand and be expert in it” ("The Question Concerning Technology" 13). In his 
description of techne, Heidegger points to the Descartes’ “ego cogito ergo sum” as the 
clearest breaking point that heralds the modern age: “Man becomes that being upon 
which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man 
becomes the relational center of that which is as such. But this is possible only when the 
comprehension of what is as a whole changes” ("The Age of the World Picture" 128). 
Modern thought objectifies all that it considers through representation, setting it up 
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before man as subject to be “present at hand” ("The Age of the World Picture" 131). 
Translator and critic William Lovitt comments that: 
Modern technology in its essence is a ‘challenging revealing.’ It involves a 
contending with everything that is. For it ‘sets upon’ everything, imposing upon it 
a demand that seizes and requisitions it for use. Under the dominion of this 
challenging revealing, nothing is allowed to appear as it is in itself (xxix). 
 
Through technology’s representation, all things including life, nature, history and men 
themselves are processed and positioned to be used and controlled as a “standing reserve” 
("The Question Concerning Technology" 17) — a term Heidegger uses to signify that 
which is available to man and ready for his use. Man and his technology reveal Being 
through the configuration of Enframing (Gestell), which is “the gathering together that 
belongs to the setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the 
real, in the mode of ordering as standing- reserve. As the one who is challenged forth in 
this way, man stands within the essential realm of Enframing” ("The Question 
Concerning Technology" 24).  
 Man is an agent: as subject he represents reality as an object to himself in order to 
gain dominion over things and make them available for his use and will. Heidegger 
alleges that Enframing encumbers the revealing of things as they appear in themselves. 
Here Heidegger’s understanding of a “thing” is of great relevance, and for such, I draw 
upon his lecture from the year 1950, “The Thing,” dedicated strictly to its study. 
Heidegger recalls various historical senses of a thing —as an object that is present-at-
hand or put before us, even if it presences only in mental representation; as the sum of 
perceptible qualities; as a bearer of properties; as a form imposed on matter; as a 
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something and not a nothing ("The Thing" 164-67) — all of which he groups together as 
stemming from Western metaphysics. He then argues that things have never shown 
themselves qua things: “the thing as thing remains proscribed, nil, and in that sense 
annihilated. This happened and continues to happen so essentially that not only are things 
no longer admitted as things, but they have never yet at all been able to appear to thinking 
as things” ("The Thing" 168). We will shortly return to Heidegger’s alternative answer to  
“what is a thing?” which proposes a change of assessment, seeing and relationship with 
beings, as this thinking relates directly to poetry’s role. For the moment, it suffices to 
emphasize Heidegger’s prognosis that for man today, the “real” is “taken in such a way 
that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who 
represents and sets forth” ("The Age of the World Picture" 129-30). Under Enframing’s 
dominion, everything exists and appears as though it were man’s making: “It seems as 
though man everywhere and always encounters only himself” ("The Question 
Concerning Technology" 27). Heidegger reads this mode of thought as the culmination of 
Nietzsche’s will to power, which dismantles all transcendental values of society, but 
places Being and beings in the grasp of the individual subject and consciousness where 
their principle meaning rests in serving some end which can be controlled. Girri and 
Cadenas criticize this type of technological thought, especially in the way in which it 
relates to language in its common usage. 
Language, in such a context, is restricted to mere instrumentality, as a tool for 
fixing signification, value and order to things through representation, thus making them 
available for man’s disposal. Subjectivity and man’s domination over the world as his 
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object is anchored in the structure of technological and metaphysical language, grasping 
things as objects through the linguistic sign and rendering them statically present. The 
sign is functional equipment that makes its referential context accessible. Under the hold 
of human subjectivity and Enframing, language is reduced to the role of expressing and 
transmitting man’s thinking, feeling and willing, seen as his faculty and possession 
through reason. Metaphysical representation is the utterance of a subject caught up in the 
calculation of objectivity’s conditions through language. 
 The overwhelming predominance of Enframing makes man oblivious to other 
ways of “revealing” or knowing; the monopoly that technological rationality holds over 
truth-claims and reality, causes man to ignore other experiences, meanings, possibilities 
and truths. We may now observe with greater clarity the similarity of Foucault’s 
description of the modern episteme and Heidegger’s account of Enframing. Both 
philosophers consider the human being’s relationship to his world and knowledge as a 
historical phenomenon — not an intrinsic and inherent attitude and position.  Whereas 
Foucault’s declared historic neutrality is belied by his hopeful tone when speaking of the 
possible death of Man, Heidegger does not couch his description of Enframing in any 
uncertain terms. Heidegger denounces directly the danger of Enframing, and particularly 
man’s unawareness of his own fundamental part in it. William Lovitt writes that: “In this 
‘oblivion’ that blocks the self-manifesting of Being, man’s danger lies. The danger is real 
that every other way of revealing will be driven out and that man will lose his true 
relation to himself and all else” (xxxiv). As I have stated previously, Girri and Cadenas 
seek to go beyond the human being’s experience in what Foucault calls the modern 
 57 
episteme of Man, and what Heidegger refers to as the age of Enframing. Whereas 
Foucault maintains a more aloof distance to the historical phenomena he describes, never 
pronouncing openly his preference for a radical change in the organization of knowledge 
and the human being’s role, Heidegger actively attempts to trace an alternative way of 
approaching the world outside of these conceptual frameworks. Girri’s and Cadenas’s 
writings also embark down such a path —if less systematic—, and Heidegger’s radical 
example will be illuminating in understanding these poets’ projects. 
1.6 THE QUESTION OF BEING 
In defining Enframing, Heidegger never loses sight of the central question around 
which his entire works revolve: that of Being. Enframing is a means of revealing Being 
but in such an overwhelming and rigid fashion that it gives the misconstrued appearance 
of being the only manner in which things come into presence and the single path man’s 
experience can take, to so great an extent that man forgets that he has forgotten Being. 
Heidegger’s lifelong project adopts a series of angles and positions from which to 
approach this most fundamental question of Being. The first of these is an attempt to ask 
the question of Being within the context of the being that is capable of articulating it: 
man.  
In his most canonical work, Being and Time, Heidegger critiques and analyzes 
modern subjectivity and Dasein —Heidegger’s term for human existence as a “Being-
there” or “Being-in-the-world”— which define Dasein’s relationship with and oblivion of 
Being. In Heidegger’s thought, Being is not understood, as it is in metaphysical 
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humanism, as the “‘most general’ being that encompasses all beings or ‘as the product of 
a finite subject’” (Gosetti-Ferencei 40). In Heidegger’s thought, Being is rather the 
happening of truth as unconcealedness. Being is the “isness” of existence and it is this 
“is” that is constantly interrogated by Heidegger. George Steiner articulates the difficulty 
in speaking of Being: it “has at one and the same time an indefinite meaning and an 
overwhelming present one” (50). As neither a “how” or a “what,” Being is first 
approached by Heidegger through its presencing to Dasein, as the one entity capable of 
asking the ontological question of Being by means of questioning his own being (Gelven 
13).  
In Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to think the question and forgotten state of 
Being within the ontic condition of Dasein’s temporality and his state of fallenness 
(Verfallen), through the existential analytic of Dasein. Fallenness is Dasein’s tendency to 
be distracted by the world of beings and their presence, a state of idle stupor, without 
attending to his own Being-there: Dasein is occupied with “idle talk” or empty chatter 
(Gerede), “curiosity” (Neugier) or the incessant fixation with distraction and novelty, and 
“ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit) or a facile and superficial public disclosedness of 
something (Being and Time 210-19). Dasein’s fallenness is his inauthentic mode of 
Being-in-the-world, and Heidegger grounds his study of the ontological in Dasein’s ontic 
existence in time and in a world of other beings, as the horizon or site of Being’s 
disclosure. In accord with critic Gosetti-Ferencei, the forgetting of Being is not solely 
Dasein’s forgetting, but also Being’s withdrawal and concealment, a concept that is 
present in all of Heidegger’s work: “A relationship to Being turns out to have the 
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structure of Beings’s own self-showing: the aletheia-structure [the ontological structure 
of the truth] of unconcealedness and hiddenness” (36). The phenomenological 
appearance of things and Beings is always only partial, and aletheia itself is the structure 
of the presence and absence of truth. 
As was stated previously, Heidegger’s own thinking takes several prominent turns 
(Kehre), the first one being a move away from seeking an understanding of Being 
through the transcendental a priori structures of Dasein, to a disclosure of Being through 
art and particularly poetry. Heidegger arrives at an understanding that poetic language, 
liberated from the binds of logic and Enframing as well as from the metaphysics of 
subjectivity, is the most propitious ground for a thinking of Being. Heidegger emphasizes 
the self-concealing, mysterious and elusiveness of Being and posits art and language as 
the dimensions in which Being’s revealing-concealing duality is made evident, and where 
things and the human being are restored to Being itself. Although Girri and Cadenas do 
not use Heidegger’s very particular vocabulary, their ideas commune with those of 
Heidegger’s in seeing in poetry an opening for the thinking of what is as presence and 
absence. 
Art and poetry in particular are, for Heidegger, the privileged spaces for Being to 
be experienced. Unlike modern techne as technicity, which functions as a reductive 
totalization of that which is revealed for man’s use as equipment, art and poetry are a 
form of deconcealing in which the work of art is a self-sufficient, autonomous presence, 
although created by the human hand. Beyond the circumstances and processes of its 
genesis, the work is self-subsistent and its most prominent feature is that it is rather than 
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it is not (Heidegger "The Origin of the Work of Art" 63). The nature of art is defined by 
Heidegger as “the truth of beings setting itself to work” where “to set” means to “stand in 
the light of its being” ("The Origin of the Work of Art" 35). Art is not mimesis but the 
bringing to light of things by making them show in the founding of truth, understood as a 
bestowing, grounding and beginning. Hans-Georg Gadamer clarifies this concept of 
beings “standing-in-themselves” when he writes: 
What Heidegger means can be confirmed by everyone: the existing thing does not 
simply offer us a recognizable and familiar surface contour; it also has an inner 
depth of self-sufficiency that Heidegger calls ‘standing-in-itself.’ The complete 
unhiddenness of all beings, their total objectification (by means of a 
representation that conceives things in their perfect state) would negate this 
standing-in-itself of beings and lead to a total leveling of them. […] In the work 
of art, we experience an absolute opposition to this will-to-control, not in the 
sense of a rigid resistance to the presumption of our will, which is bent on 
utilizing things, but in the sense of the superior and intrusive power of a being 
reposing in itself. Hence the closedness and concealment of the work of art is the 
guarantee of the universal thesis of Heidegger’s philosophy, namely, that beings 
hold themselves back by coming forward into the openness of presence. The 
standing-in-itself of the work of art betokens at the same time the standing-in-
itself of beings in general (226-27). 
 
A thing, when understood outside of its customary status as object through 
representative thought, is for Heidegger a self-sustained and self-supporting presence that 
comes into its own being always in relationship, and in the gathering and mutual 
belonging of the “fourfold” in the “onefold,” which is the world. The “fourfold” is a 
poetic and difficult way of understanding the world outside of the conceptual framework 
of Gestell and its subsequent derivation of subject-object. The “fourfold” is not a concept 
that can be grasped or explained; Heidegger describes it as the mirror-play (Spiegel-Spiel) 
of four elements —earth, sky, divinities and mortals— which are betrothed to each other 
 61 
and freely appropriate each other and are joined to form the “world.” It is only in the 
thing understood as a thing, that these four are in free play that “sets each of the four free 
into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their essential being toward 
one another” ("The Thing" 177). The fourfold’s belonging together is made evident in the 
thing, as the point of intersection of their mirror-play. The thing itself is left in its mystery 
as that which gathers and unites the fourfold as the world. In fact, the gathering of the 
four in staying is called the “thinging of the thing,” and that event is what allows the 
world, as the unitary “onefold” of that “fourfold” to come into its own.  
Heidegger’s preferred example of a thing is a jug whose jug-character is shown to 
be its void which allows for the gathering of drink and its outpouring: a drink which is 
given by sky and earth betrothed and poured out for mortals as a libation or consecrated 
gift to the gods. Heidegger’s very poetic thought seeks to recall the mutual belonging and 
entrusting of all elements to each other —the onefold which is also the world— that is 
unconcealed through the presencing of the jug as thing ("The Thing" 170-73). It should 
be stressed that Heidegger does not seek to grasp the thing in any definition, but rather to 
recall and respond in wonder to the thing’s gathering and uniting of the fourfold. 
Heidegger warns that things do not appear by means of human making or representation, 
but at the same time, that they cannot presence without the vigilance of mortals (“The 
Thing” 179).   
The presencing of things as things in this new sense is made possible in large part 
because of art and poetry. As we may recall from before, Heidegger writes of art’s nature 
as the “truth of beings setting itself to work.” Truth, for Heidegger, is approached over 
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time in different manners that can be seen as complementary. In “The Origin of the Work 
of Art,” truth refers to the “opening up, clearing, lighting, the self-showing of beings in 
overtness.” This self-showing is not for the human being’s perception, will and 
understanding but is the being’s own way of being present. Later, in “…Poetically Man 
Dwells,” Heidegger returns to the problem of truth as the “rightness and fitness by which 
beings belong to one another” (Hofstadter xx). This evolution of the Heidegger’s thought 
about truth signals the fourfold, and each element’s own way of existing in belonging in 
mutual appropriation to the others. The open and light interplay of the fourfold is truth as 
the “disclosure of appropriation,” which indicates the dance of being as a light, easy, 
open appropriation of all things which, in this relationship, brings them into the light of 
their own. In much of Girri’s and Cadenas’s writing as well, poetry will attempt to afford 
a way of approaching things that sets them in their own being and belonging. Girri writes 
in El motivo es el poema: “Que el poema refleje las cosas con la espontaneidad que 
ostentan al aparecérsenos” (75) and Cadenas, in this same vein writes a brief poem, 
“Flor” which simply reads: “Desde qué profundidad surges/ como llama/ para 
esconderla” ("Memorial" 231). 
 Art and poetry are where the truth of beings and things is set into work. The 
following summarizing statement of critic Dilip Naik should make more sense now when 
he states that “Being as setting-free and letting-be allows the thing to appear. Then, and 
only then, can we properly say that the thing is” (46). The place where this occurs is in art 
and poetry, and the event of or happening of this disclosure is given the name of Ereignis, 
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a topography of the historical disclosure and withdrawal of Being. Das Ereignis is the 
event of the fourfold: 
The mutual lighting-up, reflecting, eräugnen, is at the same time the mutual 
belonging, appropriating, ereignen; and conversely, the happening, das Ereignis, 
by which alone the meaning of Being can be determined, is this play of eräugnen 
and ereignen (Hofstadter xx). 
 
The event of disclosing allows each thing to be and to presence in openness. The work of 
art and the poem open the place for things to find their full, mysterious, appropriate 
dimension in the belonging together of the fourfold in one, and make this happening 
pertinent to man. Art lets beings be in their imminent “thereness,” as present presence. 
1.7 THE HOUSE OF BEING  
 Within the arts, poetry holds a privileged position, because language in its 
fullness—not referring to its predominantly current state of being unattended and worn 
out, used up, employed for empty communication, possessive representation or idle 
chatter— is called by Heidegger the “house of Being” ("What Are Poets For?" 129) and 
its saying is the “flowering of Being” (Heidegger "A Dialogue on Language"). Language 
is not, for Heidegger, a fixed, objective construct or system of signs and ciphers in which 
a thing called Being is posited and possessed by a subject. The “house” in which Being is 
sheltered is the precinct of the absent gods. Dilip Naik explains that  
The temple is not the god. It does not ‘have’ the god. It only makes way to his 
presence precisely by not making him present in anything that is presently 
available […] Language is the house of Being in that it calls to the presence of 
Being, a presence which is not the presence of something readily present, but a 
presence sheltered by and in absence (19). 
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As the “house of Being,” language and the word give Being as a promise in its 
showing of the “isness” of things. For Heidegger, language is a revelatory blossoming of 
Being in that the word is the closest to Being’s truth: it reveals Being’s nature as the 
unconcealment of concealment, which is at the heart of things themselves. The poetic 
word grants things their “thingness” of mutual appropriation and belonging, at the same 
time as it demonstrates their mysterious and ungraspable essence. In a parallel manner, 
Being itself is always shown in a dual play: in the presencing of beings, Being itself 
withdraws to allow their presence. The word is of this same nature:  
The word is not, properly speaking, because it would signify totally, present its 
transparent sense without obstacles, but because, cut off, it remains open to… 
(The ellipses mark what remains to be said.) The word is dedicated, promised, and 
yet, in this promise, nothing else promises itself, neither the kingdom of Being nor 
that of God —nothing but the promise (Froment-Meurice 74). 
  
Being is brought to word in language for it renders apparent the impossibility of 
its absolute univocity. Whereas language as technicity requires a totalizing, controlling 
and exhaustive revealing, the poetic word allows things to be brought into presence 
without requiring them to be fully present (Gosetti-Ferencei 59). This idea resonates fully 
in Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetry and essays, and the following chapters will dedicate 
space to exploring how each poet conceives of the poetic word. In Heidegger, this word 
is a saying in which “[l]anguage speaks as the peal of stillness” (Heidegger "Language"), 
maintaining in its center the unsaid, the silent, that which remains concealed. If language 
is understood as aletheia or unconcealment, it nevertheless streams —much like the 
Greek river— from concealment (lethe) and is forever inseparable from mystery and the 
unsaid. Stillness is not simply the absence or negation of sound, but as critic Gerald L. 
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Bruns writes, it is a plenitude “not in the metaphysical sense of a totality in which 
everything is contained (in place), but in the sense of a palpability for which there is no 
determinate object” (94). Stillness’s peal is the calling of the world and the thing into 
their own as self-disclosure within the nearness of the fourfold. The round mirror dance 
of earth, sky, gods and mortals is the peal of silence and is what language speaks.   
We can briefly refer to the first verses of Cadenas’s poem “Rilke” to glimpse the 
accord between Heidegger’s thought with that of our poets. In this poem, things are given 
to themselves in their proper and mysterious exactitude an existence that is not fixed, but 
one of “happening” through silence: 
Las cosas supieron, más que los hombres, 
de su mirada  
a la que se abrían 
para otra existencia. 
Él las acogía transformándolas 
en lo que eran, devolviéndolas a su exactitud, 
bañándolas en su propio oro, 
pues ¿qué sabe de su regia condición 
lo que se entrega? 
 
Piedras, flores, nubes 
renacían 
en otro silencio 
para un distinto transcurrir (“Gestiones” 443).  
 
For Heidegger, language is essentially poetry, and the essential being of poetry is 
a saying as showing, a letting appear in the open. Everyday language is not 
fundamentally different than poetry, nor is poetry a higher mode of everyday speech. It is 
simply that poetic language, unlike that of daily use, still resounds and responds to the 
peal of stillness, Heidegger specifies that “we are to think of the nature of poetry as a 
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letting-dwell, as a —perhaps even the— distinctive kind of building” ("...Poetically Man 
Dwells..." 213). Poetic “building” is not conceived as man’s mastering and shaping of 
language to become his means of expression through a poetic formula or a knowledge of 
poetic speaking. For Heidegger, there is the disbandment of the idea of agency in poetry: 
For, strictly, it is language that speaks. Man first speaks when, and only when, he 
responds to language by listening to its appeal […] But the responding in which 
man authentically listens to the appeal of language is that which speaks in the 
element of poetry. The more poetic a poet is —the freer (that is, the more open 
and ready for the unforeseen) his saying— the greater is the purity with which he 
submits what he says to an ever more painstaking listening, and the further what 
he says is from the mere propositional statement ("...Poetically Man Dwells..." 
213). 
 
The human being’s relation to language is one of listening, not that of speaking subjects. 
What should be noted as well, as Gerald Bruns observes, is Heidegger’s radical statement 
that “The peal of stillness is not anything human” (Heidegger "Language"). Language is 
not human in its essence or provenance; it seems simply to occur, to issue forth and 
places a claim on man, to which he responds, answers and accepts through listening. 
Listening and speaking are intrinsically linked together, and that speaking that listens is 
the human answer and acceptance of language’s claim and call. When the human being 
speaks as a listening to language, his is a saying that speaks what has been heard. Girri 
writes of the experience of poetry as an austerity of the individual and subject, when the 
poet is an instrument who listens: “El tránsito en que aquello de ‘el ritmo de lo escrito es 
el ritmo del que escribe’ caduca, y a partir de allí no se escuchará sino el ritmo del 
poema” ("El motivo es el poema" 69). 
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Language is not given to man as a tool for rational cognition and apprehension of 
knowledge, but rather as something that he experiences. Man is a privileged listener or 
custodian who submits himself in attentive awareness and openness to the summons that 
the voiceless peal of language addresses to him. The human being —or mortal, as 
Heidegger refers to man in his idea of the fourfold— alone is the medium and the 
permeable locus that opens as the place of disclosure for language and of things. 
Liberated of the language of dominating humanism and will, the human being is but a 
clearing, an open space for Being to speak in language. The mortal’s proper relationship 
with language is one of attentiveness but also of renunciation. In poetry, language makes 
present things in their thingness, but it can only do so in guarding silence and stillness 
within words. Poetic language draws one up to the rift where words themselves fail and 
abdicate their power of plenitude in presence, letting things be without seeking to 
overcome them. In poetry, language resists keeping things under control, and the naming 
of things in poetry preserves that which “cannot be subsumed or assimilated into our 
orders of signification” (Bruns); language in this sense cannot be made ready at hand 
through signs, propositions or conceptual systems which can structure discourse. For the 
human being, to experience language is for the subject to be divested of itself and all that 
pertains to it, to be left open as an ear to be possessed, appropriated by a silent call. The 
peal of silence appropriates mortals and allows them to appropriate earth, sky and gods 
—not in the sense of subjective possession over objects— but as a figure in a play, which 
he does not determine and to which he is expropriated. 
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To be a poet involves a loss of subjectivity that does not signify self-annihilation, 
but rather a belonging to the peal of silence and to the round dance of the fourfold. The 
poet renounces subjectivity and his consequent place in the center of Enframing. Man is 
not eliminated, but reappropriated to his world through his open attention to it. This state 
of attentive disposition —in which the metaphysical “I” as the locus of thought and 
knowledge is overcome— is very dear to both Girri and Cadenas, and it is reiterated as 
the condition necessary for the writing of poetry.  Girri recalls Keats’s experience of 
writing as a stripping oneself of a fixed identity: “despojarse, mientras el poema progresa 
(esto a expensas de aquello), de los incontables yoes que en él conviven, y cuya fase 
última, el sentimiento de nulidad, coincidiría con la culminación del poema” (“El motivo 
es el poema” 71). In various poems, like this brief one, Cadenas extols the appropriate 
posture of the human being: “Atención/ redoma hechizada,/ néctar de estar presente” 
(“Memorial” 246). For Heidegger as well, this is mortals’ mode of being appropriate to 
the world, and the poet’s saying is the ultimate manner of coming into our own. 
Heidegger writes:  
The encountering saying of mortals is answering. Every word spoken is already 
an answer: counter-saying, coming to the encounter, listening Saying. When 
mortals are made appropriate for Saying, human nature is released into that 
needfulness out of which man is used up for bringing soundless Saying to the 
sound of language ("The Way to Language" 129). 
 
By saying and bringing language to voice, the poet moves along a path that creates an 
open space where the world, in its four parts are set free and allowed to be. Truth is set 
into work in poetry, in the sense that mortal saying freely sets the world and beings into 
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presence and brings what is absent into absence. The truth of poetic saying is an event 
(Ereignis) in which everything, including man, comes into its own.  
 One can summarize Heidegger’s understanding of poetry with the term 
Gelassenheit, the letting-be of things as a letting-go of representational thought and 
subjective will. Gelassenheit is a reverent and quiet sheltering which attends things in 
their mysterious and ungraspable self-unfolding, outside of Gestell and technological 
enframing. Poetic dwelling and living in the open allows thought to be set free, avoiding 
completely the attempt to reduce the Other to the Same by allowing the human being to 
abide in the mysterious company of the other through language’s saying of that which is 
withdrawn. Poetry does not, for Girri, Cadenas or Heidegger (especially the Heidegger of 
the 1950s-1960s) restore man to a lost utopian paradise. Rather it simply allows man to 
dwell on the earth, in the company of others in a way other than through representation, 
calculation, sense-making and domination. The poem gives a new direction to thought 
where there is a release of traditional metaphysical notions of the subject and object to 
come to a dwelling of care, listening and preserving of that which is other but to which 
one is expropriated and through which one comes into ones own.  
Through examining Heidegger’s approach to poetry, we have come to a possible 
understanding of what Foucault may have glimpsed as that which could succeed the 
death of Man. Heidegger’s understanding of Being, moves the human being outside of 
the center of knowledge and welcomes him —but not as subject— to dwell and belong in 
the world. In art and poetry, Heidegger encounters a method of setting this new 
knowledge to work experientially. To resituate the human being in relationship to Being 
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in both presence and withdrawal is a radical turn from the posture of Enframing or the 
structure of knowledge edified by Man that Foucault describes. Such an approach to the 
human being, his relationship to the world and language may seem to some readers to be 
fanciful, foreign and a conundrum for cognition. With locutions like “the thing things” or 
the “fourfold,” Heidegger asks us to let go of definitions, dominance, and disposal of 
these traditionally called “others” and to let them —and ourselves— be. This approach to 
the human being, language, knowledge and the world will facilitate our reading of Girri’s 
and Cadenas’s works, for both authors articulate similar positions.  
1.8 THE EASTERN SLOPE  
Where Heidegger’s notions about language, about the “poetic open” and the idea 
of Gelassenheit as a letting-be and setting-free challenge traditional Western thought, it 
finds uncanny resonance and parallels with various philosophical traditions of Eastern 
Asia, particularly Taoism and Zen Buddhism. To bring this discussion full circle, it is 
notable that both Girri and Cadenas were consistent readers of Taoist and Zen texts, as 
well as the works of Jiddhu Krishnamurthi.  Girri and Cadenas directly reflect on their 
readings of Eastern philosophy and religion in both their poetic and essayistic works. 
These Oriental texts enhance our poets’ perspective, and offer a means of exploring ideas 
such as the reduction and elimination of the subject, the adoption of a state of open and 
present attentiveness, the coexistence of opposites within ambiguity and reconciliation, 
and the role of silence, the void and nothingness. 
 71 
 Many of these topics should already seem familiar from Heidegger, and it is in the 
company of this philosopher that we will approach several prominent ideas taken from 
both Taoist and Zen (Ch’an) Buddhist traditions that appear in the writings of Girri and 
Cadenas. This turn to Eastern traditions is coherent within the philosophical framework 
thus far examined. In seeking to move beyond the episteme of Man and the structure of 
Enframing, both Foucault and Heidegger see in non-Western philosophical experiences a 
way to distance themselves from traditional metaphysics of the subject, a fundamental 
concern in Girri’s and Cadenas’s poetry.  
In dialogue with a Japanese Zen monk, Omori Sogen, in Uenohara, Foucault 
comments about the “current crisis of Western thought” and the possibility of finding a 
new path “en confrontant la pensée occidentale avec la pensée de l’Orient” and he adds 
“Ainsi, si une philosophie de l’avenir existe, elle doit naître en dehors de l’Europe ou 
bien elle doit naître en conséquence de rencontres et de percussions entre l’Europe et la 
non-Europe” ("Michel Foucault et le zen: un séjour dans un temple zen" 622-23). In this 
same occasion, Foucault highlights what he sees to be most important about Zen “mystic” 
practices: the goal of the attenuation of the individual — the same figure that edifies the 
modern episteme. As Uta Liebmann Schaub demonstrates, Foucault’s discussion of a 
new literary language, where the individual as Man disappears, finds its parallels in 
Oriental texts. She writes that “This new language would be” and here she quotes 
Foucault, “‘the exact reversal of the movement which has sustained the wisdom of the 
West at least since the time of Socrates’” (313). It seems clear that Foucault’s 
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anticipation of an arrangement of knowledge beyond Man, would draw at least in part 
from Eastern thought. 
In Heidegger’s works, Oriental texts and concepts play even a more prominent 
role. With Taiwanese philosopher Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, Heidegger translated into German 
eight chapters concerning the tao of the Tao Te Ching of Lao-tzu, one of the most 
important Taoist texts (Hsiao 97). Hsiao asserts that this experience exerted a “significant 
influence on Heidegger” (98) and that much of what Heidegger later “‘brought to 
language’ has frequently been said in the thinking of the Far East” (94). Although he was 
reticent to speak openly about his familiarity with East Asian ideas and his sources7, 
various studies have demonstrated that Heidegger was already familiar with German 
translations of Lao-Tse and Zen texts as early as his writing of Being and Time.  
Heidegger also shared dialogues with various prominent Japanese philosophers —
Kuki Shuzo (the author of the first book-length study on Heidegger), Yamanouchi 
Tokuryu, Miki Kiyoshi, Tanabe Hajime (the “founder” of the Kyoto School) and Daisetz 
Teitaro Suzuki (Zen’s chief exponent in English). Most well-known by readers of 
Heidegger is his 1954 “dialogue”8 with a Japanese professor of German literature, 
Tezuka Tomio, “From a Conversation on Language: Between a Japanese and an 
                                                
7 See Graham Parkes’ complementary essay “Rising Sun Over Black Forest: Heidegger’s Japanese 
Connections” included in Reinhard May’s book Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His 
Work. Trans. Graham Parkes. 1996. New York: Routledge, 79-117. 
8 I write the word “dialogue” within quotes, because as Reinhard May has demonstrated in the work cited 
above, most of the words attributed to the “Japanese” are in fact comments of Heidegger’s own authorship, 
and several of the topics “discussed” were, in fact, never touched upon in conversation. May has textually 
compared Heidegger’s published version of this “dialogue” and Professor Tomio’s detailed account of their 
conversation, finding large discrepancies in their recollection of their dialogue. In addition, May has 
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Inquirer,” published in 1959. Here, Heidegger asks about the Japanese characters for the 
word language (kotoba) and the meaning of the Japanese word iki, which in the dialogue 
get translated as “grace.” The explanations given coincide with Heidegger’s thoughts 
about language and the grace and stillness from which language speaks. Precisely 
because of the apocryphal nature of many of the “Japanese’s” explanations, this 
“conversation” is revealing in that it demonstrates Heidegger’s independent knowledge of 
Taoist and Zen Buddhist texts — the sources he used to craft the answers he attributed to 
the Japanese professor.  
Many articles have been written about what seems to be the rich “sympathetic 
resonances” (Parkes "Rising Sun Over Black Forest: Heidegger's Japanese Connections") 
between Heidegger’s ideas and East Asian thought, ranging from parallels with Vedanta 
to modern Japanese philosophy, in particular that of the Kyoto School9. For the purposes 
of this study, these observations are pertinent in the measure that Heidegger —whose 
philosophical view of poetry, language, things and the human being’s role beyond that of 
subject is perhaps the most radical attempt within the Western tradition to open a new 
mode of thinking— seems to draw much of his inspiration from far Eastern philosophical 
traditions. Critics like John Steffney, see Heidegger’s later works as a path of thought that 
closely approximates certain East Asian ideas, but are still less “radical” than the 
complete transcendence of all dualities that is posited at the center of Zen and Taoist 
beliefs (324).  Alberto Girri and Rafael Cadenas, as is clearly observable from their 
                                                                                                                                            
identified the Taoist and Zen sources that “inspired” many of the words that Heidegger wrote as having 
been spoken by his Japanese visitor. 
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poetic and essayistic works, find important stimulation in Taoist and Zen texts for 
proposing “radical” alternative approaches to understanding the poetic act, the role of the 
subject and the type of knowledge proportioned through poetry. The following 
examination of several key notions from both traditions will be the last step in completing 
the constellation of concepts that will be drawn upon in the analysis of both poets’ works. 
In order to build on the ground already established, when outlining certain Taoist and Zen 
concepts, the parallels found in Heidegger’s thought will be recalled. Due to the scope of 
this study, only those ideas that resonate most clearly in Girri’s and Cadenas’s works will 
be examined: 1) the underlying unity of all 2) the dispossession of the self; 3) the concept 
of the empty and silence; 4) the state of present presence; 5) satori or sudden 
illumination. 
1.9 THE UNNAMABLE WAY 
We will begin with a few ideas that are central to Taoism, an ancient body of 
knowledge whose multifaceted teachings touch on almost all aspects of life, from warfare 
to literature. The most important classic Taoists texts are undoubtedly the I Ching or 
Book of Changes (a text composed in China probably during the 12th century B.C. 
attributed principally by Wen Wang and used for divination), the Lao-tzu or Tao-te Ching 
(a compilation of highly condensed teachings and insights originally intended for a ruler, 
dating from around 500 B.C., and traditionally attributed to Lao-tzu), and the Chuang-tzu 
(a monument of Chinese literature from the 4th – 3rd century B.C. that offers a philosophy 
                                                                                                                                            
9 See the volume edited by Graham Parkes: Heidegger and Asian Thought. 1987. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P.  
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for private life and seems to illustrate metaphorically the Lao-tzu) (I-ming vii-xix). Other 
major Taoists texts, such as the Huai-nan-tzu, the Pao-p’u-tzu and the Lieh-tzu, have not 
been as widely disseminated or translated. As the basis of Taoist religious and 
philosophical ideas, we will primarily consider elements of the Tao-te Ching. 
Girri and Cadenas write poems that refer directly to the idea of tao, so it is here 
that we will begin. In very simple terms, tao, from which Taoism takes its name, is 
generally translated to mean the “Way,” path, course, as in the course of nature or the 
flow of water. As Jonathan Star signals, the word can be both noun or verb: “It can 
represent the substance of the entire universe and the process by which the universe 
functions” (Star 272). Tao is beyond all description, and even if it overwhelms human 
comprehension, language and thought, it seems to admit a speakable aspect: 
 Tao is both Named and Nameless 
 As Nameless, it is the origin of all things 
 As Named, it is the mother of all things (L. Tzu 14) 
Tao connotes the unchanging, absolute potentiality that exists before any thing can come 
into being and simultaneously the impermanent, dynamic world that flows from it. Tao 
has been described as the region where the world of nonbeing (or the reality that is not 
finite or determinate) comes to relate to the world of that which is determinate, 
individuated and there. Non-being does not have a negative charge; the nothingness or 
void with which it is associated is simply the non-manifestation of perceptible qualities 
and the harboring of all possibilities. The functioning of tao is the “so of itself” that 
comes into being spontaneously on its own accord. It can be thought of as the “is-ness” of 
all existence, things, forces, orders and rhythms.  Lao-tzu writes in verse 34: 
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 The great Tao flows everywhere 
 It fills everything to the left 
 and to the right […] 
 It brings all things to completion 
without their even knowing it (L. Tzu 47) 
Tao is the movement of non-being to being. Being brings phenomena into 
presence through the process of differentiation from that which is hidden in the mystery 
of the same. Jeaneane Fowler’s description of tao is helpful in summarizing the 
characteristics mentioned above: 
The source of all creation, then, is the mysterious depth and darkness of Tao. 
There are no distinctions between this and that or even between Non-Being and 
Being, or non-existence and existence. It is the potential for all things and that to 
which all things will return — the utter silence of the primordial Void. It is 
cosmic totality, Void or chaos (hun-tun/ hundun) that projects itself outward to 
form the whole of the universe and then reverts back to chaotic completeness. In 
this sense Tao is beyond One, beyond unity, but always present throughout all 
creation, “deep and always enduring” (110). 
 
The above descriptions may resonate with certain ideas developed within the 
discussion of Heidegger’s thoughts about language and Being. Heidegger, in fact, writes 
often of “way-making,” as early as Being and Time, and the idea is later developed in 
works such as Woodpaths, On the Way to Language and The Fieldpath (Fowler 79). This 
idea of tao in Heiddeger, according to Reinhard May, is associated with that region or 
“freeing ‘clearing [Nothing], in which what is illumined reaches the Open [das Feie, 
Nothing] together with what conceals itself [Being]’” (39). The tao’s simultaneous 
revealing and concealing of being and non-being reminds us of Heidegger’s description 
of language. Joan Sambaugh writes: “This is not exactly Heidegger’s language, but surely 
the true spirit of his thought” (90).  
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Although it would be erroneous to try to equate Heidegger’s understanding of 
language and the central notion of tao, in approaching Girri’s and Cadenas’s works, I 
would venture that such a pairing is not far-fetched. Neither poet seeks to systematize 
their thought in an over-arching structure nor do they adopt or endorse that of any 
particular religion or philosopher. However, both do strive to reach an understanding of 
reality and literature from an angle other than that of traditional metaphysics of the 
subject. Heidegger’s experience of Being through language and the experience of tao as 
that which flows spontaneously as the dynamic, myriad of things of existence and their 
essential unity, leave no room for Man as subject, creator of order and articulator of truth. 
We have already discussed this dimension in relation with Heidegger, and we will now 
turn to a brief examination of the idea of the subject in how it relates to Taoism. This will 
allow us an even greater understanding of verses such as these by Cadenas: “No soy lo 
que llevo/ sino el recipiente./ Lugar de la presencia,/ lugar del vacío” (Memorial 236); or 
these by Girri: “… aun muriendo/ no perezco, soy, tengo,/ estoy en el Camino” (El ojo 
32).  
In Taoism, all creation is conceived as a cosmic force that radiates beyond itself 
into the vast multiplicity of forms. Essentially, all reality is also that center of non-
differentiation and non-duality. Tao holds the unformed potentiality of all the world’s 
manifestations as well as all of the realized forms, and is considered to be even beyond 
and prior to the idea of the One. All is tao, which underpins everything, relates them 
together and makes them belong: “At the great Origin there was nothing, nothing, no 
name./ The One arose from it; there was One without form./ In taking different forms, it 
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brought life […] / Before any shape was given, their roles were assigned,/ varied and 
diverse but all linked to one another” (Palmer 97). The human being, as one of the 
differentiated elements of the creation, is limited in his experience of reality as subject or 
individual consciousness. Taoism calls the wise to seek a different experiential 
knowledge of what is through the following recommendation: “the ‘I’ of the self has to 
lose its ‘me’” (Fowler 115). 
The abandonment of the “me” of the self allows one to reach a point of 
equilibrium, a resting state of emptiness and stillness. Each entity continues to maintain 
its innate nature, but sitting in forgetfulness of its individuation, one becomes a mirror 
that reflects the flow of existence and its underpinning unity: “Where ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
cease to be opposites, there lies the pivot of the Way. Only when the pivot is located in 
the center of the circle of things can we respond to their infinite transformations” (Mair 
15). The ego abandoned, there is no attachment to this or that, for the empty self contains 
all and none: In the Chuang-tzu it is written: 
 The heart of the wise man is tranquil. 
 It is the mirror of heaven and earth 
 The glass of everything. 
Emptiness, stillness, tranquility, tastelessness, 
Silence, non-action: this is the level of heaven and earth. 
 This is the perfect Tao. Wise men find here 
Their resting place. 
Resting, they are empty (Merton 80). 
 
The human being who is empty, still and at rest is in “correct” living, or “te,” in accord 
with the tao. In this state, human action and being are able to experience tao both through 
all beings and that which is not manifest. Tao is not something that is acquired, for it is 
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ever-present in all that is and is not. However, te refers to the expression and experience 
of tao, of its operation through one particular form of tao (Star 260). Te is action, thought 
and being that is cultivated to allow the creative power of tao to manifest in its 
naturalness and spontaneity of endless transformations — even as this means from life to 
death. 
Te entails following the principle of wu-wei, which in general terms means “not 
acting,” not in the sense of inactivity, but rather as action that is carried out through non-
assertion, without the interference of the will. Through wu-wei, human action and thought 
are free of selfish, controlling constraints and conditions and naturally correspond to the 
movement of tao. Wu-wei and te rely on a quiet, watchful listening and seeing that is 
receptive, effortless and non-interfering. To adopt this mode of being is to allow oneself 
to wander without purpose, and in complete detachment and forgetfulness of results. Wu-
wei is the antipode of the current Western forms of knowing and being, as described by 
Foucault’s analysis of the modern episteme of Man or Heidegger’s Enframing. 
It implies a posture of openness, responsiveness and suppleness in which the 
human being is more like an empty vessel —a metaphor which was already examined in 
Heidegger’s writing in connection to the proper understanding of a “thing,” and which 
also appears in the poetry of Girri and Cadenas. The Lao-tzu reads: “Clay is molded to 
form a cup/ yet only the space within/ allows the cup to hold water” (L. Tzu 24). In 
Taoism, the mind emptied and freed of desire erects no obstruction or distraction to the 
acting of tao through him. The human truly comes into his own through emptiness or 
silence, as a receptive being in harmony with the rest of existence. This in no way implies 
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the annihilation of the human being, a negation of his existence or the fundamental 
questioning of his belonging within reality. Rather this “emptiness” is of the possessive 
“me” and the realization of man’s complete potential and his place in the natural order. In 
a similar fashion, the human being is called to occupy a place in Heidegger’s fourfold 
mirror play with the earth, sky and gods.  
The “empty” is often described in Girri’s and Cadenas’s works as a type of 
hearing —similar to what Heidegger described as that attentive listening which 
constitutes the proper function of the poet— or a type of mirror-like seeing. The eye, 
untainted by the subject’s limitations, desires and preconceived notions, acts a neutral 
mirror that gathers in its gaze all things equally.  In his typical epigrammatic style, 
Cadenas offers this poem: “¿Qué hago/ yo detrás de los ojos?” (Memorial 261). The self 
as subject (“yo”) is not only not needed, but also constitutes the impediment for 
“authentic” seeing and living, in which the self is “possessed” by being and reality. 
Another poem by Cadenas thus reads: “Sé/ que si no llego a ser nadie/ habré perdido mi 
vida” (Memorial 249). The self discovers its truest role through the dispossession of its 
own parameters and the openness to the creation and to what is to be created. Girri’s 
poem entitled “Cuando la idea del yo se aleja” describes how, when the body (“blando 
organismo”) no longer knows how to say “Yo soy,” the self finally reaches a new 
understanding that is not tied to “enfermedad y muerte,/ vejez y nacimiento” ("El ojo" 
46). Although this may prove an unachievable ideal, when the traditional idea of the self 
is overcome, Girri ventures that the emptiness or “vacío” that will occupy its place will 
allow a radically different type of thought: “ni sin, ni con, ni dentro,/ ni en el medio,/ 
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vacío sin dualismos, oquedad,/ sin uno y dos” (“A lo que el mirar con atención revela” El 
ojo 87). 
The Taoist idea of the “empty” offers Girri and Cadenas a model for a type of 
knowledge, made possible through the poem, that escapes the parameters of Western 
metaphysical thought. Girri describes his ideal for poetry in El motivo es el poema as:  
Poemas (proyectos), como la imagen del círculo que empieza y concluye 
en sí mismo. Lo que todo poema quisiera tener de mandálico: soporte para la 
meditación y soporte para el éxtasis. 
La figura circular, emblema de lo muy lleno y muy vacío, resultante 
(merced al desarrollo dentro del poema) de un ciclo ("El motivo es el poema" 
275-76). 
 
For Girri and Cadenas, poetry is not embraced as the expression of man’s self-projection, 
but as an independent manifestation of being that maintains in its center the silence and 
emptiness from which language was brought to presence. Girri elaborates on this point in 
the same book: “El poema responderá, entonces, a la necesidad de que el lenguaje sea 
encarnado. Y, al mismo tiempo, nunca reunirá todos los elementos. Algo o mucho 
quedará fuera; de allí el poema que nace” (277). Language “incarnates,” as Heidegger 
also wished to demonstrate, the double nature of “that which is” as revelation and 
concealment, be it called “Being,” in Heideggerian terms, or tao. The poem is born of 
that which remains outside, unarticulated and silent. Its speaking is ambiguous in that its 
own center remains empty, and by that virtue convokes the undifferentiated whole from 
which it arose. As a type of “mandala,” the poem is a representation of reality and 
universal forces. By reading the poem, one “enters” the mandala and arrives at its center 
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from which, it is traditionally understood, emanate the processes of disintegration and 
reintegration.  
 At the center of tao is a fundamental ambiguity that allows for simultaneous 
arriving and departing, being and nonbeing. Taoism understands the universe as 
constantly changing and pulsating from unity into plurality and back again. There are no 
static, “fixed,” or idealized identities, as everything is continuously being transformed 
and reshaped. In addition, all labels meant to designate, classify and determine the 
“identity” of something inevitably fail because their intelligibility is always only 
correlative, as is written in the Chuang-tzu: “Can a man cling to the positive/ Without any 
negative/ In contrast to which it is seen/ To be positive?” (Merton 88). Words cannot be 
fixed, unequivocal values that “translate” reality “objectively.”  
This brings us to a fundamental paradox at the center of the practice of poetry and 
the writing of philosophical texts about tao. Through language, Girri and Cadenas seek a 
more authentic understanding of their reality and their place within it. Their poems circle 
around an intuition that displaces themselves as subjects, speakers and generators of 
language: one of silence, of stillness, of quietude. Any attempt to articulate such a state, 
however, automatically restricts this original experience. Both Taoist texts and Girri’s 
and Cadenas’s poetry attempt to use words as a way to facilitate a fresh way of observing 
and approaching the world so that this silence and original unity is made present in all 
that is experienced. However, to literally create silence and to name the unnamed is a task 
that will inevitably fail. For this reason, the opening verses of the Lao-tzu are eloquent in 
highlighting this conundrum: “A way that can be walked/ is not the Way/ A name that 
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can be named/ is not the Name” (L. Tzu 14). Nevertheless, Taoist masters did not remain 
silent, but wrote their words around this ineluctable caveat. And similarly, Girri and 
Cadenas persisted in the path of poetry despite the sense that their ultimate goal would 
forever be unattainable. Girri aptly sums up this realization in the last verses of his poem, 
“Imaginar un lenguaje” when he writes: “y la intuición/ de cómo el que pesa, arroja, mide 
la piedra/ puede equivocarse, suele errar/ y yerra con frecuencia,/ suele/ transformar y 
expresar la piedra/ en una mentira” ("Casa de la mente" 121). 
1.10 ZEN 
This mistrust of language brings us to the second Eastern religious and 
philosophical tradition that informs certain aspects of Girri’s and Cadenas’s writing and 
was also influential in Heidegger’s views of man’s being in relation to other things10. 
Zen—also known as Ch’an, in the Chinese— is a branch of Mahayana (Greater Vehicle) 
Buddhism that originated in China in the 6th century, with the arrival of the first patriarch 
of Bodhidahrma to China from India in 527 AD. It gained full development in Japan in 
the 12th century and currently has three main branches: the Rinzai (Lin-chi), the Soto 
(Ts’ao-tung) and the Obaku (Huang-po). One of people most instrumental in bringing 
Zen to the West was Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki (1870-1966), a Zen monk, professor of 
Buddhism in Otani University in Kyoto and Columbia University of New York, the 
author of numerous books on Zen, Mahayana Buddhism, mysticism, and Japanese 
                                                
10 I have previously referred to Heidegger’s frequently quoted comment to a friend who observed him 
reading one of D. T. Suzuki’s books on Zen, “this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings.” See 
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culture, and the translator of Taoist and Zen texts. Suzuki’s works have been widely 
distributed and translated into Spanish. Both Girri and Cadenas quote from Suzuki’s 
writings; Girri does not specify the books he cites11, but Cadenas refers his readers to 
Budismo zen y psicoanálisis written by Suzuki in collaboration with Erich Fromm and 
published by the Fondo de Cultura Económica12. Although numerous books now 
expound the fundamentals of Zen, I will refer principally to Suzuki’s explanations, as his 
were the books to which Girri and Cadenas refer. 
According to Suzuki, much of Zen Buddhism draws on its historic predecessor, 
Taoism. As Suzuki frequently quotes the Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu in order to illustrate 
Zen concepts, certain overlap in Taoist and Zen ideas should not be surprising. Suzuki 
insists that all schools of Zen are centered around what is considered to be Buddhism’s 
essence and fundamental experience: the realization of satori, the Japanese term that 
means enlightenment or awakening. In an explanation of satori, Suzuki writes: “Satori 
constitutes the essence of Zen, for where there is no satori there cannot be any form of 
Zen. Zen revolves around this axial experience” (Zen and Japanese Buddhism 47). 
Gautama’s attainment of a new state of awakening under the Bodhi-tree is set forward in 
Buddhism as the ultimate goal to which to aspire, be it for one’s self-realization (as in 
                                                                                                                                            
William Barrett, "Zen for the West," Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, ed. William Barrett 
(New York: Doubleday, 1956). 
11 See, for example, the May 1st entry of Girri’s Diario de un libro where he quotes Suzuki as writing, “Es 
como la lluvia que cae sobre justos e injustos; como el sol que se levanta sobre el bien y el mal, sobre tus 
enemigos y sobre tus amigos. En cierto sentido, el sol es inocente y perfecto, como lo es la lluvia. Pero el 
hombre que perdió la inocencia y adquirió el conocimiento diferencia lo justo de lo injusto, el bien del mal, 
los enemigos de los amigos.” 
12 See Cadenas’s “Bibliografía” of Realidad y literatura. 
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Hinayana Buddhism) or to thereafter guide others to a similar state (as taught in 
Mahayana Buddhism).  
Satori is a mode of unmediated consciousness of reality, the experience of the 
harmonizing of all contradictions and opposites beyond even the very notion of the 
“One” and the “many.” Much like being united with tao, it does not annihilate the self, 
but “my individuality, which I found rigidly held together and definitely kept separate 
from other individual existences, becomes loosened somehow from its tightening grip 
and melts away” (Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki 105). The human 
being enters into the field of emptiness in that all egoism is shed and the self is free of all 
noetic paradigms, knowledge and means of approaching reality. Nancy Wilson Ross in 
her anthology of Zen, quotes Shinichi Hisamatsu who writes: “To realize the satori of 
Zen is to become one who is unhinderedly free, released from all chains, one who 
recognizes himself truly, being no longer attached to the forms of matter and spirit” (45). 
In one of his descriptions of satori, Suzuki enumerates several of this experience’s 
identifying characteristics: a sudden intuitive insight (as opposed to learned knowledge); 
a sense of the “beyond” or absolute; a “feeling of exaltation” as the restrictions on the 
individual being are done away with; an “authoritativeness” in the sense that the direct 
and personal experience of Being is insuperable; the affirmation of all that is and is-not as 
simply being; an “irrationality” in the sense that no reasoning or intellectual 
determination can grasp or make communicable this experience; a “momentariness” 
because satori is not gradually learned or unfolded, but rather is suddenly experienced; 
and an “impersonal tone” because satori is not the “romantic” culmination of a personal 
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other-worldly experience of the divine, but a here-and-now event that occurs in daily life 
within the realm of the commonplace (Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki 
103-08). 
Through satori perception, the “awakened” master experiences the “just-so” 
quality of all things and of his own nature, always within the context of a spirit of release, 
freedom and of simply being “This,” without differential value. Through satori, there is 
no need or desire to escape birth or death, nor is there any supreme teaching which one 
must strive to master. A Western practitioner of Zen, Ruth Sasaki, attempted to articulate 
this simple “isness” by writing: 
Only THIS —capital THIS— is. Anything and everything that appears to us as an 
individual entity or phenomenon […] is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in 
form; every activity that takes place, whether it be birth or death, loving or eating 
breakfast, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in activity (Sasaki 18). 
 
Sasaki’s explanation seems to be yet another variation of what Heidegger described as 
the experience of Being or what is understood as tao in Taoist thought.  
One of Mahayana Buddhism’s most commented sutras, recorded by Nagarjuna in 
the Mulamadhyamakakarika, summarizes satori perception in its broadest sense: “There 
is nothing whatsoever of Samsara distinguishing it from Nirvana. There is nothing 
whatsoever of Nirvana distinguishing it from Samsara” (XXV:19). Employed in 
Buddhism to refer to the cycle of birth, death and rebirth, the term samsara constitutes 
phenomenological existence, often regarded as a negative condition of bondage and 
suffering. Nirvana, in Mahayana Buddhism, is considered to be the state of pure and 
eternal awakening and selfhood, as characterized by the enlightened Buddha himself. 
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Nagarjuna’s teachings have been interpreted in a variety of manners, but Suzuki’s 
commentary is perhaps the most useful for our purposes. If satori consciousness 
transcends even the very idea of the One and the many, Suzuki likewise elucidates: “a 
dualistic conception of the world is not the ultimate one, and thus it is a mistake, due to 
this wrong discrimination (vikalpa), to seek Nirvana outside of Samsara (birth-and-death) 
and Samsara outside of Nirvana” (Essays in Zen Buddhism 92). One attains 
enlightenment, therefore, within life itself, experiencing its effects in everyday existence.  
All things and human actions, without discrimination, can be the catalyst for satori; once 
this state is realized, no thing is known as not pertaining to the empty-fullness of all that 
is.   
Like Taoism, Zen rejects the capacity of language to adequately capture or 
communicate satori. As an experiential and individual realization, no amount of 
explaining is capable of transmitting satori so that another may grasp and attain it. Zen 
differs from other forms of Buddhism by placing little emphasis on the study and 
memorization of philosophical concepts as a component in the road to enlightenment. 
Words are most often deemed by Zen to be a form of linguistic segmentation and division 
of reality, and an obstacle to a direct experience of complete, non-rationalized 
understanding. Suzuki expounds: “words are representations and not realities, and 
realities are what is most highly valued in Zen” (Zen and Japanese Buddhism 65).  
Two important exceptions to this appreciation are worth mentioning. The Rinzai 
school of Zen distinguishes itself from the Soto and Obaku branches through the 
utilization of koans as a fundamental element of a disciple’s education. Koans are 
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statements, questions or dialogues offered by a master to his student for the cultivation of 
Zen consciousness, through a type of contemplation that surpasses rational thought. In the 
presentation of utterances that seem to possess no logical explanation, the mind reaches a 
precipice that requires it to jump beyond its normal parameters to suddenly grasp a 
greater truth13. An estimated 1700 koans are the “auxiliary means” that induce in the 
seeker an awakening to the universe’s fundamental unity, an occurrence that is only 
possible when “the attentive mind is relaxed, free from purpose and ego, and fully 
devoted to the task” (Dumoulin 131). In koan exercises, words themselves do not 
“capture” awakened consciousness, but they do facilitate for the seeker a manner to 
supercede the accustomed path of strict logical thinking and representation. In this sense, 
the Zen assessment of language coincides with that of Girri and Cadenas, who also 
persistently question the ability of words to “translate” objectively their vision of reality, 
but paradoxically consider poetry to be the best (and perhaps only) manner to 
approximate their experience. Girri and Cadenas also often recur to aphoristic writing in 
their contemplation of the nature of poetry, being and reality. Although not properly 
koans, these economically phrased and often seemingly illogical statements also induce 
the reader to move beyond the regular boundaries of rational thought, as in this couplet 
by Cadenas: “El rostro que no se ve/ es mi rostro” ("Memorial" 269). 
The second exception Zen makes for words is the practice of poetry, and in 
particular that of haiku, which attained its full expression in the seventeenth century in 
                                                
13 A famous example highlighting the seemingly non-rational formulation of koans is recalled by Suzuki 
with these words: “A monk asked Tung-shan, ‘Who is the Buddha?’ ‘Three chin of flax’” Daisetz Teitaro 
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Japan. The economy and apparent simplicity of this poetic form —with its alternate 
verses of five, seven and five syllables— takes as its subject the mundane, immediate, 
and simple elements of everyday existence, with the aim to cultivate the consciousness of 
the miraculous “Here” and “Now.” The practice of haiku puts in evidence the concept 
that all beings, indiscriminately, are simply “thus” and that satori occurs here, in the 
company of the things that surround us. The humble elements that constitute each brief 
verse are not symbols of the infinite, but communicate directly themselves their perfect 
being in the realm of the ordinary: “Enlightenment now equals ‘every day,’ and the 
‘every day’ equals enlightenment. […] Reality is one single Now. This Now is every 
day” (Dumoulin 110). 
In his comparative study of Zen texts and English literature, Reginald H. Blyth 
recalls a conversation with Suzuki in which the latter suggested that “poetry is the 
something that we see, but the seeing and the something are one; without the seeing there 
is no something, no something, no seeing. There is neither discovery nor creation: only 
the perfect indivisible experience” (Blyth 84). Verses are not the place for “my” 
expression but a disinterested emptiness open for all things to presence. Poetic 
articulation allows for a cultivation of prajna, an “intuitive” perception that surpasses 
thought founded on the opposition of the one who sees and what is seen, and it transcends 
attachment to any particular thing (Suzuki Studies in Zen 85). Matsuo Basho (1644-
1694), one of the greatest Japanese haiku poets and Zen disciples, wrote about a practice 
of poetry that allows true insight: 
                                                                                                                                            
Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki (New York: Doubleday, 1956). 
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Go to the pine if you want to learn about the pine, or to the bamboo if you want to 
learn about the bamboo. And in doing so, you must leave your subjective 
preoccupation with yourself. Otherwise you impose yourself on the object and do 
not learn. Your poetry issues of its own accord when you and the object have 
become one – when you have plunged deep enough into the object to see 
something like a hidden glimmering there. However well phrased your poetry 
may be, if your feeling is not natural – if the object and yourself are separate – 
then your poetry is not true poetry but merely your subjective counterfeit (Basho 
33). 
 
In a similar spirit, Alberto Girri wonders “out loud” about the relationship of the subject 
and object in poetic writing:  
¿En suma, el escribir considerado como un camino, no arte? ¿Escribiendo 
‘naturalmente’, sin empeño aparente (sin intención ni reflexión)? ¿Conseguir el 
vacío de sí se asemeja a esa extrañeza, distancia, que nos acomete al recorrer lo 
que hasta allí hemos escrito. Sólo se cumple si el escribir no busca escribir, cree 
en el desinterés y el renunciamiento. […] ‘La ausencia del pensamiento no 
consiste en no pensar en nada, que ya sería un tomar contacto, apegarse a esa 
nada, sino un pensar en todas las cosas instante a instante, en perpetuo desapego. 
(Que todos los pensamientos resbalen perpetuamente sobre las cosas sin fijarse 
jamás)’ ("El motivo es el poema" 265-66). 
 
In a poem belonging to a series dedicated to Rilke, Cadenas also ponders this type of 
literary experience: “Es tan recio estar/ ahí/ desabrigado/ sin exigir nada/ salvo/ el dictado 
hondo,/ su ráfaga/ anonadante,/ la voz/ sin sueño,/ el sonido/ que no pertenece a nadie” 
("Gestiones" 451). Common to these three appreciations of poetry is the almost ascetic 
approach to the self, not an erasure of one’s being, but a resituating in which the subject 
is placed in the same context and on the same level as its poetic object, without room for 
distance between the two. The prajna (intuitive) perception that Zen attributes to poetry 
is a personal “impersonality” that comes about through detachment and nondeliberation. 
In Zen poetry, as well as the writing of Girri and Cadenas, there is an 
understanding that silence ultimately contains the underlying truth, but neither of our 
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poets, nor Zen authors renounce words altogether. Instead, an aesthetic is adopted that 
attempts to constantly reduce linguistic embellishments, metaphoric expression and 
hyper-personal self-indulgences. The first-person poetic subject is eliminated, reduced or 
resituated in the verses and allocated a non-centralized role. As a poetics naked of 
ornaments, verbal distractions and artifices, its foundation is the spontaneous and natural 
here and now, wrought in a dry, incorruptibly exact language that leaves no space for 
anthropocentrism. This writing often approaches the prose fragment with its natural 
speech, immediacy and clarity in expression, without narrativity. Although an artificial 
order behind the words obviously exists, an ethical, as well as aesthetic choice is made to 
write without a clear design, with an inherent insecurity that permits the immediate, 
instantaneous and every-day elements to make themselves present and visible. This 
direct, unbiased, fresh and open attitude assumed in poetry is thought of as an act of pure 
and spontaneous awareness, which at its fullest, leaves only listening and seeing — the 
perceiver and the perceived having dropped away.  
1.11 THE ILLUSION OF THE “I” 
This description of a pure state of being and perceiving where the self as subject 
is eclipsed, is an attempt at articulating what perhaps may be sunyata, or unity with tao or 
even the Heideggerian gelassenheit of the fourfold, from which an imperfect but 
necessary poetry is born, offering a glimpse of that which is fully reached only in silent 
experience. The disbanding of the “I” and Man as the axis of knowledge — as is the case 
in the arrangement of the modern episteme — is a project that has been undertaken under 
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various guises, several of which have been the focus of this chapter. I mentioned earlier 
in this chapter one other source common to Girri and Cadenas that informed their writing 
and search to disband the metaphysical subject: Jiddhu Krishnamurti, (1895-1986) an 
Indian thinker and teacher who was educated by the Theosophical Society in Adyar14 and 
whose lectures and writings were widely disseminated in the West.  
Krishnamurti dedicated his life to giving public talks with the “one cause of 
setting man free from ignorance, from illusion and from fear and belief” (Shringy 33). 
Krishnamurti’s primarily oral (transcribed) teachings, as analyzed by Dr. R. K. Shringy, 
reflect many of the ideas we have already discussed thus far. His purported aim was to 
help others to reach liberation from the mind’s constrictions and fragmentation of 
existence that are summed up in the construction of the self and “I” in contrast with that 
which is not me. Liberation is the complete awareness of the “Real” without any 
divisions of outer and inner, and free from time and its implications of becoming, instead 
of simply being “what is.” “Becoming” projects a false duality of consciousness and a 
pursuit of what is not yet, leading to desire and discontent, the division between subject 
and object and the perpetual cultivation of the self as a means of permanence and 
security. Krishnamurti considers the “I” to be a fictitious entity composed of ideas, 
memory and experience that out of fear, attempts to construct constancy, feeding on the 
                                                
14 The Theosophical Society in Adyar was created in 1882 as a successor to the Theosophical Society 
founded by Helena Blavatsky and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott in 1875. Other important members were 
Annie Besant and Charles Webster Leadbeater, the former who adopted Krishnamurti, educated him, 
ordained him the head of the “Order of the Star,” and proclaimed him to be the World-Teacher and 
Maitreya, responsible for the education of humanity. In 1929, Krishnamurti disavowed this position and all 
organized religions, distancing himself from the Theosophical Society and its claims. 
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past to respond to the future. Girri quotes Krishnamurti in translation about this point: “El 
temor generalmente difundido en todos los dominios, y el temor psicológico, dentro de 
mí, son siempre el temor de no ser. De no ser esto o aquello, o de no ser simplemente 
[…] Para liberarse del temor se debe explorar la idea de permanencia en su totalidad” 
("Diario de un libro" 51-52).  
In stark contrast with fear and never-fulfilling becoming, Krishnamurti proposes 
the idea of “choiceless awareness of what is,” a state of emptiness and freedom from 
“duality, time-space and self-consciousness” (Shringy 350) that normally condition the 
mind. Nowhere does Krishnamurti imply that liberation signifies a disengagement or 
flight from the “Real,” an abstract existential escape or the dissolution of manifestation 
itself; rather “liberation is into manifestation and not away from it” (Shringy 357). 
Without a self-center and the limitations of self-conscious existence constructed through 
lineal time, the human being is free to live spontaneously, in constant relationship and 
regeneration with Being, which itself is in constant and total transformation. A 
Venezuelan critic writes about Cadenas’s poetic imperative, that mirrors Krishnamurti’s 
thought: “La vida se convierte en una pura atención, es despojada de todo contenido (de 
todo ‘conocimiento’ diría Krishnamurti) para que la realidad se perciba en toda su 
inmediatez” (Isava Briceño 52-53). The immediate, unmediated “choiceless awareness” 
that is liberation’s hallmark, is the consciousness of true creativity and the unbridled 
freedom for its manifestation. In what he terms a “movimiento krishnamurtiano,” Girri 
contemplates that: 
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Despiertos a medias, propendemos a observar, juzgar, fragmentariamente; 
dividimos y comparamos: así la trama del poema, así su tono, etc. Despiertos por 
completo, las divisiones cesan, trama y tono confundiéndose: no más efectos de 
nuestras proyecciones ("El motivo es el poema" 92). 
 
Such a state of wakefulness allows the author —having eclipsed his own fragmentary 
projections— to achieve a holistic means of poetic composition that is born of an 
unprecedented openness to the “real” that reciprocally grants the poetic work this “real”:  
…admitimos estar ante una Obra de lo real, abierta poéticamente a lo real. Lo que 
ganamos de la lección y efectos del modelo depende de nuestras capacidades para 
adecuarnos a él. No en aspectos exteriores, no en la imitación, pero en lo que lo 
particulariza como modelo: su especial vehemencia interna para dar lo real. / Ese 
contacto suministraría el impulso, y/o la situación poética ("El motivo es el 
poema" 267). 
I would like to conclude this chapter with a word dear to Girri, Cadenas, 
Heidegger, both Taoist and Zen philosophers and Krishnamurti: “attention.” Attention 
dispossessed of all content; attention given here and now to being; to reality in its 
immediacy as experience but established nowhere; attention as the impersonal 
contemplation of a mind quieted to offer an empty space to a dynamic and undivided 
reality forever in flux; attention as a silent offering of the self that recognizes the world’s 
self-sufficiency and supreme nobility; attention as the stepping back from representation 
to listen to language’s speech; attention as language’s manifestation in lucid, pure, 
precise and truthful words. With this word also as our banner, we will now turn our 
attention undividedly to first Girri, and then Cadenas, to examine in greater depth how 
these ideas resonate in their respective works. 
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CHAPTER 2: ALBERTO GIRRI  
2.1. The Impossibility of Knowledge 
2.1.1 GIRRI, THE AUTHOR   
When asked by a dear friend and fellow author, Jorge Cruz, about the motives 
behind the unswerving cultivation of his poetic vocation, Alberto Girri replied that 
“…escribo para alcanzar un conocimiento de mí mismo, sin idealismos ni 
encubrimientos; en otros términos, para llegar a ser lo que soy” (Girri Cuestiones y 
razones 77). With this directive, the following pages seek to provide the sketch of Girri 
the writer, the scope of his literary works and the manner in which we will approach his 
poetry of self-knowledge in this chapter. As Girri’s life and works can, in many ways, be 
appreciated as a coherent whole, I consider it relevant to begin with a brief review of his 
biography, relatively unknown outside of Argentina. 
 Alberto Girri was born on November 27, 1919 in the Almagro neighborhood of 
Buenos Aires, the son of a Venetian father and a Bonaerense mother. He later moved to 
the Flores neighborhood of the capital, attending Francisco de Victoria primary school 
and the secondary school Colegio Nacional Bernardino Rivadavia. From the age of four, 
Girri began to read and write, his favorite books being those by Almafuerte15, Emilio 
Salgari16, Alexandre Dumas, Charles Baudelaire, Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Jorge Luis Borges and various English-language poets (Girri Cuestiones y 
                                                
15 Almafuerte: pseudonym of Argentine poet Pedro Bonifacio Palacios (1854-1917). 
16 Emilio Salgari (1862-1911): prolific Italian author of adventure novels. 
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razones 167). Even as a child, Girri actively sought to cultivate his literary vocation, 
alleging that he intuited that the act of transforming internal feelings and thoughts into 
words “alimentaría con sus resultados, permanentemente, mi vida y la de los demás” 
(Girri Cuestiones y razones 43).  
Girri completed his academic studies in the Department of Philosophy and 
Philology at the de Universidad de Buenos Aires where he helped found a short-lived 
literary magazine, Leonardo, contributed poems to the Department’s publication Centro 
and first became acquainted with fellow authors Olga Orozco17 and Héctor A. Murena18. 
From his university years, Girri recalls the impact of his inaugural readings of the works 
of Spanish picaresque novelists, the mystics and Cervantes, as well as the development of 
his personal cult towards Borges whose books “hasta publicarse El jardín de los senderos 
que se bifurcan, […] eran inhallables” (Cruz 179). From Borges’ writings, Girri learned a 
particular diction in Spanish that approximated English in its concision and neutral 
rhetoric. These qualities, along with the epigrammatic, impersonal, precise, and ironic 
dimensions that he appreciated in Borges’ writing, Girri began to adopt in his own poetry. 
Girri also credits Borges with his initial introduction to Coleridge, de Quincey and 
                                                
17 Olga Orozco (1920-1999): Argentine poet and author of numerous volumes of verse including Desde 
lejos (1946), Las muertes (1951), Los juegos peligrosos (1962), La oscuridad es otro sol (1962), Museo 
salvaje (1974), Cantos a Berenice (1977), La noche a la deriva (1984), El revés del cielo (1987), Con esta 
boca, en este mundo (1994), También la luz es un absimo (1995) and Relámpagos de lo invisible (1998). 
She was honored with the Juan Rulfo Latin American Literary Prize in 1998. 
18 Héctor A. Murena (1923-1975): Argentine essayist, narrator, playwright and poet of great influence in 
the fifties and sixties. Murena collaborated in Sur and the Suplemento literario of La nación, co-directed 
the Colección de estudios alemanes, translated the Frankfurt School, and authored a number of original 
works, including: La nueva vida (poetry, 1951), El juez (play, 1953), El pecado original de América (essay, 
1954), El nombre secreto (essay, 1969), Caína muerte (novel, 1971) La metáfora y lo sagrado (essay, 
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Elizabethan poets, a personal discovery that fomented his preference for other English-
language poets. In exploring further this terrain, Girri would later translate many of his 
preferred authors into Spanish: Eliot, Pound, Williams Carlos Williams, Wallace Stevens, 
John Donne, Edgar Lee Masters, Theodore Roetkhe and Stephen Spender, among others.  
In 1944, Girri began to contribute in the production of the magazine Correo 
literario19 and soon after became a regular collaborator in the Suplemento literario of La 
nación newspaper, directed by Eduardo Mallea20. Playa sola (1946), Girri’s first book of 
verse, corresponds to this period. A prolific writer, Girri maintained a steady rhythm of 
publication, releasing a new collection of poetry every two or three years.  Invited by 
José “Pepe” Bianco21 in 1948, Girri sent his first submissions to the renowned literary 
magazine Sur, directed by Victoria Ocampo. He later joined its Committee of 
Collaborators (“Comité de Colaboración”) and continued to contribute his own articles 
and poems to its pages. That same year, Girri published his first book of translations, 
Poesía inglesa contemporánea, with William Shand. These roles —poet, translator and 
collaborator— define Girri’s existence, becoming his vital axes, with only slight 
                                                                                                                                            
1973). An anthology of his work entitled Visiones de Babel was published by the Fondo de Cultura 
Económica in 2002. 
19 Correo literario was the short-lived project of Spanish émigrés to Buenos Aires. Arturo Cuadraro, Luis 
Seoane, Lorenzo Varela and Javier Farias produced the magazine from Nov.  15, 1943 until Sept. 1, 1945. 
20 Eduardo Mallea (1903-1982): Prolific Argentine essayist, novelist and diplomat. He directed the 
Suplemento literario of La nación, served as president of the Argentine Society of Writers and represented 
Argentina before the United Nations. Some of his most important works include: Cuentos para una inglesa 
desesperada (short stories, 1926), Historia de una pasión argentina (essay, 1937), Fiesta en noviembre 
(novel, 1938), La bahía de silencio (novel, 1940), Todo verdor perecerá (novel, 1941), Chaves (novel, 
1953) and Gabriel Andaral (novel, 1971). 
21 José “Pepe” Bianco (1908-1986): Argentine narrator, essayist, journalist and translator. Bianco was the 
Editor-in-chief (secretario de redacción) of Sur from 1938 until 1961. His works include: La pequeña 
Gyaros (stories, 1932), Sombras suele vestir (novel, 1941), Las ratas (novel, 1943) and La pérdida del 
reino (novel, 1972) and Ficción y realidad (essays, 1946-1976). 
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variations: trips abroad to Italy (1959), the United States (1964), Germany, France and 
England (1968), Italy, Holland, Spain and France (1974), Paris (1975), and Italy and 
France (1976).  
In studying his literary trajectory, Girri cannot be easily identified with his co-
generational peers. Chronologically, he is associated with the Argentinean generation of 
194022, a group divided into those who sought to further certain elements of Hispanic 
American modernismo, inspired by neo-romantic trends, and others who explored the 
recent waves of surrealism, inspired principally by French poetry. This oniric, irrational 
and highly metaphoric writing was of little interest to Girri, who often felt alone in his 
literary project. He explains in an interview: 
En realidad, yo diría que el auge de esas corrientes y esos grupos […] me 
produjeron en general un estado de aislamiento interno y externo. Externo porque 
la recepción que tuvo mi libro inicial fue de desdén o de burla o de estupor o 
sencillamente negándolo. […] Y por otro lado, la presencia de esos poetas de la 
generación del 40 […] nada tenía que ver con lo que yo me proponía. En muchos 
casos me despertaron profunda admiración. Pero una admiración que al mismo 
tiempo sembró, durante bastante tiempo, dudas respecto de lo que yo mismo hacía 
(Vera Ocampo 52).  
 
Despite any personal doubts, Girri cultivated his unique voice and developed a particular 
vision that cannot be assimilated under standard generational groupings. It is because of 
Girri’s exceptional approach and cultivation of poetry within the context of Argentinean 
                                                
22 The group’s “members” —Vicente Barbiere, Enrique Molina and Olga Orozco— often took issue with 
the earlier avant-garde movement of ultraísmo, whose principal proponent in Argentina was the young 
Jorge Luis Borges. Curiously, when asked to reflect upon this epoch in retrospect, Girri highlighted the 
fundamental place Borges held in the development of his own poetics, even at a time when Borges was 
being read by only a limited audience. Girri ascribes to the notion that “la literatura escrita en lengua 
española es una antes de Borges y otra después de Borges” and attributes to Borges the conception of a new 
poetic discourse. See: Raúl Vera Ocampo, "La condición de poeta: Alberto Girri," Creación y poesía 
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Kir, 1995). 
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literature that I believe it appropriate to study his works alongside the writings of Rafael 
Cadenas. In the introduction of this study, I mentioned the numerous literary accolades 
and public recognitions that Girri received in life. Despite his acclaim in literary circles, 
Girri’s work has not enjoyed wide dissemination outside of his native Argentina, and has 
remained within limited academic appreciation. By examining Girri’s oeuvre in 
conjunction with Cadenas’, my intention is not only to demonstrate the parallelism of 
their evolution, but to also gain a clearer perspective in terms of the place their writings 
hold within the context of contemporary poetry and thought. Analyzed solely within the 
scope of their respective generations, we run the risk of mistaking both of these poets as 
only curious exceptions and not as proponents of an alternate experience of modernity. 
 As I will do in approaching Cadenas’ works in the following chapter, here I also 
propose a reading of a selection of Girri’s writings in two movements. The first 
encompasses Girri’s first production, from 1946 to 1962: Playa sola (1946), Coronación 
de la espera (1947), Trece poemas (1949), El tiempo que destruye (1951), Escándalo y 
soledades (1952), Línea de la vida (1955), Examen de nuestra causa (1956), La 
penitencia y el mérito (1957), Propiedades de la magia (1959), La condición necesaria 
(1960), and Elegías italianas (1962). The second extends from 1963 until the publication 
of his last book in 1990: El ojo (1965), Envíos (1967), Casa de la mente (1970), Valores 
diarios (1970), En la letra, ambigua selva (1972), Diario de un libro (1972, prose), 
Poesía de la observación (1973), Quien habla no está muerto (1975), El motivo es el 
poema (1976), Árbol de la estirpe humana (1978), Lo propio, lo de todos (1980), 
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Homenaje a W. C. Williams (1981), Lírica de percepciones (1983), Monodias (1985), 
Existenciales (1986), Tramas de conflictos (1988), and 1989/1990 (1990).  
In the first phase, I will consider Girri’s persistent epistemological interrogations 
in relation to the structuring and grounding of knowledge, combined with a marked 
existentialist anxiety. In the second phase, I will emphasize Girri’s attempts to articulate 
various ontological proposals in response to his dissatisfaction with the rationale of 
Western metaphysics. This partition of Girri’s works should not lead the reader to believe 
that there exists a radical break in his poetic conception after 1963. Rather, this division 
serves to shift the focus of this study from the initial queries posited in his first 
production to the tentative solutions he explores in his later writing. In limiting the focus 
for this project to this essential axis of Girri’s writings, I will not be able to exhaust the 
rich complexities and polysemic themes present in his texts. Neither do I pretend to offer 
a reading of each of his individual books. Because of inherent limitations of space, I have 
selected a corpus of poems that I feel best reflects the underlying purpose of this 
investigation. Although I will often follow a chronological order in the presentation of 
individual poems, as Girri returns to the same questions time and time again, I will also 
recur to grouping poems from different moments in their production. Girri’s complete 
works have been published interspersing his prose and poetry. As this division of genres 
is a concept that Girri questions, and as his prose offers a complementary form of 
reflection for his poetry, I will incorporate reflections derived from his prose in my poetic 
analyses. 
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The examination of the first stage of Girri’s works will begin with an approach to 
the first-person poetic subject. The distinctive feature of the modern subject, according to 
Foucault, is that it attempts to discern the world by grounding his knowledge in and 
through himself. By repositioning all possible knowledge in the centrality of his own 
figure, the subject soon encounters a series of self-imposed challenges when he realizes 
that the very source of modern knowledge —the speaking subject that he is— is not 
completely knowable.  
2.1.2 THE SUBJECT THAT I CHOOSE 
In his preliminary study to an anthology of Girri’s poetry, Horacio Castillo quotes 
several lines Girri published in La Nación in 1977: “En mi caso personal, debo decir, casi 
a título confesional, que el ejercicio de la poesía no ha sido simplemente voluntad estética 
sino voluntad de existir a través de la poesía. Ante la inaferrabilidad última del mundo 
como una gran apariencia, el ejercicio de la poesía es una posibilidad de existir” (Castillo 
13). These lines project a stability of the subject that infers an almost harmonious relation 
between poet and poetry or between subject and its knowledge. The poetic “I,” perhaps in 
a Cartesian attitude, reaffirms its existence only through the vehicle of poetry. Following 
various aspects of modernity since the Enlightenment (rationalism, teleology and the 
enhancement of the Schopenhauerian will) the “I” is grounded in the world through an 
exercise of language that “allows” the poet to produce his own means of existence. In 
other words, the poet exists because he writes poetry. A closer reading of Girri’s poetry, 
however, reveals a more complex dynamic of this apparent harmony between the subject 
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and its language. As we will demonstrate in what follows, Girri’s poetic subject is also 
defined by a fundamental paradox in which his ability to exist in the world through 
poetry will be contested. Along with this challenge, the whole of the poetic subject will 
undergo a crisis that will lead to its disarticulation.   
Various literary critics of Girri have noted this phenomenon in their studies of his 
poetry. For example, Barbara Crespo de Arnaud’s observations are articulated in the 
following terms:  
Hay dos etapas en la constitución de su escritura: la primera, caracterizada por 
una mayor metaforización, una retórica más vinculada a lo sensible y la presencia  
más acusada del sujeto de la enunciación, relacionada con la actitud lírica 
tradicional. La segunda, en la que se verifica una neutralización de todos estos 
procedimientos a favor de un incremento del lenguaje lógico, la función 
referencial y las formas impersonales, vinculadas directamente con el registro de 
lo intelectual (III). 
 
Crespo de Arnaud’s intuitive characterization of the development of Girri’s poetics in 
loose expressions such as a “traditional lyrical attitude” that is exchanged for an 
“intellectual register” is typical of the analysis his works have received until now. In 
approaching Girri’s crisis of the subject, my aim is to incorporate this reading within a 
greater context of the modern subject, and in particular, to situate it within Foucault’s 
systematic diagnosis and analysis of Man as the center of the modern episteme, as 
introduced in the first chapter of this dissertation. By establishing a direct correlation 
between Foucault’s theories and my reading of Girri, I intend to demonstrate how the 
symptoms of the subject’s crisis may be accounted for through a thorough revision of the 
defining elements of modernity. Beyond a mere acknowledgment of this crisis, a 
Foucauldian reading of Girri’s poetry will show how the nostalgia for a lost sense of 
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stability and a grounded center for knowledge through man, mirrors Foucault’s 
conception of the modern subject and its ultimate impossibility.  
 At the inception of Girri’s poetic journey, the first-person subject predominates as 
the indispensable element from which any experience of being in the world emanates. In 
this sense, the subject operates from the assumption of his being the source of order and 
comprehension of what is. Girri’s poetry thus situates us in the middle of what Foucault 
describes as the condition of the modern subject: Man, here represented by the first-
person poetic subject, seeks to establish his dominance as the foundation of knowledge, 
but inevitably is undermined by his own limitations. Girri’s “yo” attempts to gain the 
clarity that would grant knowledge and meaning to his existence. Nevertheless, a 
simultaneous perception of his deficiencies undercuts and threatens the consolidation of 
his understanding of himself and the world. Girri oscillates between a grounding 
experience of the “yo” that would potentially serve as the base for all possible 
apprehension, and a disruptive negation of this protagonism. Instead of constructing the 
realm for Man’s transcendental being, Girri’s poetry is soon the space for conflict. Critic 
María Victoria Suárez understands these two defining aspects of Girri’s poetic “I” as 
contradicting “absolutes” that ultimately cancel each other out. To the absolute 
reaffirmation of existence through poetry, the “I” suffers radical feelings of loneliness, 
self-deception and even exile from the reality that his presence previously justified. The 
duality is extended in a continuous juxtaposition of opposites that contradict each positive 
step taken by the subject toward his reconciliation with the world. Suárez considers this 
 104 
conflicting movement as a “horizontal negation” through which the “I” gradually 
undertakes the project of its own annihilation.     
In examining Girri’s first books, I concur with Suárez’s interpretation of the 
primary role of the first person in his poetry: “En medio de la vorágine del cambio 
universal, el yo que aflora busca un puerto, una forma de permanencia que no sea el 
cambio mismo” (Alberto Girri: Existencia y lógica poética 37). The “change” to which 
Suárez refers, can be understood as the constant flux that all beings are subjected to by 
time —Heraclitus’ river, in the famous analogy. The self wills to overcome his state of 
contingency through becoming the knowing subject, the articulator of order. Girri 
explains that his first works were “de orden existencial, en el sentido que era, como en 
todo adolescente o todo niño, todo joven, una especie de manoteo para aferrar algo que 
siente vagamente, cual es el sentido de su propia existencia” (Vera Ocampo 46).  
To make sense of his own existence, Girri’s subject must transform his 
surrounding reality into recognizable features. Recomposing the world in the subject’s 
likeness, would eradicate the threatening counter-presence of the other. This dominion of 
the poetic subject, however, is always undermined by precisely that which defines him as 
a modern subject, in the Foucauldian sense: by positioning himself as both the subject 
and object of knowledge, Man is faced with his own finitude as the ultimate 
unconquerable frontier that bars his ability to fully understand what is. Foucault analyzes 
modernity through the repositioning of Man as the central object of knowledge. This is 
what we discussed in the previous chapter as the “analytic of finitude,” a reading of those 
strategies employed by Man to overcome his limitations in knowing himself, and 
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consequently, the world. These strategies are the mechanisms through which Man 
acquires knowledge of the world. The paradoxical nature of these strategies is found in 
the fact that their source is Man’s own finitude. We may recall Dreyfus and Rabinow’s 
explanation of the Foucauldian doublets, the three mechanisms through which Man 
simultaneously asserts and short-circuits modern positivity: 
Seen under this double aspect man appears: (1) as a fact among other facts to be 
studied empirically, and yet as the transcendental condition of the possibility of 
all knowledge; (2) as surrounded by what he cannot get clear about (the 
unthought), and yet as a potentially lucid cogito, source of all intelligibility; and 
(3) as the product of a long history whose beginning he can never reach and yet, 
paradoxically as the source of that very history (Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics 31). 
 
Girri’s poetry transits this same avenue of thought. A poem that illustrates the 
concepts that we have hereto been discussing is entitled “Elegir, la opción que elijo,” 
published in Escándalo y soledades (1952). The first stanza reads:  
Elegir, la opción que elijo, 
se acuesta a mi lado, 
alternado monstruo 
y rama en florescencia.  
El amanecer lo trae, 
confusiones —de hecho sustancia—, 
aíslan el suspiro, 
retoman certeza —de hecho finitud—, 
tributos de ganas y variantes, 
para ser cada vez Alberto Girri, 
según el que refleje, 
según lo que afuera soy, 
con insomnio, 
con la cerviz quebrada, 
en el lujo de desmentirme ("Escándalo y soledades" 162). 
 
The emphatic “I” that gives voice to these verses exerts its will as the source for choosing 
the primordial identity of Alberto Girri, and to be able to match his enunciating “I” with 
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the poet’s name. Beyond the simple act of self-acknowledgement and identification, the 
poetic “I” strives to establish a stable ground for his existence —to become the Same in 
Foucauldian terminology— avoiding any threatening dissonance (the Other) that could 
dismantle this constancy of being. In the act of choosing, the subject attempts to control 
the outcome of his elections and establish the terms of his choosing. Girri clearly 
comprehends the precarious position of the subject, whose determinations can as easily 
produce “monsters” as “blooming branches.” Confusion and certainty, alternating in the 
configuration of his subjectivity, produce a doublet that paradoxically founds the 
existence of the “I” (substance) and its annihilation (finitude). And between will (ganas) 
and variations (variantes) the “I” concludes the reflection triggering, as the ultimate 
“luxury,” a negation of preserving “each time” the link between the “I” and the name of 
Girri.  The poem ends with the following verses:    
Lobo del absurdo, 
aborrecido deslumbramiento, 
cruz ansada en mis invocaciones ("Escándalo y soledades" 162). 
 
The (im)possibility of the subject’s election, culminates with the desperate hope 
for countering unavoidable finitude with a talisman for eternity. The Ankh-cross the “I” 
invokes represented for the Egyptian Christians a syncretic symbol for eternal life.  Such 
a possibility would be the ultimate guarantee of the subject’s predominance as the 
chooser, creator of order and the determiner of meaning. Yet while pronouncing this 
invocation, the “I” is inevitably confronted by the “wolf” of the absurd that always 
accompanies the subject. This verse is an acknowledgement of the hazards to which the 
self as subject is relentlessly subjected: the Other that threatens him as the Same, the 
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origin that continually eludes him, the language he speaks but cannot make transparent, 
and the unthought that undermines his own cognition.  This poem serves as a disclosure 
of the conundrum of the modern subject in the process of opting to be “Alberto Girri,” 
producing for himself and us an “abhorred dazzle.”  
2.1.3 A TIME WITHOUT WINGS OR MEMORY 
In her book-length study of Girri’s literary production up until 1985, Muriel Slade 
Pascoe examines the poet’s treatment of time as a vehicle for approaching the 
relationship between the world and language, as well as the self and his reality. She 
divides Girri’s œuvre into three periods: denunciation and testimony (1946-1955), 
solutions (1956-1963) and lucidity (1964-1985). Although we have chosen to read Girri’s 
production in a two-part movement —all divisions considered to some degree arbitrary— 
Slade Pascoe’s observations are useful in understanding the position of Girri’s modern 
subject in what we have termed its first stage.  
One element that defines this subject is its denouncement of lineal time that 
governs the physical world, imposing its inexorably destructive mark on all that is. The 
poetic voice of this poetry is characterized by its “sed de absoluto,” a need for continuity 
and permanence. Slade Pascoe explains: “A Girri le duele no sólo la conciencia de la 
desintegración incesante en el mundo sino el olvido progresivo del origen divino, de la 
‘real realidad’. Por eso, acusa a su imagen en el espejo de ser ‘préstamo vil, sólo bruma y 
polvo’ con respecto a lo que recuerda” (35). What the subject “remembers” or intuits is a 
utopian moment of reconciliation, an absolute or origin before the inception of sequential 
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time in which language and things perfectly corresponded and man’s being and his reality 
were integral elements of an ulterior order. Girri comments that in writing there is often a 
“[l]ucha por la expresión (expresividad), esfuerzo para recobrar la memoria de un Paraíso 
Perdido, algo que, a veces, con inesperados destellos, se actualiza. Y, como una Caída 
sobreviene cuando ya no creemos que esa memoria podría seguir haciéndose oír” ("El 
motivo es el poema" 260). This idea of a “lost paradise” from which man has “fallen” is 
not simply an appropriation of the Genesis myth to explain human suffering, but also a 
definitive characteristic of modern Man’s experience and understanding of his condition. 
The search for a lost origin is, according to Foucault, an effect of Man’s 
historicity, which marks the radical break of the modern episteme with the 18th century’s 
taxonomic structures of knowledge. Man projects himself as the center of a new account 
of the world that begins and ends with himself. Man is no longer one element among 
others: he is the ordering force behind all possible epistemic knowledge. As the 
primordial justification for his culture, society and language, the modern Man undertakes 
the need of explaining to himself and his peers their origins in a detailed and exhaustive 
history in which he and only he can be the ultimate protagonist. It is precisely at the dawn 
of Man’s dream of history that we find the emergence of historical dialectics (Hegel) and 
its further ramifications (Marx). As he conducts his search for the lost origin, however, 
Man soon encounters the fact that both his culture and the language to narrate its history 
are overwhelming factors that precede and surpass him. Dreyfus and Rabinow elucidate:  
Although man is defined by the cultural practices which establish the temporal 
clearing in which objects can be encountered, and this temporality is 
‘preontologically close’ to man since it is his very being, he cannot reflect on 
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what these practices are precisely because they are too near to him and thus too 
encompassing (Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 39). 
 
The need for history is faced with the paradox of having a beginning too distant in time 
and space to be attainable through his empirical inquiries, and so his “origin” continually 
recedes or is posited as an equally remote future “resolution” or imminent “return” to that 
which has been promised since time’s beginning. With this understanding, we can better 
appreciate Girri’s reflection about the first half of his poetic production, as recorded by 
Danubio Torres Fierro in an interview:  
es como si el vínculo metafísico absoluto haya sido roto en remotísimas zonas y 
edades, a las cuales nos está vedado retornar. Pero ese retorno puede ocurrir. De 
acuerdo con la visión paradójica que —creo— siempre opera en mis poemas, lo 
que acabo de describir no sólo indica la nostalgia de ese paraíso perdido sino 
también la vaga esperanza de que alguna vez haya una especie de retorno, que de 
la confusión en la cual está metido el hombre se logre acceder a lo perdido (21). 
 
This “vague hope” is voiced in multiple terms by the poetic subjects that populate 
the pages of Girri’s earlier poetry. Adopting the persona of the German philosopher, 
theologian and occultist Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535), Girri 
relates one variation of the search for the return:  
[…] merced a una voluntad 
de ganar lo más sutil 
fui tras el secreto lazo 
de las cosas con sus nombres, 
y tras la causa primitiva 
de los encadenamientos: 
el número ternario, 
el número 
representante de Dios, 
el que abarca el fin, 
el medio, 
el principio, 
símbolo creado por Dios 
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antes de extenderse fuera de sí 
y crear los seres ("Propiedades de la magia" 288). 
 
The “secret tie of things with their names” reflects the system of correspondences that is 
presumed to exist at the outset of language where all things could be traced back to a 
clear and identifiable cause. The search for the secret number that could summarize both 
origin and resolution reveals the true state of the modern subject in relation to his world: 
his actual alienation and disconnect from such an “original experience.” Nevertheless, by 
his will (“voluntad”), he yearns to make transparent to himself the order which he 
enunciates but cannot comprehend, seeking to be the holder and articulator of the cipher 
that represents even God.  
 The crux of Man’s drama as subject is that in narrating his history, he seeks to 
conjure an original point of departure or a future cessation of his contingency. This 
process, however, belies his actual construction as the knowing subject: that this ultimate 
knowing of himself —through an origin or final destiny— will be infinitely postponed. 
Girri defines modern poetry as a “testimonio de lo inaccesible de versiones absolutas de 
la realidad, y del reducirse al manejo de verdades sólo relativas, inestables y complejas 
por definición, y cuyo dramatismo reside en que no las va descubriendo el poeta, las va 
comprobando” ("Lo propio, lo de todos" 83). Girri’s early texts chronicle the drama of 
various poetic subjects that attempt to articulate an all-encompassing explanation of 
reality through which to secure their place at the center of world and make transparent to 
themselves their own finite being. Despite their limitless will to access an absolute 
version of reality, their experience is that of instability, confusion, relativity and 
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limitedness, constantly accompanied by the shadow of their own inaccessible origin: a 
secret absence that fuels their desire. A poem that is representative of modern Man’s 
existential situation is “El examen,” published in Playa sola, Girri’s first book: 
Rodeado de misterio, 
inquieto y vulnerable como una estatua, 
asistiendo sin fe a los pactos del mundo, 
emprendía la tarea de escucharme. 
 
Hay en todo lo mío, 
en lo subterráneo que me distingue, 
un aprendizaje irracional pero certero. 
Y desde las resistencias pasablemente juveniles 
en que la esperanza deja y deja, 
desde las sonatas dulces y los autorretratos dulces, 
desde los equitativos exterminios 
planeados con vehemencia nocturna, 
corre un tiempo sin ala ni memoria,  
un tiempo desvelado 
que protege y enmascara mi secreto patrimonio. 
 
¡Cuánto pavor y cuánta jactancia enumerada! 
En esta mi entrañable duda, 
limita sabiamente 
el pulso retirado de la noche ("Playa sola" 34). 
 
In the first stanza, the poetic voice announces its position in the world: surrounding him 
is a mystery that he does not understand. If the world has an order, he does not partake in 
its secrets. He is vulnerable, exposed and anxious. In seeking answers, he turns to 
himself, to listening to his own voice and what he has established as learning 
(“aprendizaje”). The subject distinguishes two simultaneous planes: one of time’s 
passing, from juvenile “resistances” to the “sweet” formulations of himself by and for 
himself, passing through the stages of hope and exterminations. Beneath the endless 
change inherent to the process of the subject’s formation, a timeless stratum of constancy 
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is sensed that functions in the subject’s conception of his identity as both origin and aim. 
The “patrimony” that is invoked and held as fundamental to his formulation of self, 
however, is masked and hidden from even the subject himself. The subject concludes his 
soliloquy with unfeigned honesty: it is doubt and not a coveted origin that defines his 
existence. Out of “fear” and “boastfulness” Man as subject organizes the narrative of 
himself, his origins and world that ultimately cannot fulfill him. Meanwhile, Girri 
insinuates, the indomitable world that Man seeks to order, wisely retires its veiled pulse. 
 In addressing the problem of time in later books, the strategy and particular angle 
of the poetic subject varies, although the underlying question remains the same: how to 
reconcile the figure of Man as subject and his unremitting disintegration and distancing 
from his source at the hands of time. The poetic voice of Girri’s poems fluctuates 
between attempting to conjure or recover a form of permanence, and denouncing the 
passage of historical time that corrupts and decomposes all that it carries in its path. 
Sometimes it is a lost moment of time that is contained in a vague memory that promises 
to reveal to the subject his transcendental meaning, as in a poem entitled “De pronto”: 
“¿Podré entonces, recuerdo,/ probar tu voluptuosidad,/ tu sentir profético/ descubriendo 
contigo/ la rueca que me hila, / el huso que me devana/ el hilo que ha de cortarse, […]” 
("Examen de nuestra causa" 198-99). But just as likely the past, as well as the unknown 
future, brings the terrifying revelation that: “Eres préstamo vil, sólo bruma y polvo,/ Ya 
que conspiras y saludas y te nutres/ Y hace tiempo aceptaste lo que pronto/ Pronto serás 
aunque tal mudanza no desees” ("Trece poemas" 100).  
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2.1.4 THE DISTINCTNESS THAT PERSISTS IN EVERYONE 
 
For modern Man as the subject of all knowledge, we have seen that the 
establishing of an origin for his being, culture, language and history is an essential but 
unsolvable aspect of the episteme that is structured around him. The elusive origin is 
illustrative of Man’s finitude and the conundrum that is inherent to his original structure. 
Modern Man is defined since his first appearance as a figure in crisis: the identity of the 
subject is in constant need of (re)establishing its place in the center of the episteme. As he 
displaced the centrality of God, he is weighted with the burden of proving to himself that 
he is indeed the conditioning source for all knowledge. It is in this dialectic within 
himself that the Same and the Other inaugurate an epistemic tension as they exchange 
places as subject and object of knowledge. The Same, in general terms, is defined by his 
need to apprehend and define himself and others, rendering them transparent to himself 
and thus becoming part of his Same. As we recall, it is this drive to which Foucault 
attributes the birth and expansion of the human sciences. The scope of these disciplines, 
however, is never far-reaching enough to extirpate those dark regions that inhabit the self 
or to penetrate and conquer the being of another. The Other, inevitably, is modern Man’s 
constant double; he is the shadow that provides the impetus to Man to establish his 
knowledge in order to achieve total light, but he is also the perpetual reminder of Man’s 
limitations.  
 In the first stage of Alberto Girri’s poetry, the drama of the Same to overcome the 
Other is played out in a number of poems through the figures of the poetic subject and a 
female second person (“tú”). This pairing is a natural one, as the intimacy —both 
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physical and emotional— between lovers would seem to provide the most providential 
opportunity for the subject to possess the other and, in doing so, to reveal his own being 
to himself. This desire is expressed in verses such as the following, from the poem 
“Epístola de Heironimus Bosch” in which the poetic voice pays homage to the Flemish 
painter’s insight into human nature, and in particular, to his masterpiece “Garden of 
Earthly Delights”: 
Mas siempre el hombre, 
yo, cualquiera, tú mismo, 
el hombre y su desnudez 
correteando atontado 
por jardines de delicias 
y planicies infernales 
y detrás y arriba 
del carro de heno del mundo  
en el que cada cual arrebata lo que puede; 
su desnudez, no el sexo, 
añorando la totalidad de la desnudez, 
la primitiva unidad hermafrodita, 
el completo ser adán-eva ("Examen de nuestra causa" 186-87). 
In these verses, the first person voice identifies himself with men of all times who in both 
heavenly and infernal circumstances seize and seek to possess the most they can. The 
drive to procure and master is, on a more profound level, motivated by a yearning for 
totality. Just as Man attempts to reach his origin, he likewise is compelled to recover a 
state of complete “Same-ness,” before the self and other were rent apart. The “Adam-Eve 
being” that is considered to be a “primitive hermaphrodite unity,” represents a utopian 
state of being and of knowing that would fuse the Same and the Other, ironically 
abolishing Man as he is presently defined through his “completion.” 
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 Other poems of Girri’s further our understanding of the nature of the relationship 
of Man as subject with the Other. The context of the romantic interaction between a man 
and a woman serves as the vehicle for exploring what it means to be a subject. It should 
be noted that “man” and “woman” are arbitrary representatives of the unresolved 
existential dialectic between what one identifies as the self and the other. Girri 
commented on this point in an interview with Enrique Pezzoni that there is: “la serie de 
poemas sobre el amor, en los que una y otra vez se insiste en el abrazo amoroso como 
prueba, precisamente, de distancia, de separación, de imposibilidad de reconciliar los 
opuestos” (Pezzoni "El hacedor en su crítico" 157). The final two verses of the poem “La 
separación” also succinctly complement this explanation: “La procaz esperanza de 
descubrir en el amor cumplido/ Un perfecto glacial conocimiento de mí mismo” ("El 
tiempo que destruye" 110). The modern subject acknowledges the limits of his science —
both of himself and of the other— and is compelled to surpass them. The act of love 
appeals to the subject as a way of accessing what is veiled and generally impenetrable to 
his reasoning, and bringing it to light. The adjective “glacial” is telling, in that the 
knowledge desired is detached, crystallized, frozen and fixed into icy transparency.  
 Girri’s poetic subjects are not afforded the luxury of cultivating a conciliatory 
experience of love. The voices that speak from his poems may harbor an initial illusion 
about their capacity for reconciliation and co-penetration, but experience amends these 
naiveties. One poem’s title summarizes the veritable condition of the subject who acts 
upon his impulse to overcome his own finitude through approaching the other: “El 
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engañado.” The poem denounces the deceived lover that “[c]ree buscar el absoluto” and 
unmasks the motives and the results of such an attempt to go beyond himself: 
Ni siquiera la duración del momento 
Es cosa que recuerde bien, 
Porque su memoria sólo guarda con cuidado 
Lo que él es y acepta en el impulso. 
Primero, un ansioso, falso apremio 
Desafiando al tiempo mortal, 
A la pesadilla vergonzosa del futuro; 
[…] 
Un darse cuenta que el salir de sí mismo 
Para verse vivir en otro rostro 
No es comunión, es desunión, 
Es abandonar en mezcla insípida 
Lo distinto que persiste en cada cual. 
Y al terminar la pugna, 
Devorada ya la imitación que busca, 
Vuelve a estar en el sitio de partida, 
Y solo ("El tiempo que destruye" 105). 
The poetic voice begins by ironically signaling the first barrier to surmounting his 
finitude: the mind and memory cannot operate outside of the “I” that forms the borders of 
his consciousness or the time that demarcates his mortality. These conditions assumed, 
the subject awakens to his manifest loneliness and heterogeneity that cannot be 
reconciled with the Other. One cannot leave oneself to be merged with another, nor can 
the other imitate the subject so that their differences are dissolved. Man can never master 
himself or the other because there will always be “lo distinto que persiste en cada cual.” 
In an article written about a posterior book of Girri’s, Valores diarios (1970), Alice 
Borinsky comments on the role of the second person in this stage of Girri’s poetry. I 
believe these observations are relevant to the subject being described in “El engañado”:  
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El camino que conduce a la respuesta a estos interrogantes se materializa en la 
relación con el tú a quien se vitupera, hiere, utiliza para demostraciones, de quien 
se sospecha. Es un tú cuyo cuerpo (el lugar del sufrimiento físico y el centro de 
placer) permanece siempre ajeno o huidizo; es un tú con una identidad en 
constante lucha […] La identidad es, así, delineada como una hipótesis de 
equilibrio inestable; ser uno es un campo de batalla que a veces brinda el 
espejismo de la autenticidad (884-85). 
 
Borinsky attempts to prove that “El afán revelador de la poesía [de Girri] es descubrir los 
límites de la elocuencia del otro” (886), but I would argue that it is actually one’s own 
limits that are Girri’s concern. The one who is vituperated, wounded and suspected is the 
subject himself, whose identity is never consolidated. One is never one, as the Other 
incriminates the solidification of a unified concept and experience of the self. Man by 
definition will always be confronted with the radical autri that inhabits himself and the 
things and beings he attempts to know.  
Just as Girri concludes that the other is always out of the subject’s consciousness 
and reach, even in the embrace of two lovers, he also exposes that part of himself that 
cannot be subsumed in the pronoun “I.” He terms this side of his own being a “fanatical 
guest,” spy,” and “accomplice” and ultimately says that he “[e]s un hermano”:  
Es un hermano 
el fanático huésped 
alzado sobre mí, dentro de mí 
espía y cómplice 
resolviendo en pérfida igualdad 
la oposición y tensión 
de mi terrena estructura 
que se lanza tras su imagen 
como exorcizando lo creado 
para crear un hombre nuevo, 
inmune a los fantasmas 
que dejé de lado, 
diezmo que debo pagar 
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por la anhelada paz 
de aquel que desespera. 
 
Es un hermano, 
retrospección él, soledad ambos, 
rechazándonos, amándonos ("Examen de nuestra causa" 173). 
 
The poetic subject is structured in duality so that whatever he claims to be and know is 
mirrored in opposition in his twin that stands over and in him. The first person attempts 
to create himself as a “new man” who is “immune to the ghosts” —the unassailable 
others— that destroy his peace and wholeness. This “new man” would have to be 
fundamentally different from himself, so much so as to imply a complete exorcism of 
what he is thus far. The subject, however, is as close to becoming that Man as he is to 
reaching and inhabiting his origin. In the end, Girri’s poetic voice acquiesces and 
subscribes to the equalizing condition of the plural pronoun “we,” which links and 
reconfigures the profile of the enunciating “I” (the Same) and the “He” (the Other). This 
correspondence is one of equalizing solitude in which the dialectics of their relationship 
is endlessly repeated: the Same approaches and loves the Other to gain wholeness and 
total self-comprehension, but rejects it for not being and becoming the Same. Man as 
subject in Girri’s poetry will adopt a similar stance with the systems of knowledge he 
creates for and about himself, as we will presently discover. 
2.1.5 THE LIGHT BEYOND MY REACH 
 The last defining aspect of the modern subject has a direct precedent in the 
foundational assertion of rationalism: cogito ergo sum. As he undertakes the central 
position in the episteme, modern Man conceives himself as an empirical subject that can 
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only establish his dominion by founding all of his knowledge on his thoughts. More than 
being the initial stage for the subject’s investigations, his ability to think becomes the 
source for all that there is to know. Girri ironically refers to Man’s intellectual activities 
as “la labor de clasificación,/ rotulado, encasillamiento,/ de nuestras pequeñas 
construcciones” ("La condición necesaria" 306). By opposition, that which he cannot 
think, does not exist for the modern Man. Girri’s poetry acknowledges this impulse and 
critically reveals the paradoxical vision of Man for whom modernity is only available 
within the limits of his intelligibility. Let us consider this image in Girri’s following 
poem, “La condición necesaria”:       
En la ilusión de que posees 
un yo creador, indestructible, 
justo y sin deformidad, 
fortaleza 
en el dominio de las evidencias, 
señor absoluto 
de tu casa, tu camino, 
señor  
de los orbes terrenales ("La condición necesaria" 313) 
 
 The “illusion” or hope of a subject capable of projecting perfect sense and order 
to the universe through the force of his empirical cogito is soon challenged. Girri’s poetic 
subject, questioning a second person in the above poem, deconstructs the self-conferred 
attributes of Man who believes himself to be not only the “indestructible creator,” but 
also the “absolute ruler” of the earth. Man’s experience, however, is not of complete 
dominion and understanding. From the ironic inflections addressing the imaginary second 
person of this poem, Girri redirects his critique to a first-person subject in a poem in 
which he articulates the basic “truth” of Man’s state: “…esta sola verdad:/ el orden, orden 
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de lo que sea,/ ¡ay!, me está vedado” ("Playa sola" 33). Girri evidences what Foucault 
describes as the crisis of the cogito facing “the unthought”: the realm of epistemic 
knowledge that is not breached by the modern Man’s reasoning. As pure negativity, the 
unthought imposes, nevertheless, the boundaries for the positive empiricism of modern 
Man. As in the conflicting dynamic of the Same and the Other, modern Man’s cogito is 
determined not only in its positivity, but in the insurmountable negativity of the 
unthought. In other words, the modern subject is defined not just by its self-given 
epistemic centrality, but also by the very impossibility of maintaining such a position. In 
order to be modern, Man has to embrace his crisis. In Girri’s poetry, this crisis is 
acknowledged and immediately confronted. As we will discuss in the second part of this 
chapter, however, Girri’s poetic “I” will later reconsider his relationship with reality and 
Girri, the author, will seek to abolish its centrality and presence in his works. At this 
stage though, the “I” is the only possible knower —the main subject of this world— and 
it attempts to overcome its empirical limitations by resorting to magic, a strategy through 
which the obscure regions of reality may be finally accessible.  
Girri dedicates an entire book to exploring “magic’s properties.” The opening 
epigraph argues that magic: “…es el poder, la cantidad, la sustancia, las virtudes, las 
semejanzas, las diferencias, el arte de unir, de separar, de componer…” ("Propiedades de 
la magia" 265) — in other words, its power lies in unveiling and harnessing the hidden 
order and relationships between things that are not discernable through Man’s faculty of 
reason.  From this collection is the following poem, “Bastón”: 
Oh Potencia, 
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gobierno de las regiones límite, 
ayúdanos 
a que sobre ella, 
rama de nogal, 
modesta vara sin retoños 
menos singular que la felicidad 
y que el trébol que jamás florece, 
se extiendan  
la virtud y la gracia, 
concede transparencia 
a las veladas aguas de la fuente 
donde bañaremos sus nudos, 
hazla obediente. 
Amén ("Propiedades de la magia" 268). 
 
Presented in the form of a prayer or an invocation, the poetic voice calls for a 
supplemental artifact, the “bastón,” to act as the key to subdue reality to the will of the 
knowing subject. The poetic voice appeals to a “power” beyond himself so that the staff’s 
properties, as well as those of the water that will sanctify it, will have the qualities that he 
himself desires. The staff’s potential abilities do not emanate from Man’s cogito; in fact, 
the poem is an admission of the subject’s limitations. Man, here a collective subject, still 
harbors hopes of governing the “outer limits,” but in order to do so, he is faced with the 
unknown that dwarfs him. In other poems, such as “ El Sueño” ("El tiempo que destruye" 
104) or “Bocanadas de adios” ("Examen de nuestra causa" 197), the poetic subject 
invokes dreams or memories as other means of accessing that unknown region that 
haunts him with its inaccessible presence. As in the poem “Bastón,” these strategies only 
reinforce the fact that the scope of Man’s knowledge is restricted and that his centrality in 
the episteme is precarious, at best. 
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In addition to exploring the problem of the “unthought” in his poetry, Girri also 
struggles with an even more basic aspect of the empirical subject: the correspondence of 
things and words. Language’s power of representation is what Man utilizes to be able to 
“capture” and communicate what he establishes as the known. As we have seen in the 
first chapter, the modern episteme operates within the assumption of the arbitrary 
relationship between sign and signifier. It is precisely this arbitrary relationship —and not 
an essential and hermetic bond between words and things— that allowed the infinite 
classical taxonomies to develop that characterize the previous episteme. In the modern 
episteme, the simple pairing of a thing and its representative word is no longer so 
transparent, as language itself experiences two radical changes: 1) the need to historicize 
its grammatical structures and to search for the etymological root of each word launches a 
complex and permanent analytical task; 2) the acknowledgement of a literary discourse 
that no longer operates under the imperative of representing the world provides the 
foundational possibilities, according to Foucault, of what will be known as literary 
modernity. Under these two premises emerge what thinkers like Foucault and Heidegger 
consider the major challenges in modern Western epistemological thought: the analytical 
force of Nietzschean philosophy and the emergence of modern literature and its 
exceptional epistemic status, in which the paradigms of modern subjectivity are put into 
question.  
Girri’s poetry is a timely manifestation of these concerns, producing a literary 
discourse that is uneasy with the function of language in relation to the world. As critic 
Enrique Pezzoni explains of Girri’s poetry: “La palabra es mero conato de llegar a la 
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realidad, pero la realidad está siempre más allá de la palabra” ("Prólogo" 10-11). He 
quotes from the poem “Semántica”: “Nunca conseguiríamos/ llegar a la médula, atrapar/ 
qué significó, exactamente,/ Dante con amor,/ qué quiso Sócrates con arête.” The poem is 
included in El ojo (1963), a book that we will consider as transitional from what we have 
termed the first and second periods in Girri’s poetry. The crisis of modernity is in full 
view at this stage of Girri’s works. The ability of the poetic I to make sense of his world 
is compromised, as we have seen, by the impossibility of overcoming the shortcomings 
of his cogito and the historical density of his language. To express these phenomena, the 
poetic discourse enters into a crisis that questions the validity of our epistemic 
knowledge. Horacio Castillo summarizes Girri’s position:   
La primera etapa se caracteriza por su indefinición, por la insuficiencia expresiva, 
la imposibilidad de conciliar fondo y forma, vida y arte. […] El lenguaje tantea 
entre la ruina, entre tanta desolación; busca afirmarse, rescatar esa material de la 
nada, insuflarle nueva vida, perdurabilidad (Castillo 19-20). 
 
The lack of definition to which Castillo refers, as well as the desire to affirm 
oneself through some form of permanence despite the subject’s incapacity to do so, 
comes to a head in poems such as “Palomas.” Here, the first-person subject reveals his 
unstable condition, his desire and his doubts, summarizing what we have discussed so far. 
The poem begins with an epigraph from the sixth book of the Aeneid that reads: 
“Guiadme, oh, si hay un camino,” the words that Aeneas utters to the two doves that lead 
him to the golden bough that is presented to Proserpina, allowing him to enter the 
underworld in life. In this poem, the first-person poetic subject also seeks to connect with 
doves that are just beyond his arm’s reach: 
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Casi en la extendida mano, 
extraños y a la vez subrayando 
mis diluvios más secretos, 
los cuellos multicolores, hinchados, 
cargan balcones y arquitrabes 
con la última fuerza del día, 
verano que se desploma,  
luz fuera de mi alcance. 
 
Continuo y férvido, 
ceremonial y tembloroso, 
el arrullo de dilectas 
bestias de lujuria 
me acosa, retumba, 
como realidad intermedia 
entre lo natural y lo divino, 
y como Eneas imploró, suplico  
que en sus vuelos me señalen 
allá abajo, detrás de las paredes, 
en la espesura del asfalto, 
quién oculta, dónde languidece, 
la dorada rama, amor y sésamo, 
para arrancarla de cuajo 
y azotarme hasta aventar la borra, 
las emanaciones que el espejo devuelve, 
figuras y arbitrios 
de mi buscar certezas  
y no querer posarme en ellas, 
de mi dejarme consumir apeteciendo 
retener algo que supere todo cambio 
aunque sólo en lo que ya no es 
se demore lo mejor de mí ("Examen de nuestra causa" 169). 
 
In the first stanza, the doves evoke various thoughts for the poetic speaker. The birds are 
representative of the enigma of the world: they are there almost at hand, but remain 
impenetrable, swollen in their own strange and secret being. They remind the subject of 
his own internal conflicts, perhaps of the parts of himself that he cannot understand or 
dominate. Aware of his place in the passage of time and inscribing himself within a 
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cultural and literary tradition, the doves are symbolic of a light of understanding that he, 
unlike Aeneas, cannot reach. The second stanza reaffirms this idea: the doves’ cooing 
belongs to a place between the “natural and divine” that “harasses” him because of its 
incomprehensibility. Man has separated and elevated himself from the natural world in 
articulating its meaning and seeking to dominate it; he also has attempted to usurp the 
place God. In these verses, it is evident that both attempts have failed: nature and the 
world remain closed to him, and unlike a divinity, the poetic subject does not hold the 
secrets to the universe. Alone in the episteme of his creation, the poetic subject implores 
that the birds reveal to him the hidden key to resolve his existence.  
The symbol that Girri invokes and invests with this power is the golden bough, an 
object that has fascinated scholars for centuries and has been the inspiration of exhaustive 
books, such as the now classic The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (1922) 
by Sir James George Frazer. Relying on folk beliefs, Frazer identifies the symbolic 
golden bough as mistletoe. In Girri’s employment of the golden bough in his poem, 
however, the interpretation of Robert A. Brooks is more insightful. He writes that Virgil: 
has presented life and death, both as opposites […]. The human actors have 
reached the impasse of inner experience and outward observation, two 
irreconcilable aspects of reality. The golden bough is the necessary and external 
sign demanded to resolve the antinomy, and bears a fundamental relation to it. 
[…] The gold takes its meaning from the tree on which it grows, and the essential 
purpose of the image, […] is to create a contrast between living and dead which is 
at the same time a vital union. […] The significance of the bough as death, or 
rather as the tension between life and death in a single unit of being (271-74). 
 
The golden bough allows Aeneas to pass from the realm of the living to that of the dead, 
and back again. Its very constitution unites the irreconcilable spheres of being and non-
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being that subsume the categories of sameness and otherness, the ultimate origin/finality 
and temporal existence. Girri’s poetic subject announces that he would use the bough to 
whip himself in order to go beyond the boundaries and structures of Man. He wishes to 
be rid of the emanations of the mirror that only serve to reflect and reinforce the notion of 
the self as the center of the “certainties” that he seeks and on which he wishes to rest, as 
that thing that “surpasses all change.” The golden bough represents an attempt to create a 
different order, to arrive at a new understanding of the self that is removed from the 
center, which embraces its own antimony and strives to move beyond the confines of the 
“I.” Luis Alberto Vittor in his monographic book-length study about the hermetic gnosis 
in Girri’s poetry, remarks that “el sufrimiento que le ha originado ese desgarro que se 
produce cuando el yo externo descubre que lo que en él parecía ser algo permanente no es 
más que una ‘ilusión’, una ‘apariencia’” is also “lo que llevará al yo poético, aunque 
parezca paradójico a primera vista, a conseguir la ansiada prenda de su conquista 
espiritual: la ‘Rama Dorada’” (64-65). Girri’s next “spiritual conquests” will also be due 
to a questioning of the role of Man —explored here principally through the first person 
subject— both as a figure of knowledge and as the optical lens for poetry.  
2.1.6 MAN HANGING FROM THE BARS 
Girri’s first poetry, as we have discussed in these pages, grapples directly with the 
terms of being a modern subject, and in particular, the doublets that Foucault uses to 
describe the figure of Man: the retreat and return of the origin, the Same and the Other, 
the cogito and the unthought. It should be understood that Foucault does not write of the 
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modern episteme as a system that in its genesis was free of contradictions. On the 
contrary, modernity was born in crisis, and Man’s centrality and capacities have always 
been defined by his finitude. Girri, likewise, begins his poetic explorations by directly 
confronting the conundrums inherent to the subject as it seeks to establish its dominion of 
empirical knowledge and identity. In the first phase of Girri’s writing, his poetic subjects 
never realize their goals of finding an origin, making the Other part of the Same or 
overcoming the unthought. Girri’s poems serve in part to denounce Man’s existential 
condition and to highlight the failure of the routes to which Man turns in an effort to 
overcome these obstacles.  
 Girri has often commented on this period in his literary career, offering analyses 
of the thematic and poetic style that predominate in these works. Of his observations, one 
that adds dimension to our discussion is his remark about the role of irony in these 
poems. In an interview with Danubio Torres Fierro, Girri elaborated on his first books 
and why irony is an important lens through which to study the modern western subject as 
it faces the world: 
Si en los primeros títulos asoma [la ironía] con claridad se debió a que era una de 
las pocas armas de que disponía para poner en evidencia, o para señalar, esa 
presencia constante del yo en el hombre occidental. Es curioso lo que sucede con 
ese yo. Por un lado, significaba o significa una voluntad de poderío, de dominio 
sobre la naturaleza, sobre la cosa, sobra sí mismo, y, por otro, es una 
manifestación de la notable inferioridad o invalidez del hombre, para defenderse 
de las cuales no hace sino dorarse la píldora con este yo (18-19). 
 
Modern Man’s exertions to control all aspects of himself and the world that surrounds 
him in order to be able to affirm the “I’s” predominance are met with a critical eye. 
Girri’s early poetry is a denunciation of the figure of the “I,” deconstructing those 
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elements that form the base for its erection. Enrique Pezzoni opines that the employment 
of irony is a form of distancing to demonstrate the “[d]uelo entre la subjetividad y una 
objetividad que sólo corrobora la condena y la muerte” ("El hacedor en su crítico" 156). 
Girri’s poems implicitly reject the figure of Man as the form of being in the world, 
demonstrating that his very structure is at “duel,” and that for all of the subject’s efforts 
to resolve its crises, it is condemned to defeat. One of Girri’s earliest poems published, 
“El testigo,” already pronounces this judgment: 
Con el rostro enlodado, en un rapto de furia celosa 
levanto el acta de mi piel. 
esta piel mía, fantasmal y tensa, 
que envejece sola. 
 
Hay respuestas, condenas, hay nacimientos 
y heridas de clavos que algo significan. 
Mas ni eso, ni la elevación del cáliz encendido, 
muerte y muerte del hombre por el hombre 
anuncian paz.  
[… ]  
 
He tratado de decir 
que el occidente está enfermo de materia y de ironía ("Playa sola" 23). 
 
In these verses, the poetic voice speaks to chronicle his existence: one of time, change 
and suffering in which the attempts to make sense of his being and to control his destiny 
fail. None of Man’s explanations —be they religious or secular— brings peace or 
comprehension to him. The final couplet urges the infirm Western world to explore 
different courses of being and thinking that break the mold of subjectivity in which he is 
locked. Girri portrays the modern Western subject as a prisoner, trapped in the “I.” In 
another poem laden with irony, Girri writes of Man’s reaction to a tiger in a zoo which 
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leads him to the following reflection: “qué será de nosotros que aceptamos/ depender de 
una verdad/ y no adivinamos en su jaula/ permanentemente,/ al Hombre colgado de las 
rejas” ("La penitencia y el mérito" 258). Man, bound by the truth that he establishes in 
and through himself, is stuck in a cage of his own making, what Foucault has termed the 
“sommeil anthropologique.” 
 The strategies and discourses of “el Hombre” form the basis of the modern 
episteme that Foucault describes and, parallelly, the “technology” that Martin Heidegger 
terms Enframing (Gestell) —the manner in which man reveals the real to himself as to set 
upon it and to have it present at hand for his use and control.  Girri’s early poetry can be 
read as participating in this very modern philosophical exploration and critique of Man. 
Foucault, we should recollect, foretells the proximate erasure of the figure of Man and the 
dawn of another manner of approaching the world, the word and knowledge, already 
perceiving in certain literary experiences an alternative outside of the epistemic 
framework of Man. In abandoning Man as the figure through which all knowledge and 
experience is configured, both Foucault and Heidegger intimate a manner of being and 
knowing for humankind. Girri shares this opinion, and the second phase of his writing is 
dedicated to articulating a poetry of knowledge that moves beyond Man and the 
domineering presence of the “I” so that literature itself can speak. In an interview with 
Raúl Vera Ocampo, Girri elaborates on the goals of his literature, which go against the 
grain of traditional Western thought: “Vivimos dentro del mundo occidental y lo real es 
que la presencia del yo que impone el mundo occidental, la autoafirmación a través del 
yo, produce todas esas fracturas y esa esquizofrenia. En realidad el ideal último de la 
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literatura debiera ser el anonimato” (58). The subject of the second half of this chapter 
focuses on the form and content that his “anonymous” literature takes, as well as its 
points in common with the philosophical project of Heidegger and other thinkers. Let us 
preview this process through the words of María Victoria Suárez who writes that Girri 
proceeds: 
del andar despojándose de cuanto tomó por propiedad y estuvo contenido en su 
decir ‘Yo soy’; saber que le adviene con la conciencia de que el tiempo es ilusión 
y, por lo tanto, ilusorio el individuo singular e histórico, el yo aferrado de la 
memoria; certidumbre de que sólo el presente y su vivencia son en el acto 
impersonal y universal de generar una forma ("Una poesía en pugna consigo 
misma" 7). 
 
In the following sections, we will trace Girri’s new positioning of the human being in the 









2.2 The Path of the Hacedor 
2.2.1 NOT KNOWING HOW TO SAY “I AM” 
In what we are calling the second half of Girri’s works, the question of the 
metaphysical subject does not disappear, nor is Man’s centrality immediately exchanged 
for some felicitous solution. Girri, like Martin Heidegger, views Man in his current state 
as an obstacle to an authentic relationship with the real, one that is not scripted by the 
configuration of his Enframing. While Foucault predicts Man’s erasure, he does not foray 
into this uncharted territory, preferring to maintain his analysis within the limits of the 
historical. Heidegger, on the other hand, does venture to trace a role for the human being 
that does not signify his elimination, but his ontological repositioning and re-
appropriation to the world. Girri, likewise, explores new roles for the human being that 
resonate with Heidegger’s thought. In his prose reflections, Girri contemplates the 
possibility of achieving “autoanulamiento” and “impersonalidad” as an alternative to 
modern subjectivity.  
To write from the “I” impedes contact with the rest of reality, as the subject that 
faces any object inherently assumes the stance of duality when it attempts to gain 
knowledge of it. Sergio Cueto rightly comments that “La pregunta por el qué señala es 
distancia, esa disociación entre el sujeto y el objeto del preguntar, entre lo interior y lo 
exterior, la persona y el mundo que se abre con la representación” (Seis estudios girrianos 
44). Knowledge through Man’s representation inevitably is undermined by the fact that 
he cannot really grasp what is, and therefore the modern episteme is structured through 
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the three doublets we have discussed in detail in the first half of this chapter. Girri 
ponders the dual nature of modern Western thought that is erected through affirmations 
and denials and never the neutrality of emptiness: “Porque siempre hay afirmaciones y 
negaciones. Porque ninguna de ellas ha construido dentro de sí un vacío. Ese que concede 
trascender cualquier afirmación, negación” ("El motivo es el poema" 254). Man’s use of 
language is also defined by the rigidity of subjective representation in which all thought 
is articulated through him and for his use, attempting to overcome the unknown and 
language’s ambiguity in order to assure the total objectification and unhiddenness of all 
beings. This manner of speech and writing is what characterized the poetic subjects of 
Girri’s first poetry —what he has termed the “vía de la representación” (Torres Fierro 
41)— and that which he attempts to overcome in his later works. Girri illustrates the two 
possibilities through the following words: “el ojo izquierdo en efecto es el que mira al 
tiempo, mientras que el derecho mira a la eternidad. Y demostrar que el ojo izquierdo es 
el que engaña, armando una representación tras otra, y provocando así un deseo 
insaciable de propiedad” ("Diario de un libro" 54). To move beyond the “I” while being 
and writing is a difficult task, as the “I” is stuck in its habitual discourses, psyche and 
biological condition. Girri elaborates: 
Especie de absurdo, porque todo proviene de la obsesión por identificarse con lo 
que sea, en lugar de la autoanulación. Hacer y moverse, cuando lo que más 
importaría es no hacer, no moverse, ser (abandonarse), poseídos del llamado a la 
inexistencia ("El motivo es el poema" 278).  
 
Girri struggles with the natural tendency to approach the world from within the 
parameters of the episteme in which he was born —one defined by the contradictions of 
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historical and subjective existence— and the necessity to disband the “I” and renegotiate 
the concept of self in order to achieve different truths, meanings and experiences. To 
question the legitimacy and truth of the first-person subject is anguishing, as what one is 
or could be is, therefore, not known. In the second part of the poem “Cuatro ángulos, 
idéntica certidumbre,” Girri explores this possibility: 
Mirar y observar 
con la congoja de reconocerse 
en la perspectiva de que no  
se es dueño de un yo permanente, 
y lo dudoso, al no haberlo, 
de contar con un yo hacedor 
de nuestros actos, 
un actor detrás de ellos, un receptor 
detrás de nuestra percepción ("Quien habla no está muerto" 172). 
 
Despite the anxiety of conceiving of oneself without a certain identity, not even as a 
unified consciousness behind one’s actions, Girri has discovered that assuming a fixed 
subjective identity is a greater danger. All writing done from posture of subjectivity, he 
realizes, will ultimately be controlled by what he terms the “Demonio de la singularidad,” 
which he explains: “Va petrificando al que lo padece, exaspera al lector de lo que 
engendra. Textos aplastados por un peso en definitiva extenuante” ("Lo propio, lo de 
todos" 74). Man that insists on his singularity as subject encumbers himself, his reader 
and his writing with the burdensome weight of the “I” that overwhelms and squelches all 
other thoughts and perspectives through its representation of the world to himself: “Nos 
individualizamos por la enfermedad, no por la salud” ("Diario de un libro" 29). 
Girri has arrived to: “La etapa en que el creador de literatura empieza a calmarse 
de sí mismo, de opiniones, prejuicios, obstinación, egoísmo” ("Diario de un libro" 32). 
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Such a task requires that one ask oneself, as Girri does in the poem “Preguntarse, cada 
tanto”: “Qué hacer/ del viejo yo lírico, errático estímulo,/ al ir avecinándonos a la fase/ de 
los silencios, la de no desear/ ya doblegarnos animosamente/ ante cada impresión que 
hierve […]” ("Quien habla no está muerto" 188). If Man as subject is to be abandoned, 
the question remains as to how to redefine the human being. María Victoria Suárez 
speaks of an “antiyó” that gains predominance over time in Girri’s works that she defines 
rather circularly as “universalidad instalada en la carne y el hueso despojados de 
ilusiones, esto es, de la idea del yo” (Alberto Girri: Existencia y lógica poética 118). To 
transform oneself into an “antiyó” requires an abandonment of the traditional modes of 
thought and self-conception. Girri conceives of this process in the poem “Cuando la idea 
del yo se aleja” which reads: 
De lo que va adelante 
y de lo que sigue atrás, 




abjurando de armas, faltas, 
de oraciones donde borrar las faltas, 
blando organismo, entidad 
que ignora cómo decir: “Yo soy”, ("El ojo" 46). 
 
Here the poetic subject is still the center of articulation, but it proposes a regulated course   
intended to achieve a new mode of comprehension and experience, free from the 
domination of the “I.” As these verses suggest, such a process entails rethinking notions 
of time, of the function of language and the conception of self. This new poetic voice 
comprehends the dangers of Man trapped behind the bars of his self-made prison that 
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“enframes” him along with the world that surrounds him. A new image is proposed for 
the human existence —a “soft organism” or “entity that does not know how to say ‘I 
am’”— one of flexibility and softness and free of doctrines and divisions designed to 
assure Man’s dominance.  
If we take our cues from Heidegger, the “antiyó” is an approximation of a 
position that the subject attempts to adopt in which the self becomes a place of reception. 
The loss of subjectivity does not equate self-annihilation but rather Gelassenheit, a 
posture of sheltering that permits things to reveal themselves in their own terms, 
respectfully guarding their core of mystery. Removed from the center of representation, 
the human being (Heidegger’s Dasein) is re-appropriated to the world through his 
attentive disposition, opening himself up to listening and seeing in such a way that he 
achieves an emptiness both temporally and spatially for the manifestation of other things 
and beings in their unconcealedness and hiddenness.  
As a routine practitioner of meditation, Girri cultivates a new awareness of the 
self in relationship with the world. In conversation with Pablo Ananía, Girri says that his 
meditation simply “consiste en buscar mi reubicación en el mundo…es como abrirse al 
hecho de que ha aparecido un nuevo día, esto es de alguna manera un milagro frente al 
que hay que ubicarse” and that “cualquier otro instrumento, puede ser un objeto de la 
meditación” (Ananía 223-24). As these unaffected words indicate, the subject 
accommodates himself to his world —and not the world to the subject— so as to 
experience them freshly, as a “miracle.” In the interview with Danubio Torres Fierro to 
which we have referred previously, Girri similarly recommends:  
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quien escribe piense en sí mismo con una intensidad tan absoluta que lo lleve a 
trascenderse, a colocarse más allá de ese interlocutor […] En otras palabras, […] 
estar en un estado de atención casi absoluto, o absoluto en la medida en que cada 
cual pueda estarlo. Y ese estado de atención genera una situación interna que nos 
obliga a meditar sobre aquello que lo ha provocado. Esa meditación traduce en 
una visión donde las palabras son un complemento de la cosa (14-15). 
 
Although such comments may seem facile, Girri is by no means glib in his thoughts 
about this process. On the contrary, the inability to articulate a specific method to abolish 
the “yo” is often aggravatingly frustrating. Heidegger and Girri coincide in their opinion 
that to specify a particular path to dismantle the “I” would be a form of participation in 
the episteme of Man by transforming experience into representation thought  for his use. 
Instead, each subject must embark on his own ascetic journey: “Trabajar sobre sí. El 
recurso de intentar ver y avanzar en la oscuridad, antes que por regiones que de tan 
iluminadas se convierten en tierra de nadie” ("Diario de un libro" 110). In other words, 
each person’s path of discovery is dark, requiring the individual to work on himself. If 
everything were already illuminated to Man, then there would be no reason for him to 
modify the self or to challenge his central position: such “illuminated regions” would 
only be added to the field of his control. 
 This path-making without guidance is an arduous and uncertain process, as there 
are no definitive answers or markers to which to refer. We should recall Heidegger’s own 
metaphors for his philosophical thought process: the Holzwege, Feldweg, Unterwegs zur 
Sprache (wood path, the path across the field, on the way to speech) cut by “indefatigable 
walker in unlit places” (Steiner 18). Girri also treads uncertain territory and he 
acknowledges this often, as in the following contemplation: 
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Prédica fácil. Impersonalidad personal, impersonalidad sinónimo de 
distanciamiento, distanciamiento como impersonalidad. En la práctica, no tan 
terminante. ¿Quién establece la distancia correcta, nosotros, los que estiman 
nuestra capacidad de distanciamiento? ("Lo propio, lo de todos" 77). 
 
How is it possible to ascertain if the “I” has been extinguished and that an impersonal 
universality has been achieved? Girri does not seem to know. However, sometimes just 
losing oneself without knowledge of the way is, in itself, the optimum form of advancing: 
“El que extravió las propias huellas. El que utiliza esa pérdida para alejarse de sí mismo” 
("Diario de un libro" 27). 
2.2.2 THE “ONEFOLD” OF THE POEM 
 If we take Girri’s word and seek an understanding of his poetry as pure 
enunciation —an attentive and thoughtful saying having eclipsed the subject — then 
further drawing on Martin Heidegger’s attentive contemplation about the nature of 
language and poetry is illuminating. My continued inclusion of Heidegger in this 
discussion would not be without dissenters; Alberto Villanueva, a careful reader of 
Girri’s work, sees a disjuncture between the Heideggerian point of view of the poet and 
his work, and that of Girri. This critic summarily writes off Heidegger’s thought as a 
means of expanding our understanding of Girri’s poetic stance because he attributes to 
the philosopher the opinion that the poet is the sacred protagonist, and not the poem or 
language itself (Villanueva 50-51). Instead, Villanueva sees a kinship in literary 
philosophy between Girri and Wallace Stevens, in regards to the conceiving of the poem. 
Such an interpretation is unfortunate, as Villanueva clearly has overlooked many of 
Heidegger’s later essays such as On the Way to Language (1959) and those collected in 
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Poetry, Language, Thought that meditate on the preeminence of the word and the very 
humble, but integral position of the human writer. This is not to imply that Villanueva’s 
observations about the commonalities of Girri’s and Stevens’s works are imperceptive, 
for Girri himself makes them evident in his commentaries included in Poemas de 
Wallace Stevens (1967), his Spanish translations of a selection of Stevens’s poems. What 
should be noted, however, is that these similarities share ground with Heidegger because 
of his transformative approach to language and poetry that coincide with Girri’s search 
for a poetry that eclipses the subject and simply speaks language. 
 Girri’s comments about Steven’s poetry are particularly eloquent in revealing his 
own conception of the poetic endeavor, which, in turn, will be related to Heidegger’s. 
Among the twenty-some textual commentaries that illuminate his translations, Girri 
addresses three points that I would like to highlight as germane to this discussion. The 
first is the fundamental relationship poetry maintains with the “real,” a precept for 
Stevens that Girri adopts as his own: “lo real que es ‘sólo la base, pero es la base’, y hacia 
lo cual debe ‘volar la imaginación para dar cuenta de las cosas tal y como son’, pues la 
imaginación ‘pierde vitalidad en cuanto deja de adherirse a lo que es real’” (Poemas de 
Wallace Stevens 66). This “real” is defined by Girri as the “campo donde opera la poesía, 
entendiendo por ello no solamente el mundo físico sino las cosas como son, as they are, y 
el proceso incesante que las mueve” (Poemas de Wallace Stevens 36). This real is the 
world in its immediate persistence of presence as being, as existence in constant 
transformation. Poetry explores the relationship between the reality of things and the 
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human being’s “imagination” or dynamic perception that opens itself to house the “nada 
que no está allí y la nada que está” (Poemas de Wallace Stevens 24).  
We should recall from the previous chapter our review of Heidegger’s 
appreciation of the “thing” and the manner in which poetic language respects and 
enlivens its being. Unlike the language of “enframing” and technology that strives to 
“grasp” a thing through the act of representation, thus rendering it an object or equipment 
for Man’s use. Heidegger writes: “It is no longer just a name-giving grasp reaching for 
what is present and already portrayed, it is not only a means of portraying what lies 
before us. On the contrary, the word first bestows presence, that is, Being in which things 
appear as beings” ("Words" 146). Poetry restores a thing to itself as autonomous, 
ungraspable, both revealing and concealing its being. “To say,” Heidegger states,  “means 
to show: to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call World, lighting 
and concealing it. This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential being of 
Saying” ("The Nature of Language" 93). When Girri refers to the poem as responding to 
the nada that is and the nada that is not, he returns us to the mysterious and ambiguous 
nature of Being that conserves its no-thingness even as it presences as things.  
Heidegger’s “world” emphasizes and harbors the interrelationships and mutual 
belonging of the elements that compose the world. In fact, he defines the “thing” as the 
site for the “gathering-appropriating staying of the fourfold” (Heidegger "The Thing" 
172). Each of the fourfold —earth, sky, divinities and mortals— has its own nature and 
particularity that simultaneously stands forth in presence and remains concealed and 
unfathomable. Likewise, each of the four is, of its own accord, appropriated to the others 
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and, in turn, appropriates and “mirrors in its own way the presence of the others” ("The 
Thing" 177). This mutual betrothing, appropriating and radiating selflessly back forms a 
“onefold mirror-play” that Heidegger terms the “world.” Only in facing each other and 
belonging to one other does each presence come into its own completely. Similar to 
Heidegger’s vision of poetry as the “onefold mirror-play” that restitutes the “world,” 
Girri likens his poems to a clear mirror that opens itself non-selectively as an attentive 
surface where all things may gather:  
Y el poema encarnándose, 
ni demasiado rápido, 
ni la menor agitación ociosa, 
   un claro espejo 
suspendido en lo alto ("Tramas de conflictos" 32). 
Of the four, the human being honors his own essence and responds to the world 
when he gives of himself and his attention, becoming the Open in and through which 
language speaks. Heidegger writes: 
Language, Saying of the world’s fourfold, is no longer only such that we speaking 
human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and 
language. Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It 
relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world’s 
regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself —Saying— in reserve. 
Reserving itself in this way, as Saying of the world’s fourfold, language 
concerns us, us who can speak only as we respond to language ("The Nature of 
Language" 107). 
 
The poetic word grants the restoration of the world, as such speaking sets each thing free 
into its own presencing and self-concealment, gathering the fourfold together around it. 
Girri also brings to his reader’s awareness the interlacing of the thing itself, the one 
granting an opening to the experience of its being through his attentiveness and the word 
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that preserves this relatedness as truth. He writes that there is “una tensión espiritual a 
través de la cual el poeta trata de aprovechar todos los recursos que la inteligencia y la 
sensibilidad ponen a su alcance por expresar una verdad, objeto esencial del poema, y los 
movimientos sucesivos en la búsqueda de esa verdad” (Poemas de Wallace Stevens 8).  
The “successive movements” that are involved in the continuing this search are 
related to the second point that I would like to take up as it relates to Girri’s poetics vis-a-
vis Stevens’s, and in relation to Heidegger. In commenting upon Stevens’s “Anecdote of 
the Jar,” Girri remarks how this poem in itself demonstrates the dynamic principle of how 
a thing, the world it is part of, the human poetic imagination and language interact to 
create a constant flux of interweavings. Girri comments:  
Este poema ha sido explicado como un intento del autor de introducir el tema de 
la interacción mutua, el efecto de un objeto sobre lo que lo rodea y viceversa. En 
la ‘anécdota’, el objeto es un cántaro, algo que no es solamente una forma en sí 
misma sino que también crea formas en lo que circunda. La imaginación, 
actuando sobre la realidad, provoca ese estado. Pero a la vez, lo que funciona es 
un anhelo de orden, derivado de la necesidad mutua de los elementos en el juego: 
el cántaro, firme, gris y desnudo sobre la colina, y el yermo, despojado de 
matorrales y de pájaros (Poemas de Wallace Stevens 62). 
 
Stevens’s poetic rendering of the jar takes place in the confluence of a wild hill, the birds, 
the air, the human who had placed it there and whose imagination and language open up 
a new space for all the elements thus gathered by virtue of the writer’s openness and 
attention. The human being’s participation is not that of the subject that defines the 
relationships; rather he is also the recipient of the appropriation and “play” of the other 
parts and his imagination and language create the opportunity for this experience to arise. 
The result is a mobile appreciation of all assembled, such that the poem restitutes to each 
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its integral “being with” that binds it freely to the world and into its own nature. Girri’s 
reading of Stevens’s jar cannot fail to remind us of Heidegger’s jug —briefly discussed in 
the previous chapter— that is the quintessential example of the thing qua “thing,” in 
Heidegger’s understanding of the word. The jug, like the jar, when housed in thought and 
poetry, becomes the holding space for earth, sky, divinities and mortals to “dwell 
together all at once” ("The Thing" 173), creating an “outpouring” that is the knowledge 
that only such attention and speech can produce. Girri contemplates this movement in his 
commentaries to the translation of other North American poets:  
es importante expresar el choque y abrazo de la imaginación con la realidad, 
realidad que se convierte en poesía en el instante en que el poeta toma nota de 
ella. […] hay algo no conocido en el conocimiento, con lo cual no sólo manifiesta 
esa duda, pero también que la realidad debe ser observada mediante vías que no 
son las del conocimiento habitual, y que el hombre se enfrenta con más de un 
mundo. La poesía puede ser un medio de acceso a tales mundos (Quince poetas 
norteamericanos 36). 
 
 Poetry’s enunciation grants access to a non-habitual, more essential knowledge of 
the self and the world that Heidegger and Girri would term moral, as it attends to and 
draws to nearness the ontological experience of Being, allowing for that “something that 
is not known by knowledge” to issue forth. I turn, apropos, for a third and last time to 
Girri’s interpretation of Stevens’s ars poetica as a window into his own. Recalling Harold 
Bloom’s assessment of Stevens’s poetic ideal as a “supreme fiction,” Girri adds:  “Llegar 
a esa ficción como tal significa despojarnos de todo factor histórico, antropomórfico, 
llegar a la idea primigenia, sin superposiciones mítico-religiosas, a una suerte de 
contemplación platónica que ‘recoge el fuego de la idea primera’, que nos conduce a la 
integridad originaria del Ser” (Poemas de Wallace Stevens 116). We can see this ideal 
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mirrored in Girri’s own poetry, as in the case of the following verses excerpted from 
“Poema didáctico”:  
 El instante en que en un 
 objeto franqueamos el trecho 
 de Dios a nosotros, 
   Dios que adquiere 
 forma del objeto, invade 
 por completo el campo, nos detiene, 
 cesa lo tangible, cesar 
 de olores y sabores, 
 voliciones, 
  y hasta esfumarse 
 también el objeto, 
  y el confín, postrer 
 abrir y cerrar de ojos 
 donde también desapareceremos, 
    vacuidad ("Tramas de conflictos" 48). 
 
In this poem, the “supreme fiction” that is offered is the non-human, undivided, 
ontological experience of Being. As the final two verses indicate, where the object, the 
world it is part of, the human being and the gods are “onefold,” language withdraws itself 
into silence. This ultimate experience of Being is the wordless empty, and the Being of 
language eschews articulation. Heidegger, too, concludes that “the essential nature of 
language flatly refuses to express itself in words-in the language, that is, in which we 
make statements about language” ("The Nature of Language" 81). The poem, in its 
movement toward definitive knowledge of the real, the human being and Being (God), 
reaches an impasse in language. 
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2.2.3 TO BE, TO HAVE, TO BE ON THE PATH 
In forging a path of impersonality, Girri finds inspiration for his transformation 
and examples of non-subjective being outside of traditional Western metaphysics, which 
maintains its base in Man. Girri critiques modern Western thought and alludes to other 
possible paths when he comments:  
Pienso que una de las fallas de Occidente —y son palabras excesivas para decirlas 
tan a la ligera—, es haber desdeñado, devorado por la omnipresencia del yo, el 
concepto oriental de que, a la larga, toda literatura, todo texto que lleve una 
mínima intención o carga espiritual tiende a tener carácter anónimo (Cuestiones y 
razones 74). 
 
The omnipresence of the “I” in Western thought presents itself as a failing for both 
literature and the general conceptions of knowledge that inform our ways of approaching 
the world. Girri stresses here the idea that Oriental writings with a “spiritual intention” 
favor anonymity in that the words or characters of a text are not written (or later read) 
from the stance of overt subjectivity. The wisdom expressed in such literature invokes the 
human being, including him in its breadth, but is not read as issuing from Man or 
pertaining exclusively to him.  
 In developing a poetics that eclipses Man and the “I,” Girri finds in Oriental 
philosophies, elements that aide him in thinking and writing outside of the center of the 
self, much like Heidegger found inspiration in Taoist and Zen texts. It should be 
reiterated that Girri does not subscribe to a particular religious philosophy. As María 
Victoria Suárez correctly states, “Girri no intenta exponer un sistema en sus poemas sino 
objetivar en ellos su itinerario existencial” (Alberto Girri: Existencia y lógica poética 82). 
This existential itinerary perhaps begins with the Taoist and Zen conceptions of the 
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human being. D. T. Suzuki, in introducing Zen Buddhism, draws from Chuang-tzu, a 
Taoist whose teachings resonate in later Zen texts, to explain the concept of the “perfect 
man.” He quotes various excerpts of Chuang-tzu in explaining:  
‘the perfect man as living when time has not yet come to existence,’ ‘abiding with 
the reason of endlessness,’ ‘attaining the formlessness of things,’ ‘in unison with 
Heaven.’ Further, ‘the perfect man,’ says Chuang-tzu, ‘holds his nature in 
complete unity, nourishes his energy (ch’i) in full vigor, keeps all his activity in 
harmony’ (Zen and Japanese Buddhism 54). 
 
These attributes are radically different than the defining characteristics of Man and of the 
first-person Western subject. Chuang-tzu’s enumeration of descriptive features expresses 
a concept of the human being that is not determined by historical time, whose reason is 
not based on Man’s finitude, whose identity is founded on an expansiveness that seeks 
unity and not division, and whose actions spring from a spontaneous, ego-less 
intelligence without a center. When assumed as the grounds for thinking, such concepts 
allow the writer to approximate the ideal of an anonymous literature to which Girri 
aspires. In addition, this Taoist conception of the ideal man is a model of being in the 
world that inverts the structure of Western Man and subjectivity that Girri has found to be 
unsuccessful. 
Many poems of Girri’s second period engage in articulating a new experience of 
the self that at times finds a direct parentage in the Taoist model, such as the poem “Tao” 
that was published in 1963. I quote the poem in its entirety, as it will serve as a 
springboard to other poems that focus on particular elements touched on in this text: 
Forma sin forma 
que carece de tiempos 
entra en lo que llamo  
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mi persona 
(cuerpo y no cuerpo, 
opuestos, 
alternantes fases), 
y por los pulmones 
grises como piedras, 
por el hígado, los ojos 
y otra vez el hígado, 
me hace flojo, mustio, 
abandonado de la fortuna, 
ajeno a las matanzas 




y desechar lo pródigo 
y exuberante de los sentidos, 
disolución, pilares de sal, 
obsesión del presente, 
y qué venenos 
destila cualquier rígida, terca 
ansia de singularizarnos. 
 
Desde este instante 
sé (sé, pienso), 
que nada podría derribarme, 
y aun muriendo 
no perezco; soy, tengo, 
estoy en el Camino ("El ojo" 32).  
 
Girri’s interpretation of “Tao” emphasizes a conception of the self that abandons 
the singularity of the subject as a being defined by rigid physical and temporal 
limitations. The duality of existence —form and formlessness, self as body and not body, 
death and life— is not a motive for anxiety or for the rearing of the “I” in an attempt to 
overcome the Other: that which it feels it is not. A broader notion of being approaches 
individuation as a phase that is no more or less true than one’s dissolution. Even death is 
incorporated into a universal presence which simply is each instant. Taking a cue from 
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French philosopher and historian Paul Ricœur’s Temps et récit (1983), we can say that 
the human experience of time traditionally gets ordered by the subject through language 
as a narrative capable of forging a stable identity for Man that can carry him from the 
past to the future, overcoming the discordance between memory, present experience and 
the unknown future. For Ricœur, narrative is the means to comprehending or making 
intelligible human temporality and to permit the re-identification of the individual as the 
“same.” In this poem, however, time is approached as a present of continuous change in 
which singularity and permanence are a hindrance to an experience of being that is based 
not upon prodigious individuality and self-preservation but upon a soft fluidity of the self 
that grasps nothing. Knowing the Tao alone also repositions one’s own sensorial 
experience in relationship with a greater, atemporal form of knowing. Girri heeds Lao-
tzu’s warning that: “The five colors blind the eye/ The five tones deafen the ear/ The five 
flavors dull the palate/ Racing, hunting, and galloping about/ only disturb the mind” (L. 
Tzu 25) when he reprehends the senses as another form of grasping that convert one into 
“pillars of salt.”  
The proper way of tao for the human being, Lao-tzu writes, is “Emerging, 
flourishing, dissolving back again/ This is the eternal process of return” (L. Tzu 29). And 
later he adds: “To know Tao alone,/ without trace of your own existence,/ is the highest” 
(L. Tzu 30). The last two verses of Girri’s poem summarize this new conception of 
existence. The basic characterizations of man are being as an essence or identity (“ser”), 
what one possesses (“tener”) and one’s position in space and time (“estar”). The poetic 
speaker’s final words unite these three actions through an all-embracing identification 
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with the “Path” (tao) representing the impersonal, indivisible and attributeless Supreme 
Reality. Paradoxically, by maintaining the “yo” as the center of articulation and the 
subject of the actions “ser,” “tener” and “estar,” Girri’s poetic voice, however, has yet to 
disband the “I,” even as it speaks of its own death and dissolution. We could thus read the 
word “tao” in its lexical acceptation as “the way one conducts oneself” or in its most 
literal meaning as “path, way or road.” 
Girri strives to go beyond the enunciating “I” by following the Taoist directive 
that gives title to a poem: “Al consejo de Lao Tsé:  Salir a la vida y entrar en la muerte” 
("Envíos" 86). Here, the anonymous poetic voice accompanies a second person through 
its personal “disolución” in which “vas dejando/ los últimos puestos/ y pierdes los 
primeros.” The physical death of man or the metaphysical annulment of the self as 
subject leads “you” to abandon all of the places and stances that served to found a 
subjective identity. Renouncing them preludes the unparalleled “plenitud/ de que nadie te 
dispute nada” because there is no “mine” or “yours” to divide reality. Girri borrows 
directly from the Tao Te Ching when he concludes: “el apogeo/ de endurecerte y volver/ 
a ser tronco en bruto,/ reposo/ que es retorno a tu destino,/ destino que es perpetuidad.” 
The metaphor of the “tronco en bruto” appears in Verse 18 of Lao-tzu’s original text 
which reads: “Flowing through everything/ It returns one to the First Breath/ Guiding 
everything/ It returns one to No Limits/ Embracing everything/ It returns one to the 
Uncarved Block” (L. Tzu 41). The “uncarved block” is one of the many images Lao-tzu 
gives to illustrate the human being’s true nature in its pristine state of return, representing 
the limitless potential out of which anything can become. 
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Another poem from the same decade offers a clear example of the path that Girri 
follows in moving away from individual identity to a form of anonymity that allows an 
experience of tao as absolute reality. “Desnudo al sol” published in 1970 is a poem 
written as through the lens of a camera that is focused on a naked woman lying in the 
sun. The third-person poetic voice commences by emphasizing the specific features of 
the woman, —“las piernas,/ alargadas y tersas, todavía/ esbeltas en la pasividad,”— 
relishing the sense of sight that evokes a particular identity through the image of a “zorra 
superior/ y codiciosa, pelo y dientes,” ("Valores diarios" 169). This initial literary 
treatment of the human object of observation follows the lines of traditional Western 
approaches to the Other: although the poetic voice is not that of an identified subject, the 
elements that it records attempt to pinpoint a particular identity for the woman, rendering 
her knowable and seeking to “capture” her through a fixed image as both a photograph 
and verbal portrait. This attempt admittedly fails, as the poetic voice recognizes that this 
body and person seem to have already traversed the ups and downs of personal existence 
and have achieved a serene state of equilibrium and release: 
 pero si lo captas 
partiendo de que ese cuerpo 
extendido y lustroso se abandona, 
abdica y demuestra comportarse 
como de regreso, sin escepticismo, 
tras haberlo pasado muy bien y muy mal 
 resulta una proyección 
ajena a rasgos individuales, ("Valores diarios" 169) 
 
The woman photographed is in an open posture, one of extension and abdication in which 
she simply lets be both herself and the world she belongs to. She is shown to have 
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personal knowledge of the “bad” and “good” —one of the infinite pairs of opposites that 
Man employs to understand and organize his reality— but her attitude is that of 
acceptance of both without skepticism or a compulsion to control her experiences. 
Having also shed those traits that the subject generally grasps as the foundation for its 
individual identity, the woman lying in the sun has arrived to a Zen-like state: 
 el nítido  
arrobo de un objeto bajo el sol, 
calma anónima, serenidad que a nadie invita, 
 un bulto más 
exaltando el espacio, presintiendo 
la zona que late detrás del espacio, 
vacía, incólume por no tener 
origen, crecimiento, sucesión ("Valores diarios" 169). 
 
The poetic voice brings the reader’s attention and his own to the fact that in this position, 
the woman is like any other illuminated, anonymous object that occupies space-time. By 
simply being, she serenely exalts the space she inhabits and brings to the consciousness 
of the one who observes her a new perspective of the image before him — one of a 
pristine and timeless openness. The woman resides in an “emptiness” which is similar to 
tao in that it is formless, nameless and beyond time, but is concurrently that from which 
spring forms, names and succession: “Tao is empty/ yet it fills every vessel with endless 
supply/ Tao is hidden/ yet it shines in every corner of the universe” (L. Tzu 17). 
 The Taoist ideal of emptiness is further exemplified by the poems “A lo que el 
mirar con atención revela” and “Magnitud cero.” The first of these two, briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter, turns to the reflective nature of the mirror as an 
analogy for the posture the human being should assume in order to experience and 
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understand emptiness. A mirror retains nothing and gives equal and undifferentiated 
space to all things placed in front of it; a mirror itself contains nothing and is empty of 
“self,” but it allows all to manifest on its surface; a mirror always is in the spontaneous 
present, and it seeks no past or future. It is thus that Girri writes:  
 Los espejos reflejan, 
 no retienen, 
  es imposible  
 meternos en el cuerpo de un espejo 
 o hacer que el espejo entre en nosotros, 
 y percibimos vacío, 
 vaciados de los penosos 
 instantes de inhabilidad 
 para retener, conservar, ("Envíos" 87) 
 
These verses “mirror” Chuang-tzu’s words that speak of emptiness and stillness as the 
necessary attributes for approaching creation.  
Still water becomes a mirror that gives back a clear reflection of the beard and 
eyebrows. Reposing at a perfect level, it becomes the standard for a great 
carpenter. If water gains such clarity from stillness, how much more so one’s own 
mind? The mind of the Sage, reposing in perfect stillness, becomes the mirror of 
the universe, and the eye that sees all creation (L. Tzu 283). 
 
These qualities do not imply apathy or inaction, but a new center and measure for being 
and doing that is not defined by attachment, singularity or “la aprensión de recibir 
favores,/ aprensión en la desgracia.” Instead, the human being achieves a state of 
“Quietud y vacío,/ como navegar el océano/ sobre una sombra,” (“Envíos” 87). Chuang-
tzu writes, “For the perfect man employs his mind as a mirror. It grasps nothing: it 
refuses nothing. It receives, but does not keep. And thus he can triumph over matter, 
without injury to himself” (C. Tzu 97-98). Man, alleviated of the bonds of the self, is 
afforded the universe and a harmonious mode of being that follows the movement of tao. 
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It is helpful here to recall the central Taoist term wu-wei, introduced in the previous 
chapter, which means “non-doing.” In other words, it is a nondual, non-purposive, 
harmonious and spontaneous “doing” without effort, desires, distinctions and names. The 
human being participates in movement and change, but as a shadow floating over the 
mirror-like sea, without the notion of the self as the subject of this action. David Loy 
intelligently writes, “if consciousness of self is the ultimate source of unnatural action, 
then natural action [wu-wei] must be that in which there is no such self-consciousness -- 
in which there is no awareness of the agent as being distinct from "his" act” (76).  
 The universe in its infinite manifestations is the outward impulse of the essential 
unity that tao expresses. If the human being acts through wu-wei, his subject-less 
experience of creation will be that of an underlying unity in diversity. Lao-tsu writes of 
this complementary movement: “Become totally empty/ …/ Only then will you witness 
everything/ unfolding from emptiness/ See all things flourish and dance/ in endless 
variation/ And once again merge back into perfect emptiness —/ Their true repose/ Their 
true nature” (L. Tzu 29). “Magnitud cero” is Girri’s attempt to speak about the void or 
“perfect emptiness.” I write “attempt” because this poem, structured through anaphora, 
opens each stanza with an verse that begins with the word “como.” The stanzas’ elaborate 
analogies endeavor to articulate “magnitud cero,” a metaphor itself for the tao-inspired 
void, by providing visual and conceptual images to illustrate the nature of this 
“nothingness.”  
Girri first imagines the void as an “orificio” or “punto” acting as the passive 
center of a wheel that “hace posible la rotación” ("El ojo" 40). This stanza follows Lao-
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tzu’s explanation of wu or “nothingness, emptiness, non-existence”: “Thirty spokes of a 
wheel all join at a common hub/ yet only the hole at the center/ allows the wheel to spin” 
(L. Tzu 24). The spinning wheel can be understood as the ever-flowing manifest 
universe, endlessly cycling from life to death. The movement of creation and destruction 
is only possible because of that empty center that joins all things and from which they 
come. The second stanza inverts the image of the first one; instead of a small point from 
which all springs and to which it returns, now the void is visualized as sky and space that 
contain the universe, thus emphasizing the same common essence of all things and their 
ultimate truth as emptiness. Girri then speaks of the void as an instrument, process or 
cycle in order to redefine man, “hijo de vacíos resultantes,” as also simply a part of a 
greater order of manifestations and disappearances. In the final stanza, the void is a an 
infallible cipher that explains the ever-changing “trama de la verdad,/ porque en el cero 
no existe error.”  
2.2.4 SAMSARA AND NIRVANA INTERCHANGEABLE 
 The “zero point” or void as a way of conceiving of the universe and experiencing 
it, stands in stark opposition to episteme of Man that dominates modern Western thought. 
As we have seen, Girri is drawn to Taoist principles as an antidote to Man’s centrality 
and domination. The Taoist void or emptiness, affords a completely new appreciation of 
reality, its underlying unity and the human being’s appropriation to a whole greater than 
himself. To internalize and act from the void, thus uniting with tao, is the “perfect man’s” 
goal and the culmination of his enlightenment. Zen Buddhism, as we discussed in the 
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previous chapter, draws on Taoist texts, sages and traditions in its formulation of the 
epiphanic perfection of consciousness, or satori, which is the experience of sunyata or 
the void. This sudden awakening erases all divisions, even between the notion of the one 
and the many to afford an unmediated experience of being. Zen warns its followers that 
no amount of practice or preparation will lead them to satori, which is spontaneous. Girri 
agrees, “No se da el vacío voluntario ganado por el esfuerzo. Está el vacío espontáneo, 
fuente de energía y expansivo, el vacío como Gracia, por sorpresa” ("El motivo es el 
poema" 257). The spontaneity of achieving the empty state reinforces the dictum shared 
by Taoism and Zen that emptiness and satori do not belong to an “other worldly” 
experience, but to the “here and now,” within the space and time of the present. C. 
Lawson Crowe summarizes that “The end is ‘to see’ into one’s own nature and thus attain 
buddhahood. This state can be achieved in the midst of ordinary daily activities” (32), 
and he quotes the account of enlightened Zen master Hakuin (1685-1768) who said “We 
need no escape from the cycle of life and death” (34). 
 We may remember that Zen derives its understanding of satori from the 
Mahayana branch of Buddhism that, unlike the Theravada perspective, understands 
enlightenment or nirvana within the context of the empirical world. Mahayana Buddhism 
expounds the view that all is sunyata, and that there is no perduring, discrete and 
unchanging self or objective entity. The insight that the sum of being is in its essence 
ultimate reality, allows the following conclusion to be drawn:  
All of samsara is nirvana. The critique which the Mahayana perspective exercises 
is directed against the way men understand or interpret their world, not against the 
human and natural phenomena which constitute the world. Consequently, the 
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ultimate solution which is proffered is not a new world or even a new self but a 
new point of view (Rupp 60-61). 
 
Girri clearly adopts this point of view in the poem “Versión abstracta, impráctica”, 
rejecting the notion that the phenomenological world is strictly samsara and should 
solely be considered “irrealidad” or “juego de apariencias” ("Árbol de la estirpe humana" 
300-01).  He is fascinated and tempted with the idea “que nada de lo que uno contemple/ 
ahora, ya, aquí,/ existe por sí mismo,/ nada que logre/ existir fuera de la subjetividad,/ 
samsara/ elaborando para la visión del ojo/ un continuo de objetos” but he cannot 
ultimately accept that his own body which is continually “afirmándose en un ritmo” is 
something that must be annulled in order to be “liberado.” Zen Buddhism and Taoist 
thought seek no “outside” or abolishment of man or the world as a means of achieving 
nirvana. On the contrary, they embrace the notion of “being-in-the-world,” to borrow a 
phrase from Heidegger, in which the human recognizes himself and the sphere in which 
he find himself as “no-self” — liberated from the illusory drive to possess and define a 
self and, from this vantage point, attempt to control one’s experience and knowledge of 
the world. Girri shares this understanding of the present world as the arena for nirvana, 
achieved through a shift in attention and experience of man. In one of the many prose 
reflections he penned about his vision for the proper disposition of the human being, Girri 
observes: “De los estados (por demás escasos) de atención sobre uno mismo. Entonces, 
asistimos al hecho de que todo se aclara, se deviene indistinto (samsara y nirvana 
intercambiables), y se nos despierta”  ("El motivo es el poema" 253). 
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 The awakening of the human being to the experience of nirvana in samsara 
allows Girri to accept a non-discriminating posture in relationship with himself and the 
things that make up the world. In rare moments of attention, man is afforded a change in 
perspective through the emptying of the self and the abandonment of the habit of reifying 
the world for the purpose of possessing and mastering it. In such instants, the human 
being “is woken up” (nirvana) within the context of his daily existence (samsara). From 
such a vantage point come observations such as those found in the poem “Res extensa.” 
Employing a Judeo-Christian vocabulary, Girri describes the interconnectedness of all 
things and the manner in which all singularities are actually manifestations of the same: 
Aceptas 
que la tierra y el aire, 
el agua y el fuego, 
son como fibras 
de una cuerda única 
a cuyos golpes fluye, 
lo vivo de lo muerto, 
lo mortal de lo vivo, 
fugacidad y cambio, 
apariencias que alaban al Padre ("El ojo" 31). 
 
The conceit of self-centeredness having been laid aside, the human being can accept and 
appreciate how all beings and things flow from the same emptiness and back to it again. 
In constant motion, each form, or lack thereof, essentially serves to “praise” the Being 
that they are, from which they spring and to which they return.  
 Through emptiness and the asceticism of the self, the human being can cultivate 
this new experience and perception of the world and his own person. The total realization 
of nirvana within the realm of appearances of the here and now (samsara) may not be 
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immediate. Nevertheless, the open disposition of man to receive and presence Being 
through his attention to reality becomes his means of living that eschews self-
centeredness and becomes his path toward a fuller experience. Girri’s poem, “Que tu 
mirada vaya” offers a demonstration of this type of perception: 
Y más aun haría patente 
un empezar a abandonarte 
a lo suelto y espontáneo 
como viento, como corriente, 
 viento y corriente, 
no ya situaciones fijas, inmovilidad objetiva, 
 
no ya dilemas 
sino un calmo estar 
en el que te permitas verte 
cazando pájaros con redes, 
liebres con gestos, 
irreflexivamente ("Lírica de percepciones" 196). 
 
These stanzas are directives for an exercise in observing, inhabiting and attending to the 
world with lucid attention devoid of ambition and possessiveness. The human being’s 
role is not to seek “objective immobility” or a to attain a “fixed” order for himself and his 
world. On the contrary, the similes chosen to illustrate the abandonment of Man’s will for 
dominion are taken from the dynamics of nature’s most basic “free and spontaneous” 
elements, wind and water. Lao-tzu refers to both in his writing as examples of behavior in 
harmony with Tao, a detached form of being that Zen Buddhism also teaches: “The best 
way to live/ is to be like water/ For water benefits all things/ and goes against none of 
them/ […]/ One who lives in accordance with nature/ […]/ moves in harmony with the 
present moment” (L. Tzu 21). In following the natural flow of life, the human being 
attains a calmness of being that allows actions to be spontaneous and “irreflexive,” not 
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mandated by human purposefulness for the obtaining of a predetermined goal.  This does 
not mean the disengagement of the human being from the world, but his complete 
presence and attention to the present through detachment. Man can thus observe himself  
“catching” “birds” or “hares” or anything else effortlessly, as the “thing” itself is not of 
issue. There is no drive to determine, possess or apprehend the world; to simply 
experience onself with and in it as all undergoes a constant flux is enough.  
“Enseñanza ignorada” revisits this idea through negative examples. Divided into 
four parts, the each of the first three sections of the poem correspondingly examines 
existential postures of man to demonstrate that nobody has learned yet how to be in 
relationship with “lo real” or “todo objeto lo mismo que a seres” or “la vida.” In the 
examples proffered, Girri illustrates different manners in which people attempt to impose 
their perspective on the world, not 
    aceptando 
 que la realidad se complace 
 en que nadie haga lo que pretende 
con ella; 
        que nada se hace, Todo Sucede ("Homenaje a W. C. Williams" 125). 
 
This “forgotten” or “ignored teaching” is not lost on Girri. In breaking away from the 
Western metaphysics of Man, Girri’s own attention is gathered and brought into the fold 
of “Suceder,” the unmediated, neutral simplicity of “Happening” or Being in which all 
things are empty of value and simply are being empty — another formulation of nirvana 
in samsara. To attend to the reality through the understanding of “Todo Sucede,” Girri 
writes of a particular type of hearing and listening that is open to the spontaneous 
happenings of existence and affords him greater perspective and insight into his own 
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being. A poem titled “Enéada primera” exemplifies the type of attention that Girri 
espouses as conducive to an enlightened understanding of being: 
Ve lo que ve 
tornándose afín 
y parecido a lo visto 
en beneficio de la contemplación. 
Mientras ve el sol es semejante al sol, 
y verá la belleza 
luego de que el alma 
ella misma se haya tornado belleza ("El ojo" 53). 
 
These verses reveal how the openness of the human being allows for great reciprocity 
with the world. By emptying himself of “self,” man can become the site of receptivity 
and a type of communion. He can recognize himself as that which he observes. His 
attention is in the “benefit of contemplation” and not for his own self-aggrandizement. 
One of Girri’s prose observations reads: “La realidad es el motivo. Contundencia de la 
frase, comparable al empeño puesto en identificarse con ella, convencerse a medida que 
se escribe” ("El motivo es el poema" 246). By giving himself to attention, both the 
human being and the world come into their own, realizing their fullness through each 
other. Man thus experiences himself as “beauty” while revealing the world in its fullness.  
We can now return with much greater understanding to an aphoristic statement of 
Girri’s, quoted in the previous chapter: “Lo absoluto como presente. Un alejamiento 
impersonal hacia el ‘aquí y el ahora’” (III, 270).  Girri’s “absolute” is conceived not in 
Man’s terms, but as an inclusive present to which the human being belongs. If Man is 
granted a particular role, it is that of presencing reality as the place for its manifestation 
as being. To add to the layers of sources that shape Girri’s understanding of the human 
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being’s correct “Relationship with the World” (Krishnamurti 289), J. D. Krishnamurti’s 
writings reinforce the goal of a present, choiceless awareness “empty […] of time, 
direction, and movement” (285) which, Krishnamurti instructs, can be attained through 
true observation, a coming “upon that space in which there is no center; therefore, no 
direction; therefore, no time” (288).  
The “center” to which Krishnamurti refers, is the “me” and its attachments. All 
thoughts and observations stemming from “me,” Krishnamurti explains, are conditioned 
and rooted in the past, pre-establishing a direction for Man’s actions and observations 
through his will and previous experiences and creating duality in his perception of the 
world. Krishnamurti attributes fear, the impulse to grasp and anxiety to Man’s memory 
and his accumulated thoughts through time that stake out a vulnerable and precarious 
“me” that must be reaffirmed and defended.  In contrast, by becoming the space for 
complete attention to the world, the human being gives himself to observation and the 
present, in its constant regeneration and “total freedom” to be exactly as it is. Girri’s 
poem, “No sabes cómo librarás” corresponds with Krishnamurti’s teachings:  
concluir 
que esperaste y buscaste 
el punto de coincidencia 
de lo que abarca el pasado 
y lo que depositó el futuro, 
hasta situarte, ya, 
 en el exacto instante 
donde cualquier dirección  
será meta, el allá 
alrededor del aquí ("Valores diarios" 155). 
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The present as the goal signifies the plenitude of being here and now and the 
human being’s indivisible relationship with the world. Girri views his poetry as the space 
for the present to be gathered and made manifest. He comments:  “Y no es poco lo que 
recogemos, el sentimiento de que la única eternidad a la que se tiene acceso es la del 
presente, la sensación de palpar el tiempo, lo material, la materia del poema” ("El motivo 
es el poema" 260).  
Through his caring attention to reality, Girri seeks to reveal the present in its 
material and temporal completeness, a task that Krishnamurti also urges of his readers 
through their attention: “That attention is a flame and that attention is not something that 
you come to; it is attention now to everything, every word, every gesture, every thought 
[…] When you are completely attentive there is no self, there is no limitation” (360). 
Krishnamurti conceives of the human being’s “total freedom” within the present of the 
manifest world, echoing with the words “Enlightenment is where you are” (286), the 
dictum “Nirvana is samsara” that we have visited earlier. Girri concurs when he writes 
that there is no “órbita individual, autónoma, mientras que en rigor lo que efectivamente 
actúa es el poder creador que es el mundo. Hacedores de poemas ocupando sus 
respectivos, prefijados lugares; sólo instrumentos” ("Lo propio, lo de todos" 69). 
2.2.5 THE “HACEDOR” 
This last sentence, brings us to two questions that have been alluded to 
continually in the course of this chapter, but have not been addressed directly: In what 
ways does the poet come to embody the human being who has moved beyond the 
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protagonistic role of “Man” in the modern episteme to represent a new form of 
knowledge and a unique manner of being in the world? Concurrently, what are the 
explicit or implicit ethics of the poet and his poetry?  
 Alberto Girri addresses the role of the author in both his poems and works of 
prose. We can begin to understand his profile of the “poet figure” through his 
appreciation of one of Keat’s often-cited letters from October 1818, addressed to Richard 
Woodhouse —coincidentally, the same letter that inspires a long essay by Rafael 
Cadenas, Realidad y literature.  Girri muses:  
Keats, concepto de que el poeta carece de identidad. Tomarlo, acaso, como 
referencia indirecta al sentido interno de su labor: despojarse, mientras el poema 
progresa (esto a expensas de aquello), de los incontables yoes que en él conviven, 
y cuya fase última, el sentimiento de nulidad, coincidiría con la culminación del 
poeta ("Lo propio, lo de todos" 71). 
 
Inspired by Keat’s declarations such as, “A poet is the most unpoetical of anything in 
existence, because he has no identity: he is continually in for, and filling, some other 
body” (Houghton 159), Girri considers the poet to be the reverse of modern Man, 
understood as the subject and object of knowledge. For Girri, the poet’s labor is only 
possible when he has rid himself of all sense of protagonism, favoring an impersonal and 
anonymous stance that allows language to inhabit him. Girri prefers the humbler term 
“hacedor” —a deliberate nod to Borges and Girri’s preferred title, El hacedor— to the 
title of “poeta” because the latter word connotates, for many, the superior status of the 
individual and the compounding of the “I,” when the poet is heralded as a chosen 
clairvoyant, “small god” or a modern visionary, following the Romantic tradition and its 
reformulations in the historic vanguardias. The “hacedor,” on the other hand, is an artisan 
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who offers himself to his craft and to the creative power of the world to be used as an 
instrument. Girri explains the two “alternatives” in his own words: “Ser el artesano que 
día tras día gana en destreza, o el actor volcado a una interpretación donde mucho 
intervendrá su carácter personal, y lo que los accidentes exteriores le exijan, y de lo cual 
persigue el extremo provecho en cuanto a efectos” ("El motivo es el poema" 257). Girri 
develops a similar, clear distinction between what he terms the “professional” writer and 
the “aficionado,” the latter term being almost synonymous with “hacedor” and the former 
an extension of his definition of the “poet.” The aficionado seeks to exhibit himself and 
affirm the poem as the paradigm of his own personality. He aspires for his poem to 
compete with the world and he claims to be able to discern between “noble” and 
“ignoble” poetic material ("Lo propio, lo de todos" 74). The professional, on the other 
hand, “[p]ermanence quieto, exteriormente se conserva metido en sus propios límites,” 
without approaching the poem as the product and extension of his ego ("El motivo es el 
poema" 283).  
Girri believes that the poem is not the realm for the aggrandizement of the 
author’s personal character or of the sphere of his power as a writer by seeking to 
influence the experience of his reader. The prose texts that are interspersed in Girri’s six-
volume Obra poética reiterate this conviction in analogous statements such as these, from 
Diario de un libro: “El creador legítimo tiende a ponerse a un costado de lo creado” (31); 
and “Creador. La etapa en que el creador de literatura empieza a calmarse de sí mismo, 
de opiniones, prejuicios, obstinación, egoísmo” (32); and “Oculto en la obra, contestando 
como en el episodio de los cíclopes: ‘Soy Odiseo, nadie’” (66). Likewise, various poems 
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address the participatory  —not protagonistic— role of the artisan.  “Dormir que hace el 
poema” exemplifies the relationship between the work, the writer and the reality that 
inspired it: 
 El poema, 
desprendido de la visión, 
y del que no podrías 
explicar, sólo ofrecerlo, 
 y ofrecerlo 
en homenaje a lo recibido 
pero no su enigma, 
  así como 
un bebedor no penetra en su vino, 
lo bebe, 
 pero no sabe qué es, 
además de áspero y seco, 
subido de color ("Existenciales" 99-100). 
In these verses, the poem is described as also being “separated” or “disjoined” from the 
vision that inspired it, having its own existence. The verses “ofrecerlo/ en homenaje a lo 
recibido” are of particular significance in gaining a greater understanding of Girri’s 
perspective of his craft. Poetry is not the stage of Man’s domain or possession; it is first 
“received” through the undivided attention of the “hacedor” and then offered back to the 
world in its homage as a thanking. Girri brings to the reader’s attention the autonomy of 
the poem and its central inscrutability, which cannot be explained by the “hacedor” who 
wrote it. The “hacedor” partakes of the poetic experience, as writer and then as reader, 
but he recognizes his fundamental ignorance as to the “qué es” of the work. The poem 
conserves its enigmatic being, renouncing any claim the “hacedor” may have staked in 
having words under his control.  
In “El poema como inestable” Girri furthers this understanding by writing: 
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  …el poema 
como vehículo, cerrado y concluso, 
para atesorar un presente 
sin detrás ni más allá, 
[…] 
De comprender esto  
 el hacedor de poemas lo es, deviene 
 un hacedor de poemas, 
    y en comprenderlo 
 apoya su afirmarse 
 por los poemas que hace, 
    y la vislumbre 
 de que si no fuera así sus cantos 
 expresarían de él sólo lo discorde ("El motivo es el poema" 231-32). 
 
The poem, as its own unit, is closed in the sense that it is its own presence. Man 
participates in the writing, but the poem itself is not the perpetuation of the human being, 
his life or singularity. It is the poem that holds a moment of the present in continuous 
offering to the human being, while the “hacedor” understands that the true poem speaks 
language, and not his personal expression, which would be the “discord” of Man who 
attempts to make the poem the invariable consolidation of himself, a fixedness of his own 
being for him to grasp. As an “hacedor,” Girri succinctly states the contrary as true: 
“Ascendencia del poema. Padre, madre e hijo de sí mismo” ("El motivo es el poema" 
266). He also paraphrases Maurice Blanchot to summarize his position about the human 
“hacedor” of poems: “Y, en conjunto, poemas escritos a lo largo de una vida, con la 
intención de borrar toda traza de esa vida” ("El motivo es el poema" 258). 
 The erasure of the overwhelmingly dominant personal subject within the poem 
manifests itself in the “hacedor’s” style. Self-aggrandizement is perpetuated by the “poet” 
or “aficionado’s” empty embellishment of language through decorative, metaphoric, 
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aesthetic, sonorous and musical means. While denouncing the compulsion to promote 
himself as the poem’s protagonist or word-master or to read in its words the projections 
of the self, the “hacedor” adheres to a an ascetic enunciation because “en la medida en 
que la palabra es aparentemente más pobre, más seca, menos metafórica, menos cargada 
de contenido y de imagen –digamos así-, más posibilidades tiene de renovarse en cada 
lectura” (Torres Fierro 16).  This language is flexible, and its polyphony is like that of 
aphorisms —mountain peaks addressed to those who are “tall and lofty,” as Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra said (42) — whose directness and pithiness invite the reader to return to them 
once and again, in the sober insistence of its enunciation. Girri calls such writing 
“moral,” and extols the virtues of prose-like enunciations whose diaphanous, efficient 
and clear expression responds to the necessity of what is said. Sergio Cueto explains that 
for Girri, “El poema es lo que es así, lo que es, simplemente: pura afirmación que no 
afirma nada sino la afirmación, el vacío sin contenido, y por lo tanto irrefutable, del 
afirmar. El poema emite la multiplicidad de los caminos, pero él permanece en el 
recogimiento de la encrucijada” (Cueto Seis estudios girrianos 22).  This mode of 
expression radically differs from Girri’s initial approach to writing and language. In 
reviewing his own production, as well as his philosophical comprehension of his own 
existence, Girri recalls that “Primera, expresar exagerando. Segunda, expresar pendientes 
por completo de las variantes combinatorias. Tercera, anulación de las modalidades 
anteriores, y sólo Enunciar” ("El motivo es el poema" 273).  
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2.2.6  THE PARADOXICAL PATH 
 Girri’s literary trajectory originates from a mode of writing that responds to the 
demands and restrictions of the modern episteme with Man at its center as the articulator 
of knowledge and the wielder of language. His early poems denounce as failures the 
strategies of Man —as diagnosed by Michel Foucault— that attempt to bring under his 
dominion as subject the unthought, the origin of himself and his knowledge and the 
language that he uses but is not transparent to him — in other words, all that which 
constitutes his “Other.” Girri then consciously shifts away from the mode in which the 
subject is edified as the articulator of knowledge with language as the medium for his 
expression and the representation of the world for his use. Seeking new paradigms for the 
self in relationship with the world and language, we can read Girri’s project through its 
kinship with those of Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot, John Keats, Martin Heidegger, 
Chuang-tzu, Lao-tzu, D. T. Suzuki, and J. Krishnamurti.  Girri cultivates a poetic attitude 
that is, in itself, a moral and ethical stance. He approaches the “I” ascetically, defining the 
“hacedor” as the open space for language to speak and the world to presence. Such 
attentive care allows for new genre of interactions of the human being and his world and 
for a non-dominating understanding of reality. 
 These last statements are not without their caveats. Girri reminds his readers in 
both his prose comments as well as his poems, of the intrinsic paradoxes of his craft that 
cannot be overcome. For as much as the poem distances itself from the language of 
technology that serves the edifying of Man, its articulator, Girri’s hacedor must 
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unceasingly be vigilant in his attention so that his saying remains faithful to that 
happening which seeks its expression. Girri writes:  
Pasos en que la Atención es especialmente puesta a prueba. Cuando en el 
desarrollo del texto hacia su culminar, cierre, el equilibrio está a punto de 
romperse. Lo emocional, que quiere arrastrarnos, dominar, y es preciso 
distanciarse, enfriar la mirada; o al revés, cuando somos llevados, en exceso, de 
abstracción en abstracción, y apelamos entonces a arranques emotivos, inmediatez 
que aligera el curso del texto ("1989 / 1990" 128). 
 
The poem does not require the extermination of the human being, but rather his 
meditative presence which grants the “hacedor” a fresh experience of himself through 
language that is not bound by subjectivity and emotion, nor the abstraction of the 
intellect. Such a balance is often fortuitous, for the “hacedor” must be engaged in his 
attention, but simultaneously abandon the habitual structures of the self. Without the 
“hacedor,” the poem would not come to fruition, but the poem itself is not of his 
dominion. A second quote is illustrative of the fine line the “hacedor” must tread: 
En vez de ser edificada con lo recordado, que la escritura, sin memoria y sin yo, 
se convierta en construcción del presente.  
Que el escribir sea mecanicidad, estado en el que no se dan líneas ni de mayor ni 
de menor resistencia. Como en la reiteración de mantras.   
Que el ser siempre lo mismo, el escribir ya no tenga un objetivo, y que de haberlo 
sea el vacío; o el silencio, versión más suave de ese vacío ("El motivo es el 
poema" 287). 
  
 The last sentence leads us to a second major paradox that Girri’s ars poetica  
comes to embrace. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the ultimate goal of poetry is 
to reach emptiness and silence, also called sunyata, “vacío,” zero magnitude and Being, 
but the means to achieve this goal are words themselves. The words of the poem hint and 
motion to the undifferentiated, unspoken whole from which limitless saying can arise. 
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The poem convokes the reader’s attention and demands a thoughtful listening that leads 
one away from a form of speech that seeks to define, capture and apprehend the being of 
things through language, and back to that area of ambiguity, of pure being to which 
words hint. Girri writes: “Las alternancias naturales tienen, para ser percibidas 
claramente, que traducirse en el juego constante de los vacíos y de los llenos” ("El 
motivo es el poema" 265).  
Likewise, a third contradiction is evident in the relationship between words and 
things. Girri does not wish to fix things in immobility through poetry. Rather, in the 
interstices of the verses, things that are brought to presence demonstrate themselves to be 
both revealing and concealing, in a dynamic relationship of the present. Words will not 
substitute for the real nor render it transparent to man’s knowledge, but they can bring us 
back to the neighborhood of experience, of co-existence and of selfless marvel. A poem 
that speaks eloquently of this is six-part poem, “Eco múltiple: nombres,” from which I 
will quote verses from the final two sections: 
  lo real, 
una simplicidad sin nombre, 
  o estado intermedio 




Y en su inmaterialidad de nombres 
más dura que las cosas que las cosas que nombran 
  y por encima 
de los sentidos, evidencias 
como la de que el nombre agua 
no apaga la sed 
 meramente el agua, límpida, 
sucia de tierra, gota congelada, 
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la mitiga ("Tramas de conflictos" 44). 
 
 The conundrums evident in the heart of Girri’s lyric are embraced and made 
evident within his works as a sign of modesty, resolve and discretion. They require that 
the “hacedor” refine his attention, return obsessively to the limits of his craft and to 
confront selflessly the real before him. Girri makes of these apparent dead ends his poetic 
path of thinking, an endless exercise of embracing what is, of persevering in the way 
things, the real, language and oneself are, without the filters of judgment, will or 
subjectivity. Poetry’s paradoxes exhort the “hacedor” to abandon the notion of a finality 
for writing and to elect this activity as ascetic movement and displacement, as a 
meditative exercise in being. Girri exemplifies the difficult, honorable and exemplary 
choice of renouncing the “representational rule of the word” (Heidegger "Words" 151) 
and dedicating himself, through his craft, to the poem’s happening: “Se habló de que el 
poema sucede, pura presencia, condición de la que extrae su idoneidad; tanta, que sujeto 















CHAPTER 3: RAFAEL CADENAS 
3.1 The Chronicles of Exile 
3.1.1 POETRY AS EXISTENCE 
In his latest extensive essay, Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la mística 
(1998), Venezuelan poet Rafael Cadenas quotes the turn-of-the-century French critic 
Charles Du Bos who writes that the spirit of Thomas Carlyle “se reducía a la ‘afirmación 
insistente y bastante monótona que consiste en declarar que el mundo es un misterio y un 
milagro,” ("Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la mística" 701). This opinion could be 
formulated about the work of Cadenas with the addition of the following: “Solemos 
hablar del misterio del universo sin incluirnos, como de cosa ajena, como si no 
formáramos parte de él” ("Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la mística" 699). That the 
human being should be regarded as one of its integral elements in the “mystery” of the 
universe is a more recent conceit in Cadenas’s oeuvre, but one to which we will attend by 
means of this introduction to the author. 
 The most complete biographical information about Rafael Cadenas is included in 
the introduction to his Obra entera: Poesía y prosa (1958-1995), penned by José Balza, a 
literary compatriot and fellow recipient of the Venezuelan national prize for literature. 
Without repeating Balza’s prologue, I would like to highlight the most salient 
information about this author’s very private life. Cadenas was born on April 8, 1930 in 
Barquisimeto, the capital of the state of Lara, in the central western region of Venezuela. 
Balza recounts, in loose terms, of a provincial family composed of a former military 
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general grandfather, a merchant father, an indigenous nanny, a collection of siblings and 
a large extended family. In Barquisimeto, Cadenas was accompanied in his burgeoning 
literary interests by Salvador and Hermann Garmendia, the former an accomplished 
author, as well as Elio Mujica (Yepes Azparren 191), composing his first poems, Cantos 
iniciales in 1946 (Dorante 89). 
 Cadenas came of age during a moment of great political upheaval and change. In 
1945, a coup by the Acción Democrática party unseated the military dictator Isaías 
Medina Angarita and instated Rómulo Betancourt, who governed for 28 months. The 
central-left Acción Democrática party instated a reforming agenda, but did not ally itself 
with the Communist party of Venezuela, founded clandestinely in 1931 and legalized in 
1945. Under the new constitution of 1947, Rómulo Gallegos was elected and sworn in as 
president in 1948, a term that lasted less than a year. A new coup headed by 
conservatives Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, Germán Suárez Flamerich 
and Major Marcos Pérez Jiménez overthrew Gallegos in November 1948. Of the three 
junta leaders, Pérez Jiménez’s leadership lasted the longest, from 1952 until 1958. His 
authoritarian rule silenced oppositional forces, outlawed the principle political parties, 
imposed strict censorship in the media and jailed, exiled, tortured and assassinated many 
of his detractors. Civilians, with the backing of the navy and air force, overthrew Pérez 
Jiménez in 1958, and the subsequent year, Rómulo Betancourt was elected president 
(1959-1964).  
  During this time period, Cadenas moved to Caracas in order to study at the 
Central University of Venezuela.  From 1947 to 1951, he was an active member in the 
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Communist Party and the Juventud Comunista (Communist youth). His opposition to the 
military junta landed him in the Cárcel Modelo, a Caracas prison, in 1952, and led to his 
exile in Trinidad until 1956, when he was allowed to return to Caracas. Reflective of this 
experience are Una isla, a collection of poems composed in 1958, and the extensive 
poem in prose, Cuadernos del destierro (1960). In an interview for the Spanish magazine 
Espéculo, Cadenas comments: 
Los cuadernos del destierro es un poema en prosa sobre mi experiencia como 
exiliado en Trinidad (1952-1956), isla muy próxima a la costa oriental de 
Venezuela. Era entonces todavía colonia inglesa, de modo que durante cuatro 
años fui súbdito involuntario, pero gustoso, de la reina Isabel. A este periodo le 
debo un idioma que leo mucho, pero que hablo sólo cuando viajo a Estados 
Unidos o a Inglaterra. El libro recoge también mi situación íntima de los años 60 
que te mencioné. Hoy no me encuentro en “Derrota”, pero no porque crea tener 
éxito, esta palabra no forma parte de mi vocabulario, lo que ocurre es que ese 
poema lo escribió un joven con quien ya casi no hablo, es decir, yo hace 40 años 
(Posadas). 
 
It is useful to contextualize these lines within the sphere of Cadenas’s activities from the 
late 50s to the 60s. As Elena Vera explains in her study and bibliography of Venezuelan 
authors from 1958 to 1983, the overthrowing of Pérez Jiménez incited a boom of engagé 
literary projects, groups and magazines (31).23 Upon his homecoming, Cadenas joined 
other politically critical writers and intellectuals in producing the magazine Tabla 
Redonda, founded by Jesús Sanoja Hernández and Manuel Caballero24. Although many 
of its members were Communist Party affiliates, Tabla Redonda eschewed the dictates of 
                                                
23 Such groups include Sardio, Tabla Redonda, El Techo de la Ballena, Trópico Uno, En Haa and 40 
Grados a la Sombra. 
24 The magazine Tabla Redonda was produced by Arnaldo Acosta Bello, Jesús Enrique Barrios, Rafael 
Cadenas, Manuel Caballero, Enrique Izaguirre, José Fernández Doris, Jesús Sanoja Hernández, Ligia 
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social realism, seeking artistic freedom and the attentive use of the poetic word (Vera 45, 
53). The poem “Derrota,” (1963) to which is referred in the above quote, is emblematic 
of Cadenas’s “intimate situation” during those years, and became an anthem of the youth 
of his generation, voicing through irony, an acerbic critique of bourgeois individualism 
and hypocrisy.  
As Cadenas acknowledges, the public and more politically defiant tone of 
“Derrota” was not cultivated throughout his writing career. Renouncing all affiliations to 
political parties, Cadenas focused his energies on teaching literature in English and 
Spanish at his alma mater, translating his preferred poets and furthering his own poetic 
development. His ensuing books, Falsas maniobras (1966) and Intemperie (1977), 
initiate his search for alternative, personal and philosophical solutions to a more essential 
rejection of the modern subject on epistemological and ethical grounds. Memorial, also 
published in 1977, gathers together the poems Cadenas composed between 1970 and 
1975, and furthers the exploration and extirpation of the various facets of the “I” and its 
relationship to reality. With Amante (1983) and later Gestiones (1992) the poetic voice 
seeks the acceptance of the self, but repositioned in a humble, participatory relationship 
within reality. 
Like Alberto Girri, Rafael Cadenas has threshed out in prose form, many of the 
recurring ideas that inform his poetry. His first such text, “Juventud, historia y cambio” 
was published in 1973 in Zona Tórrida, a magazine of the University of Carabobo (Isava 
                                                                                                                                            
Olivieri and Darío Lancini. It was published from 1959 until 1965, when several of its participants joined 
integrants from El Techo de la Ballena to produce En letra roja.   
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Briceño 55), and since this time, the personal essay has afforded him the forum for 
articulating in more direct terms his conception of language, its relationship to the human 
being and reality. Included in his Obra entera: Poesía y prosa (1958-1995)25 figure 
Literatura y vida (1970), Realidad y literatura (1979), Anotaciones (1983), En torno al 
lenguaje (1984), Dichos (1992) and Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la mística 
(1995). A constant in Cadenas’s literary endeavors is also his contributions as a 
translator. In 2006, a compilation of his translations into Spanish was published in book 
form under the title El taller de al lado, featuring selected works by D. H. Lawrence, 
Whitman, Cavafy, Segalen, Graves and Creeley, among others. As in the analysis of 
Girri’s poetry, Cadenas’s essays and his translations will be drawn upon to supplement 
our reading of his verses. 
In approaching Cadenas’s poetry, an acknowledgement must be made of the 
contributions to this field of study of critics such as Luis Miguel Isava Briceño, Ilis 
Alfonzo Luis and José Balza. Of the three, Isava Briceño’s Voz de amante offers the most 
complete analysis of Cadenas’s works. In it, he chronologically traces the dialectics 
between the self and the “you” in Cadenas’s poetry, while simultaneously reconstructing 
the “intellectual biography” of the author’s sources, readings and affinities (12).  Ilis 
Alfonzo’s Rafael Cadenas o La poesía como existencia: Ejercicio de aproximación a Los 
cuadernos del destierro, Falsas maniobras, Intemperie y Memorial is less methodical in 
its approach, focusing on the relationship of the self and the “other,” the notion of 
                                                
25 Other essays not included in his collected works are: “La barbarie civilizada” (1981), “Reflexiones 
sobre la ciudad moderna” (1983) and “Sobre la enseñanza de la literatura en la Educación Media” (1998).  
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emptiness and the role of memory. Although intuitive in her readings, Alfonzo lacks 
precision in the employment of open-ended terminology and summarily draws 
conclusions that seem to contradict her own analysis. Finally, the collection of articles, 
reviews and interviews related to Cadenas that was compiled and edited by Omar Astorga 
under the title En torno a Rafael Cadenas is an invaluable resource.  
This chapter seeks to contribute to the study of Cadenas’s works by situating his 
poetry within the greater discussion of modern epistemology. In the following pages, I 
wish to focus on Cadenas’s poetic response to the construction and situation of Man as 
the subject and object of knowledge, the subsequent rejection of this model, and the 
repositioning of the self in relationship to reality. As in the structuring of the analysis of 
Girri’s writings, Cadenas’s poetry is read in two “movements,” the first spanning the 
from Una isla (1958) until Intemperie (1977), and the second, including the work written 
from Memorial (1977) until Gestiones (1992). Such a division is not derived from an 
artificial pursuit of symmetry meant to mirror Girri’s development. Cadenas himself has 
reiterated in various interviews the transformation of his poetic voice and the distance he 
feels from his earlier production, whose “self”-centered focus and verbosity represent the 
exact reverse of his later aesthetic. Armando Rojas Guardia, who traces Cadenas’s 
“intellectual diary,” succinctly summarizes the aim of the poet’s second period to be the 
writing of “una poesía religada (en este sentido, religiosa) a lo Real (familiarizada 
internamente con la insondabilidad del mundo), la cual desnudada de todo oropel y de 
todo lujo escénico distractores, se levanta desde una ‘sequedad insobornable’ hasta la 
‘exactitud como criterio decisivo’: una poesía de la aletheia” (98). The process to 
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achieve such a mode of poetry is anything but formulaic and clear-cut, and Cadenas 
revisits questions and experiences that appear to have been resolved in earlier poems. 
Cadenas’s circling and cycling of ideas —like a musical theme with infinite variations— 
is reminiscent of Girri’s poetic itinerary and the philosophical path of Martin Heidegger.   
In following the route of Cadenas’s thought, certain ideas seem to re-articulate 
that which we have seen in Girri’s works. By revisiting these themes in this chapter, we 
may begin to find a pattern in the manner in which a particular vein of contemporary 
Latin American poetry problematizes the modern epistemological foundation of man’s 
knowledge and experience and seeks an alternative means of approaching, understanding 
and interacting with reality. As such, poetry is assigned a limited, modest but crucial role 
in providing the space and means to come to the radically simple experience of being that 
is rarely otherwise afforded. Cadenas echoes Girri’s affirmation of poetry’s task and 
reaffirms its task in modern times. 
3.1.2 THE POETICS OF AN ISLAND 
 Una isla (1958) is Cadenas’s first book, a collection of 38 short, mostly untitled 
poems that were composed in Venezuela, upon returning from his exile in the island 
country of Trinidad. Epigraphs by two, future Nobel laureates frame this poetry and our 
reading of the first-person subject that is developed in this text. Cadenas quotes Polish 
author Czeslaw Milosz as cited by Octavio Paz to perhaps summarize his own feelings 
about the state of affairs in Venezuela, both during and after the dictatorship of Pérez 
Jiménez: “Infeliz bajo la tiranía,/ infeliz bajo la república,/ en una suspirábamos por la 
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libertad,/ en otra por el fin de la corrupción.” His second reference, in clear contrast with 
the first, appears to offer an answer to those unhappy political and social circumstances: 
“Hablo de una alta condición, antaño,/ entre los trajes, en el reino de girantes claridades.” 
These verses are excerpted from Saint-John Perse’s “Pour fêter une enfance” (1910), a 
six-part poem composed to recollect and praise his birthplace: the Caribbean island of 
Guadeloupe. Perse was twelve in 1899, when his family left their Antillean home for 
France. Guadeloupe came to represent a place of order and sense, not only an exotic and 
simpler world, but also the distant site of identity and self-knowledge, so different from 
France, where he felt himself to be an exile. Underlying his verses is also the presence of 
a female sensuality, of those women who wear “los trajes” and are bathing their 
luminescent and warm limbs in the verses preceding the ones quoted above. 
The verses selected as the second epigraph to Una isla appear, in the original 
French, enclosed within parentheses26. Their omission here is unfortunate because the 
parentheses themselves add a layer of meaning that contribute to our understanding of 
Cadenas’s “island.” Graphically, the parentheses form the contours of this “reino de 
girantes claridades” and its enclosed “alta condición antaño”; in other words, they trace 
the outline of an island — Guadeloupe, for Perse, and Trinidad, for Cadenas. Before the 
reader ever arrives at the  “isla” of Cadenas’s title, these epigraphs serve to anticipate and 
                                                
26 The first stanza reads in French: 
« Palmes... !  Alors on te baignait dans l’eau-de-feuilles-vertes ; et l’eau encore était du soleil vert ; et les 
servantes de ta mère, grandes filles luisantes, remuaient leurs jambes chaudes près de toi qui tremblais...                                                                                                                  
(Je parle d’une haute condition, alors, entre les robes, au règne de tournantes clartés.) » 
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structure our interpretation of his text through the juxtaposition of the oppressive and 
unsatisfactory political situation on one hand, and the bygone days on the island of 
swirling lights where people maintained a “high condition,” on the other. Although his 
time in Trinidad was the result of a compulsory exile, in Cadenas’s verses the island is 
transformed into a variation of the symbolic locus amœnus, a place of plenitude, 
fulfillment, refuge and earthly paradise.  
An inherent tension is soon made manifest, however, in the poetic construction of 
the island. As Eduardo Saccone has written, a locus amœnus is typically conceived as a 
sanctuary from the historical processes and conditions of time, and its space is enclosed 
and sheltered. Nevertheless, spatial/ temporal contiguity continues to exert its dominance 
in the physical and experiential realms of this topos, such that the future encroachment of 
an “outside” is inevitable, as is the distancing from this idyllic experience (5-6). This is 
indeed the case in Una isla. In fact, the poetic subject speaks of the island through 
memory, already inhabiting a time and a place distant from those he recalls. A sense of 
fallenness and rupture predominates, with the island presented as a paradise lost that had 
been sanctified by the plenitude of a female presence; in contrast, the present is 
distinguished by its uncertainty and the experience of collapse, fear and separation. The 
protagonist of these poems is trapped between the illusive recollection of self-possession 
and identity, and a present state of uncertainty, chaos and crisis.  
As was the case in the reading of Girri’s first poetry, the broader discussion of the 
modern subject and its defining role in the modern episteme is illuminating in 
understanding the first-person poetic voice that speaks from the verses of the initial phase 
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of Cadenas’s oeuvre. Here, again, Foucault’s diagnosis of Man will provide us with the 
analytical framework for situating the crisis of the subject that is predominant in 
Cadenas’s early poetic projects within the context of modernity’s system of knowledge, 
whose foundation of unsolvable paradoxes has been referred to previously as the three 
sets of “doublets” that define Man’s construction. The poetic voice of these poems is a 
version of Foucault’s Man, as it unsuccessfully attempts to stake out and maintain its 
position as the subject and object of its own knowledge, a project symbolized by the 
island itself.  
There is an anxiety for the conformation of subjectivity in Cadenas’s first poetry. 
In this book, the poetic subject that comes to age, in the Foucauldian sense, is born in the 
immediacy of a crisis. His evident loss of an origin, unease within his chaotic and corrupt 
present and his self-described identity as an “other” alienated in his own country, are 
defining gestures of modernity. In this sense, Cadenas’s reference to Saint-John Perse is 
not limited to their analog biographical circumstances: it is deeply rooted in a common 
experience of modernity in which the poet cannot find his place in the world. Modernity 
implies the essential assumption that the subject is never at home in its epoch. As in the 
great ideological narratives produced after the Hegelian concept of history, the modern 
subject considers himself trapped between the long-departed past that enjoyed an 
ephemeral golden age and a telos that announces the unfulfilled promise of restored 
order. Both the lost locus amœnus and its always-deferred restoration imply an 
undesirable present for the modern subject. Cadenas’s first-person subject —read here as 
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a variation of Foucault’s Man— through his articulation of the world, attempts but fails 
to recover, a new sense of order. The first, untitled poem of Una isla states as much: 
Si el poema no nace, pero es real tu vida, 
eres su encarnación. 
Habitas 
en su sombra inconquistable. 
Te acompaña 
diamante incumplido ("Una isla" 17).  
 These verses express the poet’s slippery understanding of the relationship 
between author and text. The initial supposition is of the possibility of  “the poem”: it is, 
this much is affirmed, at least as a future prospect or promise, but its manifestation and 
“birth” through words, as articulated and captured by the poet, is less certain. Assuming 
the comforting “realness” of the author’s life and existence, however, the poet consoles 
himself with the idea of being, himself, the incarnation of the poem he was unsuccessful 
in “birthing.” The notion of the conflation of poem and poet would naturally appeal to the 
modern subject, as the securing of himself as the generator and enunciator of meaning. 
Cadenas, in evaluating such a position, is straightforward in his verdict: the modern 
subject is, in fact, never the master of his elusive poem. Man “inhabits” poetry’s 
unconquerable shadow —that particular darkness cast by a body in its play with light. 
Although perhaps not visible to him, the shadow announces and makes plain to the 
subject the independent, unfathomable presence of the poem. Unable to wrap his hands 
around it, the poem is ultimately portrayed as an unfulfilled, omnipresent ideal: the hard, 
luminescent transparency of a perfectly structured diamond. Cadenas acknowledges from 
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these first verses that, as much as the subject may so desire, poetry is not Man’s dominion 
through which to render the world to himself.  
Despite this awareness, poetry is the medium the subject chooses in an attempt to 
access an “original,” lost experience and to project a utopian, future resolution. Cadenas’s 
island contains the accoutrements of an earthly paradise, some of which he enumerates in 
another untitled poem: “Muelle de enormes llamas./ Navíos que viajan al sol,/ música de 
tambores,/ sales desencajadas,/ niños desnudos,/ marineros que descargan plátanos. 
Ciudad de corazón de árbol, humedades/ temblorosas, juncos que danzan” ("Una isla" 
27). To this portrait of simplicity and abundance that appeals to the five senses, Cadenas 
adds other selective, tantalizing details of Trinidad in subsequent poems: “lunas de 
bauxita” ("Una isla" 25), “Cielo plateado, subyugadas colinas, plantaciones/ de coco, tren 
de nubes, olor de viandas,” San Fernando, the port “ciudad de madera y su sortilegio” 
("Una isla" 32), “mercados donde mujeres/ de piel cobriza venden hojas, a los muelles/ 
atestado de frutas, a la Savannah donde los/ amantes encuentran la oscuridad para verse” 
("Una isla" 49).  
An essential element of the island is the an anonymous female lover, often 
referred to in the second person, whose body and presence constitute the most prominent 
landmarks in the topography of the subject’s memory. This woman is evoked in verses of 
a more literal diction — “recuerdo el amanecer en tu cabellera negra tumbada/ sobre el 
lecho o bañándose de ti o dejándote su fragancia,” ("Una isla" 34) — and in ever-
ascending tributes to her magnificence, such in the anaphoric poem titled “You”:  
Tú apareces, 
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 tú te desnudas 
 tú entras en la luz, 
 tú despiertas los colores, 
 […] 
 tú conjuras la tierra para que acompase su ritmo a tu lentitud de lava, 
 tú reinas en el centro de esta conflagración 
 y del primero 
 al séptimo día 
 tu cuerpo es un arrogante  
    palacio 
 donde vive 
        el  
   temblor ("Una isla" 46). 
 
The simple “appearance” of the woman triggers a series of events of wider and wider 
scope, until she is inscribed in the molten center of the earth, converted into the site of 
existence’s primordial tremor. For the poetic subject, this female “tú” embodies the 
Trinidad of his creation, and by being with her, he inhabits undividedly the island itself: 
“Mujer, mi suelo, tan real” ("Una isla" 38). 
Through this poetry of recollections, Cadenas constructs an origin and genealogy 
for himself out of this island: “Vengo de un reino extraño,/ vengo de una isla iluminada,/ 
vengo de los ojos de una mujer” ("Una isla" 19). The isle is a “strange,” “illuminated” 
“realm” because it seems exempt from the vicissitudes of the outside world. Although 
time is acknowledged in the presence of the sun and moon, dawn and dusk, Cadenas’s 
Trinidad is removed from historical processes, social problems and political turmoil. Its 
time is that of the mythical Golden Age of “una lentitud antigua” ("Una isla" 37) that “te 
confundes con la infancia” ("Una isla" 54).  Extracted from contingency, filtered through 
poetry and rendered pure, the Trinidad of Una isla has become the self-fashioned locus 
for the subject’s identity and being: “En esta playa no me pregunto quién soy ni dudo/ ni 
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ando a tientas./ Claras potestades imperan aquí, ahuyentan ráfagas/ de aniquilación, 
aúnan lo roto./ Inician” ("Una isla" 41).  More than a geographical location, the island 
represents self-knowledge, security and stability, a time and place when the human being 
was integrated with the world, before Man was rent apart and erected as subject. The 
poetic voice speaks of the experience of simply being and belonging: “Me entrego a estas 
arenas donde el brillo rescata./ Aquí soy. Sin pensar” ("Una isla" 40). It is for this reason, 
that the island and his lover are evoked with such longing and desperation, for they 
symbolize a state of communion and integration. Cadenas’s poetic subject suspects as 
much, when he queries: “¿Te busco a ti o busco mi rostro? […] Sólo sé esto: que al 
evocarte mi extravío cesa, vuelvo a entrar en contacto” ("Una isla" 51). Ultimately, 
Trinidad represents the Edenic possibility of a future grounding of the self as pure 
presence. In his literary treatment of Trinidad, the poetic subject of Una isla conforms 
with the Foucauldian model of the retreat and return of the origin, as discussed in detail 
in the first chapter. The poetic voice speaks from a present, beyond the eclipse of this 
idyll, but with the prospect of a possible resolution: “Ahora no me reconozco. Sólo 
espero que de mí nazca otro hombre unido” ("Una isla" 50).  
The subject of Una isla, situated within the present from which these poems are 
articulated, claims to not recognize himself; he calls himself an “exiliado” ("Una isla" 
59), for he perceives himself to be “other” than his “true” self. The actuality of this 
existential crisis is of even greater consequence to the poetic subject than his time of 
incarceration, previous to his arrival to the island. Even behind bars, he felt free, 
boundless and self-assured:  
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Mi libertad había nacido tras aquellas paredes. El calabozo núm. 3 se extendía 
como un amanecer. Su día era vasto. 
El pobre carcelero se creía libre porque cerraba la reja, pero a través de ti yo era 
innumerable ("Una isla" 23). 
  
The present stands in stark contrast. Outlined in broad strokes, the subject finds himself 
in a large, anonymous city of “duras calles” and “puertas humilladas” (Cadenas "Una 
isla" 54). Far from the island, physically unrestrained, he nevertheless feels besieged and 
trapped, incapable of reconciling his notion of himself and his experience of himself, the 
situations to which he is subjected and his comprehension of them, or the words he 
speaks and their corresponding signified:  
La destrucción me sitia. Me estanco, en litigio. La claridad se vuelve inútil. Llegué 
y no llegué. No ando, me desando, en pedazos. Digo estoy y no siento lo que digo. 
Voy de cerco en cerco. Atestiguo derrumbes. Busco lo que solo no puede 
encontrarse, y se hace tarde ("Una isla" 58). 
 
With Una isla, Cadenas initiates his literary career in the heart of the crisis of Man. His 
poetic protagonist’s present, and its doomed strategies for coping with this crisis are 
representative of the modern subject.  
3.1.3 STRATEGIES OF EXILE 
 Cadenas’s next publication, Los cuadernos del destierro, composed in Caracas in 
1959, can be read as the continuation and magnification of the poetic experience of Una 
isla. This long poem in prose, divided into thirty-one “episodes” of varying length, has 
been described in broad terms by Guillermo Sucre as “la expansión del yo a través de una 
memoria personal y mítica” (304). The affinity of Los cuadernos and Gérard de Nerval’s 
Aurélia (1855) has been noted by Venezuelan critic Ilis Alfonzo (52-54) for the delirium 
 186 
that defines the first-person protagonist; Luis Miguel Isava Briceño has also summarized 
other readers’ observations of the relationship of the poem with Arthur Rimbaud’s Une 
saison en enfer (1873) in this manner: 
comparte la actitud de rebelión, el sumirse en la ficción y en los desdoblamientos, 
el precipitarse vertiginoso en los abismos del yo. Así mismo comparte la actitud 
frente al lenguaje y, en líneas generales, los cambios de tono y la evolución del 
poema: presentación del personaje; establecimiento de su ascendencia; sumisión 
en el infierno y los abismos; desarreglo de los sentidos, dislocación del lenguaje; 
calma final, irresolución y despedida (28). 
 
Los cuadernos del destierro is Cadenas’s own “carnet de damné,” in which his 
poetic protagonist says: “relataré no sin fabulaciones mi transcurso por tierras de 
ignominias, dulzuras, rupturas y reuniones, esplendores y derrumbes” ("Los cuadernos 
del destierro" 65). A confessed non-reliable narrator, the poetic voice’s vertiginous 
account exhibits several salient features: the protagonist’s identity and voice are unstable, 
fractured and multiple; the chronology of the relation is disjointed and impossible to 
reconstruct with certainty, despite the “I’s” fixation with both the past and the future; 
language’s capacity to communicate and convey meaning is thrown into doubt. These 
characteristics have been interpreted as symptoms of the psychic process of individuation 
in the Jungian sense of the term (Alfonzo), as a personal variation of the motif of the 
“fall” —from nature, love, a state of grace, communion with the other—  (Isava Briceño), 
and as evidence of Cadenas’s cultivated and destructive poetic neurosis that fuels a 
particular brand of alienation and impotence for both poetry and men (Russotto). 
Although each critic, in the course of his or her close reading of Los cuadernos, helps the 
reader to navigate Cadenas’s labyrinthine poem, none seems to inquire about the greater 
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“wherefore” of this book, in other words, the epistemological conditions which allow 
such a text to be conceived in the first place. Cadenas himself provides the answer that 
we have already begun exploring in the previous section when he writes: “Todo esto 
ocurre porque terriblemente la palabra hombre nos roe” ("Los cuadernos del destierro" 
96). This book is the product of the episteme of Man, and can only “occur” within the 
context of the modern appreciation of this paramount word.  
Los cuadernos can be appreciated as the mise en scène of the full-blown crisis of 
Man and his strategies to overcome it. Foucault’s diagnosis of the modern episteme as an 
arrangement of knowledge through and around the figure of Man that is intrinsically 
paradoxical and “born” in crisis is exemplified in Cadenas’s poem. Specifically, the text 
wrestles with the impossibility of the reconciliation of an empirical and transcendental 
base for knowledge, of the self and its other, of the present and that which is past or 
future, of Man’s intended use of language and its ungraspable and unfathomable content. 
The first-person subject of Los cuadernos is an embodiment of “Man,” and his struggles 
and ultimate failure to bridge the contradictions of his existence parallel Foucault’s 
demonstration of the unfeasibility of an internal resolution to these quandaries, thus 
foreshadowing an epistemic shift in which Man “disappears.”  
Before Cadenas attempts a disarticulation of Man in his later works, this poem 
represents the ballooning assertion and linguistic amplification of his presence. Man, 
Foucault has insisted, is the subject and object of his own knowledge. Here, the poetic 
subject desperately seeks to establish his own identity and to define the parameters of his 
existence as a means to fix a “transcendental” ground for his empirical experience. This 
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desire and need to establish an indubitable foundation on which to stand is reiterated 
throughout the poem, in phrases such as, “Una sola certidumbre ansío. Un sólo lugar que 
podamos llamar por su nombre, palpar, acariciar” and “quiero dentro de mí un recodo 
florido, infranqueable, dúctil donde yo pueda reinar sin estorbo” ("Los cuadernos del 
destierro" 100, 01). To the rhetorical question he poses himself, “¿No habrá cerca un 
recinto seguro?” ("Los cuadernos del destierro" 95), the poetic voice has already 
answered “no,” lamenting repeatedly his present state of confusion, doubt, internal 
division and annihilation. He says that life “me deja solo frente al enorme búfalo de lo 
desconocido” (91), and thus he “Habitaba un lugar indeciso” ("Los cuadernos del 
destierro" 95). Because in this state, “Nada se resuelve. Está en pie la angustia de la 
escisión” (97), the “I” concludes: “Yo no puedo sino girar en la destrucción” (95). 
Due to the insecurity of his existential position, the poetic voice attempts to 
establish an identity for himself by tracing his genealogy and destiny, with the hope of 
situating his present within the course of a comprehensible history. The first section of 
the poem is the narrator’s initial declaration of self-definition. In it, he distinguishes 
himself from the race of his ancestors, whom he characterizes as austere, provincial, 
misaligned with the earth, incapable of reading the world’s signs, rigid of spirit but elastic 
of body. His affiliation, on the other hand, is with a people he describes as “un pueblo de 
grandes comedores de serpientes, sensuales, vehementes, silenciosos y aptos para 
enloquecer de amor” and his “suerte estaba decidida por sacerdotes semisalvajes” ("Los 
cuadernos del destierro" 63). By aligning himself with the latter group, the poetic voice 
seems to privilege an instinctual model of man, one that is attuned to nature and is guided 
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by a greater destiny than the self. Nevertheless, the narrator is unable to let go and 
embrace this intuitive approach to variable developments of his existence, finding fault in 
this manner of being: “Me había tornado primitivo, inextricable y perverso como un niño. 
Conformaba mis actos con ceremonias simples, igual que un salvaje” (65).  
Ultimately, Cadenas’s poetic voice envies the assuredness and “rigideces 
inmemoriales” (63) of his ancestors and laments his own “mudanza de los rostros” (65). 
He sums up his experience in a very Foucauldian fashion: “Yo no era el mismo” (63, 
emphasis added). Man’s need to be the Same and to eliminate the Other is central to his 
role as the subject and object of all knowledge, guaranteeing his position as its axis in the 
structuring of knowledge. The protagonist of Los cuadernos, like Foucault’s Man, is born 
with the impossible mission of knowing himself as the knower, and his incapacity of 
doing so precipitates an immediate crisis.  Cadenas’s subject diagnoses himself and 
enumerates his symptoms:  
Sólo yo conocía mi mal. Era —caso no infrecuente en los anales de los falsos 
desarrollos— la duda. 
Yo nunca supe si fui escogido para escogido para trasladar revelaciones. 
Nunca estuve seguro de mi cuerpo. 
Nunca pude precisar si tenía una historia. 
Yo ignoraba lo concerniente a mí y a mis ancestros. 
Nunca creía que mis ojos, orejas, boca, nariz, piel, movimientos, gustos, 
dilecciones, aversiones me pertenecían enteramente (76) 
 
Rephrased, these lines speak of an ignorance of the self, from the physical body and its 
processes to human history and its resolution.  The consciousness and immediacy of these 
“shortcomings” of Man are indicative of the epistemological context that made possible 
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Cadenas’s text. Our present examination of the additional strategies to which his 
protagonist will turn, furthers this assertion.  
 Mirroring the symbolic construction of the island of the previous book, the poetic 
subject of Los cuadernos verbally creates an analogous tropical Eden of memory’s 
domain, from which he is exiled. As the temporal order of this text is non-lineal, this 
marvelous realm is mobile, functioning both as an origin and the place of an ultimate 
resolution.  It is here that he posits his authentic, unadulterated and undivided self, as 
both memory and projection: “Osaré recrearme en la evocación./ Isla, deleitable 
antífona./ Horma de los cuatro puntos./ Asilo de los vientos sin paz” (67). The poetic 
subject, through the evocation of this otherworldly space-time, seeks to define himself 
anew, anchoring his being in and through the island, a word which in itself functions as 
the center of a private liturgy in Cadenas’s poems. The island is given other names, 
whose compilation here augments its polysemy. It is called the “región delgada […] la 
morada donde se depositan los signos de las aguas […] el huerto de las especias 
clamorosas, la temporada de arcilla” (70), the “tierra de luz blanda” (72), the “casa 
meridional del agua” (74), the “lugar de los ayuntamientos sagrados” (87) and “los 
paraísos que soñé” (87). These descriptors elevate the island to the category of a 
consecrated myth, a place of light, generation, and sacred unions where the waters 
convey signs and  “Todo aquí es génesis” (71). 
To the details of the tropical cornucopia of Una isla that poetically represented 
Trinidad, Cadenas combines in this book, imaginative components that effectively 
distance this place from the map of identifiable geographies. The poetic language of Los 
 191 
cuadernos “ups the symbolic ante,” investing this space with supernatural, extraordinary 
characters, beliefs and rituals. Certain features of the landscape can, however, be traced 
back to Trinidad, a country of great religious plurality, races and origins from which 
images such as the following can realistically be derived: 
Calles manchadas de fluidos vegetales, de baba ebria, de sexo negro, de mugres 
provisionales, de hálitos sacros, de africanas flexiones, de alas de loto, de 
mandarines venido a menos, de dragones rotos, de fosforescencias de tigra, de 
aires balsámicos de amplios valles búdicos. 
Una mezquita se baña al sol en las colinas (69). 
 
A country with significant populations of practicing Muslims, Hindus and followers of 
the Orisha (Changó) faith, Cadenas’s portrayal of the place of origin amplifies the 
“exotic” elements of Trinidad, supplementing them with complementary confabulations 
of his own invention, such as: “Un adolescente oscuro mira desde un trono de luciérnagas 
el paso de las cebras como cordón de brasas. Pasa un elefante herido” (71). Creating a 
mythic world to inhabit, the poetic voice unites remote times and places, and thus can 
claim to have spoken with and seen any number of symbolically “loaded” personages:  
“brujos” (72), “profetas” (73), “al dios Osiris rodeado de cuervos, a los viquingos que 
escaparon al volcán, a un caballero desencantado con un halcón al hombro, a un 
emperador romano con sus trofeos de vírgenes desnudas” (74).  
Although the place of origin is elaborated upon and recurring in the book, the 
poetic voice has to finally admit that its “orillas se han apagado” (102). He calls himself 
“Anteo sin memoria” (98), a reference to the Greek myth of Antaeus, the virulent son of 
Gaia and Poseidon whose strength to fight his enemies came from his contact with the 
earth, his mother and origin. Antaeus was defeated and killed by Heracles, when the latter 
 192 
lifted and held him from the ground until his strength was drained. Cadenas’s protagonist 
aptly laments his own experience, “Mi piel echa de menos tu caricia, tierra” (98), with the 
“earth” clearly affiliated to that land of his imagination to which he dreams of returning. 
His present is that of continuous exile, represented by a parade of anonymous, lonely 
cities where he is degraded and trapped “colgando de la pasarela del autobús como un 
orangután triste” (90), tired “de ver naufragar mis expediciones sagradas en vacíos” (84). 
Although the poetic subject is loath to admit it, he is forced to concede that the 
place he posits with origin and authenticity is a “lugar de ficción” (77) or “Erewhon” 
(90), a reference to Samuel Butler’s 1872 novel, about an eponymous, fictional and 
“utopian” country whose name is an anagram of “Nowhere.” The realization of the 
artifice of this origin represents the final hope for the poetic voice in his desperate 
attempt to create a foundation for his erection as the subject and object of knowledge. He 
writes: “Universo oral de mi libertad, en tus galaxias encomiendo mi espíritu” (98). As 
the speaking subject, he conceives himself to be the creator of meaning and the generator 
of truth, with words becoming the key to his freedom.   
This human-centered language is but another symptom of how Cadenas’s 
protagonist attempts to fulfill his role as Man within the modern episteme. As the speaker 
of language, the subject attempts to reign over and rein in the words he uses, but to little 
avail: “las palabras se liberan de la formalidad y con incipiente gozo traspasan las líneas 
presupuestas. […] El titiritero demanda orden, procura apagar la descompasada 
insurgencia, conjura la magnánima retórica pero en balde” (94). As writer and speaker of 
his autobiography, the poetic subject cannot even control the telling of his life. A failed 
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puppeteer, his own words rebel against them, speaking their own mysterious meaning 
that eclipses and erases him. In desperation, he seeks mastery of language but discovers 
that his efforts are in vain: 
Consultaba los inabarcables cursos del verbo, inquiría de las tablas de la dicción 
sus secretos trasvasables, averiguaba en pergaminos astrales la valía de los 
vocablos. El color, aroma, sabor, textura, sonido de mi idioma me eran ajenos 
(99). 
  
Cadenas’s protagonist is defeated in and through words, the very material of his 
construction: “Exhausta está mi lengua, la matriz amante. Ya no puede perfilar ninguna 
figura en la claridad del día. […] Derrotada, inútil, impotente” (97). The “figura” that 
language “no puede perfilar” is that of the figure of Man. Los cuadernos del destierro is 
the dramatization of his attempts to conquer and hold his place as the center of a structure 
of knowledge, asserting his identity as the Same over the Other, forging a space of origin 
and resolution for himself, and forcing his language to speak his meaning and identity. 
His admitted failure is that of Man, and the book is the product of pushing the 
paradoxical axis of his construction to their limits. Cadenas’s next poetry will be the 
insistent probing of his “defeat” and “failure,” and the beginning of an alternative model 
for being, beyond Man. 
3.1.4 THE PATH OF FALSE MANEUVERS 
On May 31, 1963, Cadenas published “Derrota,” a poem that first appeared in the 
newspaper, Clarín del viernes (Isava Briceño 33). Included in his Obra entera, it was 
placed after the collection of poems, Falsas maniobras, although the latter was composed 
in 1965. In this analysis, I will follow the original chronology of their publication. Rafael 
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Cordero has recalled that this poem was adopted by the youth of Venezuela of the 1960s 
as their anthem because it captured “el estado de ánimo de una generación” (113). For his 
part, Manuel Caballero classifies the text as “una carta escrita para darnos coraje” (30) 
and Ludovico Silva characterizes it as an act of hyperconsciousness, “una requisitoria 
hacia sí mismo […] que, por mayor escarmiento y ejemplaridad, no es realizada, según 
los consejos del ascético San Juan en <<los retretes del alma>>, sino a la vista del 
público” (18).  
With these statements as an introduction, it should already be evident that the 
tenor and raison d’être of this poem mark a shift from the poems of Una isla and Los 
cuadernos del destierro. Whereas in his first books, the poetic voice seeks to establish 
order and normalcy through various strategies specific to modern Man, in this poem, the 
first-person subject abandons all pretensions of fulfilling Man’s role, preferring to 
denounce the expectations and conventions that still predominate in the society to which 
he belongs and declaring himself unwilling to participate within the configuration of 
accepted values, which he scorns. Although the poetic voice offers no real solution or 
alternative to this model, he announces his abstention, judging himself, his activities, 
thoughts and life to be a failure, according to the standards and strictures of the his world. 
The poet declares himself to be “defeated” in the sense that he acknowledges the fact that 
he that he will never succeed as “Man,” given that the demands of being the absolute 
subject and object of knowledge are impossible to meet, as he experienced in his earlier 
attempts. The title of the poem, “Derrota,” is not without irony; although he is self-
deprecating, the effect of his almost fifty-count “confessions of guilt” is to interrogate the 
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sense and validity of the episteme of Man and to imply its “defeat” as the way of 
structuring being and knowledge.  
Despite being two-and-a-half pages long, “Derrota” is one long sentence, its body 
constructed of a string of anaphoric, adjective clauses that fill in the space between the 
first word of the poem, “Yo,” and the independent clause that comprises the last two 
verses: “me levantaré del suelo más ridículo todavía para seguir burlándome de los otros 
y de mí hasta el día del juicio final” ("Derrota" 139). Each of the verses in between offers 
a detail the “yo’s” profile, from his personal psyche to his political critique of Venezuela, 
from his harsh self-judgment to his non-conformity with societal expectations.  He shows 
himself to be inept at and/or disinterested in standard, expected functions of Man within 
modern civilization: holding a job, wearing a tie, earning a title, fulfilling a “useful” 
purpose, marrying and forming a home, being successful, triumphing in life, engaging in 
politics, and traveling to Paris or India, the geographic credentials necessary to call 
oneself a cultural or spiritual savant. The reader may wonder if such statements are 
simply a sign of the times — one more self-proclaimed rebel outcast of the 1960’s 
expressing his individualism and discontent with hypocritical bourgeois morals. Although 
Cadenas’s poem may have been adopted by his Venezuelan peers for precisely this 
reason, I believe that the text exposes the author’s realization of the paradoxical 
epistemological underpinnings of Man’s construction.  
In several key verses, the poetic subject voices his plight and demonstrates his 
particular consciousness about his situation, saying he is someone: “que he perdido un 
centro que nunca tuve” (137), “que perdí el hilo del discurso que se ejecutaba en mí y no 
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he podido encontrarlo” (138), “que no encuentro mi cuerpo” (138) and “que ansío la 
inmovilidad perfecta” (138). The lack of a center, of control over language and one’s own 
body, coupled with the need to establish a point of stability speak of an intimate 
awareness of Man’s crisis which is summed up in the verse “no soy lo que soy ni lo que 
no soy” (138). Unlike the protagonist of Una isla or Los cuadernos del destierro, this “I” 
recurs to no to strategies in an effort to get around his limitations and affirm himself as 
Man. Without histrionics, he states his perspective of his own position and his desire to 
find a radically different mode of being: “he percibido por relámpagos mi falsedad y no 
he podido derribarme, barrer todo y crear de mi indolencia, mi flotación, mi extravío una 
frescura nueva, y obstinadamente me suicido al alcance de la mano” (139). In the end, the 
problematic of the poem is revealed in its entirety: the “yo” of the poem recognizes, in 
addition to the falsehood of society, his own lack of authenticity but is unable to 
“overthrow himself.” Despite the expressed desire to “sweep everything away” and 
“create a new freshness,” the axis of this poem remains the obstinate “yo” who admits to 
an “orgullo satánico” (138) and predominates in this poem. It is only in Falsas maniobras 
that the “yo’s” ego and need for affirmation begins to be abandoned. 
The title, Falsas maniobras, is particularly well suited for this text and our present 
discussion. The word “maniobras,” best translated as “maneuvers,” implies a series of 
tactical and dexterous movements, sometimes devious or deceptive in nature, to make 
something function or to change directions. In the context of Cadenas’s literary 
trajectory, “maniobras” specifically refer to the various postures adopted by the human 
being in relationship to time, the world that surrounds him, language and his conception 
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of the self. Cadenas qualifies these maneuvers as “false,” thus opening the door to several 
possible interpretations. “False” could refer to Cadenas’s recognition and self-criticism of 
his own subject’s failed strategies to assert himself as the subject and object of 
knowledge. “False” could be the modern epistemological structuring of the human being 
as Man, and a critique of a society that embraces this role. In both interpretations, the 
author inherently implies the possibility of “true,” “authentic,” “ sincere” or “real” 
courses of action and manners of being.  
In the course of this book, all three of these ideas gleaned from the title are played 
out, alternating unflinching personal and societal asseverations with the opening of 
alternative conceptions and positioning of the self. The first text acts as a preface to the 
book, with the poetic subject admitting to his previous “incarnations” — “solía dividirme 
en innumerables personas”—, his conflicted scorn and desire to conform to modern 
culture’s expectations — “Para complacer a los otros y a mí, he conservado una imagen 
doble”—, and his ultimate goal to reach a fresh approach to the self and his reality, — 
“como un esplendor innominado, y mi soberbia injustificada ceda el paso a una gran paz, 
una alegría sobria, una rectitud inmediata” ("Falsas maniobras" 107). Cadenas’s doubles 
are notorious in this book, and a close reading of the poems “Combate,” “Desolado,” 
“Los dos inútiles,” “Reconocimiento” and “Él que es” reveals a pattern with regards to 
the way Cadenas conceives the self. In a binary fashion, writes of an external “I” who 
conforms with the exigencies of Man’s construction —“ese mí orgulloso, ese mí que no 
deja franquear su claustro”— and an “other,” authentic self described as “informe, vasto, 
neutro” and “oscuro, humilde y quieto, no necesita protección” (134).   
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Several poems at the beginning of the book, such as “Mi pequeño gimnasio” 
speak of the subject’s pitiable attempts to consciously mold himself through a series of 
exercises into Man. He “bends,” “hides,” “punishes,” “scorns,” “stretches” and “twists” 
himself in an effort to conform his “consciousness,” “intentions,” “actions” and “words” 
to the standards he is supposed to uphold, expressed succinctly in the final verses of the 
poem: 
En el fondo los ejercicios están enderezados a hacer de mí un hombre racional, 
que viva con precisión y burle los laberintos. En clave, persiguen mi 
transformación en Hombre Número Tal. Llanamente y en mi intimidad, espero 
con ellos dejar de ser absurdo ("Falsas maniobras" 115). 
 
Cadenas’s lexical choice coincides exactly with our reading of his work up to this point. 
His first-person poetic voice is remarkably self-aware and severe in his auto-evaluation, 
recognizing his insecurities, the motives behind his exertions to affirm an identity as 
rational Man, and their underlying falsehood. To be “Hombre Número Tal” is a bid for 
safety and positivity through the self, outside of the “laberintos” of the unknown, even 
thought internally, the “yo” admits his personal reservations about this “absurd” mold of 
being. 
 Cadenas’s critique is further developed in the poem “Certamen,” whose title 
implies a type of competition with prizes, intended to stimulate the cultivation of certain 
areas of knowledge. Here, the competition is life, represented by a racetrack in a “ciudad 
instalada sobre la prisa” (116) around which the contestants speed. In this poem, as in 
many of this book, Cadenas plays with the idea he first presented in the introductory 
poem, that of “dividing himself in innumerable persons” (107). “Certamen” maintains the 
 199 
slight presence of a first-person voice, which makes itself visible in the only verse written 
in parentheses: “(Yo lo he visto vagar por ferias de oxígeno, en fuertes atascos)” (116). 
The “him” referred to above is the central focus of the poem, and a double of the “yo,” 
one who initially attempts to compete with anonymous Men who are “sumidos en la 
apatía de una nueva prisa, enredados en sus caballos de fuerza” and “dormidos, 
orgullosos de sus progresos, tranquilizados” (116).  The “él” realizes his “ineptitud para 
competir” and decides to “situarse en un punto inmóvil” where he watches the others 
with “desprecio, vergüenza y envidia” (116). These conflicting emotions understandable: 
he feels disdain for their limited and arrogant approach to life, embarrassment for having 
participated himself, and envy for their assured sense of purpose, their pride and 
unquestioning fulfillment of their assigned role. Beyond this gut reaction to the 
experience of modern reality, an understated but sophisticated assessment of the 
wherefore of this manner of being is offered: “En realidad ni él ni ellos se mueven. Sólo 
se desplazan en el interior de un sueño para evitar que el silencio les hable” (116). 
Modern Man ceaselessly oscillates in pursuit of establishing himself as the Same and to 
affirm himself as the center of all movement. Cadenas calls this pretension a “dream” 
which does not allow for true movement. Man is trapped within his own paradigm and 
his incessant activity is a strategy to protect himself from all that is “Other” to him: the 
“silence” which would speak a way of being beyond Man. 
 For this reason, Cadenas writes a poem of personal praise to “Fracaso,” which is 
personified in the poem as a teacher and a route to salvation, and addressed in the second-
person, as “you.” Inverting modern societal values, the poetic voice offers thanks to 
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“Failure” for having prevented him from committing the gravest “false maneuver”: that 
of consummating himself as Man. In her linguistic study of this poem, critic Irma 
Chumacero writes that Cadenas “Contrapone con una visión de la realidad que 
contraviene lo establecido en el mundo occidental: el fracaso como forma de vida y vía 
para la propia liberación” (57). It is failure that has made the poetic voice “humilde, 
silencioso y rebelde” (132) by “limpiándome con una esponja áspera, lanzándome a mi 
verdadero campo de batalla, cediéndome las armas que el triunfo abandona” (132). He 
has thus avoided the pitfalls of Man: “representar un papel […] reñir con jerarquías, 
inflarme hasta reventar” (132). Cadenas takes issue with Man’s notion of “failure,” 
writing that, “Tú no existes./ Has sido inventado por la delirante soberbia” (131), and 
instead, embraces the opportunity to experience “vacío,” “la nitidez del desierto,” “sólo 
desnudez” (131-2).  
 In this book, as we have seen in Una isla and Los cuadernos del destierro, the 
poetic voice contrasts his present state of being with an experience of unity, identity and 
belonging. In Falsas maniobras, the poetic accoutrements of this condition are slightly 
reminiscent of the tropical paradise of the previous books, particularly in these two verse 
of the poem “Bungalow”: “Palmeras, acacias, sauces a pico./ Sol que hace cantar los 
techos” (120). Nevertheless, the scenery of this “Beloved country” is mostly internal, and 
eternally pertaining to him, a “País a donde van las líneas de mi mano, lugar donde soy 
otro, mi anillo de bodas. Seguramente estás cerca del centro” (121). The “center” to 
which all of his lifelines point is within himself, reflecting an evolved understanding of 
the “origin” as a personal order of consciousness. Instead attributing plenitude to a golden 
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past to be recovered, a future to be attained or a lover to be possessed, all rests on the 
present and the manner in which one is in the world.  In the poem “Reconocimiento,” the 
first-person’s “recognition” is that of the changes necessary to abandon the strictures of 
Man: 
He acechado la aceptación súbita de mi realidad. 
  
Despedí la poesía que se cuelga de los brazos. 
 Incendié los testimonios falaces. 
 Adopté la forma directa. 
 
 Abandono mi caminar intricado. Me dilato en vastedades blancas. 
 […] 
 He sentido ráfagas de otra región sin culpa. 
 Me hago a la lentitud, al gesto consciente, al rumor del desierto (126).  
 
There is a will to depose the self through a shift in the conception of the human being’s 
relationship with the world through its mediation with thought, language and carefully 
scripted actions. Poetry and words should not be the medium for the aggrandizement of 
the “I;” the ego should be diluted to transparency so that the human being can listen to 
the silence of the world around him, allowing for the integration of himself his gestures to 
his “realidad” which he accepts and embraces in the present moment.  
 A short poem in prose titled “Mirar” explicitly outlines this alternative mode of 
being beyond Western Man:  
Veo otra ruta, la ruta del instante, la ruta de la atención, despierta incisiva […] 
ruta relámpago, ruta de mil ojos […] reflejo del rayo vigilancia, del rayo ahora, 
del rayo esto, ruta real con su legión de frutos vivos cuyo remate es ese lugar en 
todas partes y ninguna (128). 
 
This language should recall that of Girri, particularly in his Tao-inspired poems, an 
influence that Cadenas also overtly touts by naming two of his central poems “Vacío” 
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and “Satori,” and declaring that “sé que has estado/ en todos mis puntos de partida, 
envolviéndome, Oriente solícito,/ como una ceremonia” (121). An “Eastern slope,” to 
borrow Octavio Paz’s title, offers a new point of view and vocabulary to Cadenas that 
forgo ordinary habits of thinking and acting, demonstrating the possibility of a sudden, 
intuitive way of “looking” which D. T. Suzuki described as “the opening of the mind-
flower” (Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki 85). Irrespective of time and 
place, this perception depends on the human being’s availing of himself to reality’s 
present, through his open, empty attention. Man becomes radically redefined by what he 
is not: “Solamente llevo lo que he quitado./ Soy un hueco florido” (127). When Man’s 
overwhelming presence no longer dictates the mode of “revealing” the world, then the 
present can be unveiled in the fullness of its present being.  
Cadenas’s poem “Satori” is not the verbal consummation of this experience, but 
the call to “bogar” or “row” without a goal or destination, simply being in the present of 
each instant. In this poem, Cadenas demonstrates his intellectual understanding of Zen 
practice —ego-less action in accord with nature, the opening of perception and the 
silencing of thought— and Satori —the sudden insight of enlightenment into the essence 
and nature of everything, which can be triggered by anything. Cadenas compares it with a 
“Relámpago” which could be sparked by “Un viraje, un golpe seco, un lamido de 
brillante ola nos lanza a donde es” (129). The fulfillment of this call to being is not 
realized within the scope of this book, but a new conception of the self, a radically 
different approach to reality and a reevaluation of Man offer a fresh path for Cadenas’s 
subject to tread. Adapted in part from Zen Buddhist models, Cadenas’s text confronts the 
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difficult task of founding a knowledge beyond Man. It is precisely in the void left by his 
disappearance that, if we recall Foucault’s assessment, it is possible once more to truly 
think.  
What exactly constitutes Man’s disappearance is the source of debate that 
Cadenas struggles with in his following books. As the modern, Western human being is 
cloaked in the complex and layered armature of Man, Cadenas seeks to strip away the 
remaining masks that unwittingly fortify this epistemological definition of the self. His 
challenge is to decant the human person, and in particular, himself, to determine what 
constitutes his “real” being, and those aspects of him that are “false.” A potential 
contradiction arises, however, because the Satori experience that Cadenas embraces as 
antithetical to Man allows for no dualistic thinking or divisions between the “real.” 
Enlightenment is essentially the acceptance of things in their transcendental aspect and 
the affirmation of their “Suchness,” with no exception made for the human being. It is yet 
unclear if Cadenas devalues the quotidian, manifest self (body, ego, individual 
consciousness) and attributes “realness” only to the transcendental Being of all beings in 
their unity. Is this a quest to eliminate particular versions and doubling of the “yo” or to 
eradicate it altogether? What is this being of the human? For the speaking subject, the 
conundrum is particularly pointed. We may recall Foucault’s eloquently phrased 
questions that Cadenas’s poetry also begs: 
que faut-il que je sois, moi qui pense et qui suis ma pensée, pour que je sois ce 
que je ne pense pas, pour que ma pensée soit ce que je ne suis pas ? Qu’est-ce 
donc que cet être qui scintille et pour ainsi dire clignote dans l’ouverture du cogito 




Cadenas’s following book, Intemperie, penetrates more deeply inside the human being, 
with the hopes of sorting out some of the facets of the “I” to embrace that thought which 
is not of the self, and the “shimmer” of being that lies beyond the cogito. 
3.1.5 THE INCLEMENCY OF THE SELF 
 In 1977 Cadenas published Intemperie, a short book of 32 numbered, 
untitled poems that are his most brief, distilled and stripped of images. Luis Miguel Izaba 
Briceño correctly classifies this as a transitional text in his trajectory (49) and Ilis 
Alfonzo summarizes its problematic as the search to discover how to “vivir desde una 
perspectiva que no sea el yo, encontrar otro tipo de saber que no esté fundamentado en la 
razón” (110). Throughout the book, the first-person subject is scrutinized by various 
projections and doublings of the self, who constitute the enigmatic characters of the text: 
“el juez” (poem 1); “cuerpo” (poems 6 and 10); a “jugador ” whose destiny is unknown 
(poem 9); an attendant to “la diosa” (poem 12); “perseguidor” (poem 19); “jornalero” 
(poem 20); “fantasma” (poem 22). The reader perceives an interior antagonism between 
the “I” and its constituent parts as if only through confrontation and combat can the 
contradictions, false posturing and impotence of the “I” be revealed.  
The violent, cruel and sometimes absurd process of exposing and cleansing the 
self is the “intemperie” or “inclemency” that subject is left outside to suffer. Cadenas 
summarizes this method in poem 7 which reads in its entirety: “Hombre/ que se acusa./ 
En el fondo/ llaga/ del Cristo/ traicionado./ Impostura/ que clama por exactitud” 
("Intemperie" 146). Man’s self-accusation is leveled against his imposture —of erecting 
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himself as the ultimate subject and object of knowledge— and betraying his own true 
nature through false self-aggrandizement. Christ’s “wound” is not only the mark of 
Man’s betrayal, but also the representation of the pain suffered that guaranteed his eternal 
redemption. Cadenas’s subject verbally scourges himself, and his self-inflicted wounds 
are also offered as key to his transformation. Through them, he demands of himself and 
seeks “exactitude”: the naked, unscripted, open truthfulness of his being. 
In prosecuting and restricting himself as subject, the poetic voice speaks of a 
“juez” who lives off of his blood and inside of himself, but who “separándose de nosotros 
dicta sus fallos” (143); he conceives himself as carrying around a “fantasma incómodo” 
who “nos ara por dentro” (151); he writes of himself as internally assaulted by a 
prosecutor who “me despedaza, me corta en trozos, me riega por el campo” (150). These 
internal enemies serve to shake the armature of the I within its self-conception as Man, 
resulting in a struggle with the subject’s will and its inclination to assert itself: “¿Y yo? 
Yo también lo devoro” (150). Locked in battle, the poetic voice eventually realizes that 
“mi enemigo” is “mi amigo a la larga” (150), because his doubles, bringing judgment and 
destruction, herald a new possibility of being. Nevertheless, the struggle between these 
radically conflicting versions of the self is repeated time and time again in the course of 
this book, such that Cadenas describes his protagonist as “el que se hace, se deshace, se 
hace” (147). Ilis Alfonzo insightfully comments that the poetic subject of these poems 
does not progressively grow in knowledge with the passage of time:  
El logro del conocimiento interno no depende del tiempo que se dedique a ello, es 
decir, no es algo que ocurre de una manera acumulativa, diacrónica, como 
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resultado de una estrategia racional. Por el contrario, cada instante de vida es un 
nuevo conocimiento, una nueva aventura (100). 
 
We may take this observation further by asking why this is the case. The poetic subject 
relives the same internal battle along the same lines of conflict without a building of 
knowledge because the eclipse of Man requires the complete, boundless, attentive 
engagement with the present in its eternal newness. Man’s knowledge is accumulative, 
and is set up through representation for him to grasp and store, so a new perspective 
requires the relinquishing of thought habits and assumptions, and a responsive openness 
to that which presences in the here and now. 
In poem 23, Cadenas phrases a key question that other poems attempt to answer: 
“Repetirse, repetirse, repetirse, y vivir ¿dónde es? ¿Quién sabe ceder el paso al 
deslumbramiento […]?” ("Intemperie" 151). The speaking subject recognizes his habitual 
pattern of existence, that of “repeating himself” endlessly, projecting his own image on 
the world and representing the world back to himself.  It is useful here to recall 
Heidegger’s explanation of Ge-stell, or “enframing,” developed in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977), which offers a critique of modern 
Man’s approach to the real “in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to 
the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (Heidegger "The Age of 
the World Picture" 129-30). The conceptual system of Man’s thinking allows him to set 
up reality as an object of his thought, assuring simultaneously his own existence and the 
existence of reality thus conceived. Heidegger warns that such representation conceals 
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the revelation of the world of itself, and is merely the self-perpetuating revealing of a 
limited version of Man. In the second poem, Cadenas expands on this idea: 
 Nada, nada se repite. 
 Sólo yo, en la memoria, me tengo 
 como un vestigio 
 entre mis propias manos (143). 
 
The world each moment is fresh, unique and new, full of “suchness” and replete with the 
presence of being. Only the “I” seeks to retain and perpetuate its own fixed image 
through memory, so that the self can grasp its being.  
The self-centered manner of existence is not what the author considers “living,” 
which requires the “ceding” of his protagonism to the “dazzling” of life. Poem 29 calls 
for the erasure of the self and the pillars that sustained it so that he can be transformed 
into an open space, a receptacle for the void:   
 Vida 
 arrásame, 
 barre todo, 
 que sólo quede 
 la cáscara vacía, para no llenarla más, 
 limpia, limpia sin escrúpulo 
 y cuanto sostuviste deja caer 
 sin guardar nada (155). 
 
This is where “living is” — it is the absence of the dictates of the will, ego and memory. 
By becoming a “cascara vacía,” the human being relinquishes its hold on how the “real” 
should and can manifest. Letting go and letting be is the imperative Cadenas reiterates in 
poem 26: “Hazte a tu nada/ plena./ Déjala florecer./ Acostúmbrate al ayuno que eres. Que 
tu cuerpo se la aprenda” (153). The void in these short texts is not a negative absence, but 
the aperture for the simple flowering of presences. The “full nothingness” is the 
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disposition of the human being that Joan Stambaugh, in her comparative study of 
Heidegger and Taoism, describes as “a kind of waiting, not a passive waiting, but a very 
attentive, intense one” (87). Man, in his new role, is not the source of truth; nothingness 
takes away from Man his self-evidence and restores him to a vital posture of quiet 
astonishment in which he is but the opening or “clearing” where that which is can reveal 
itself and language can speak. 
 Intemperie closes with Cadenas’s “Ars poetica,” a poem that outlines the moral 
and aesthetic guidelines he will follow in his future works.  The three strophes address 
the relationship of the word with reality, the writer with the word, and the writer with 
himself. The opening verses characterize the poetic word itself: it should “hold what it 
says,” becoming the living, pulsing presence of that which sustains it. Heidegger would 
speak of Being as that which speaks in poetry, and Cadenas seems to second this 
perspective by portraying the word as a dynamic presence that does not pertain to Man’s 
domain or his project of making fast the world through language for his knowledge and 
use.  The word only speaks poetry when it retains its own, impenetrable life force. For 
Cadenas, the poet is not a belletrist who adds “adornada falsedad,” “tinta dudosa” or 
“brillos” to “lo que es,” but an attentive listener who writes “para decir verdad” (157).  
The universe should hold sway through poetry, and the human being is the required 
listener that becomes the medium for Being to speak. For Cadenas, words maintain a 
special relationship of mutual belonging with the human being, such that “Me poseen 
tanto como yo a ellas” (157). The poet’s responsibility obliges him to renounce any false 
amplification of the self and to strictly seek “exactitudes aterradoras” (157). In order to 
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comply with these standards, Cadenas appeals to his inner double to hold him to the 
highest standard of truth and transparency: “Sé mi ojo, espérame en la noche y divísame, 
escrútame, sacúdeme” (157). This constitutes an open recognition that the torments 
suffered by the “I” throughout Intemperie are the necessary pains to finally be what one 
really is. 
3.1.6 REALITY AND LITERATURE 
 As Luis Miguel Isava Briceño has carefully documented, Cadenas began 
publishing his prose reflections about life and literature at the beginning of the 1970s, at 
the inception of his teaching career at the Universidad Central de Venezuela (55). 
“Literatura y vida” (1970) and “Juventud, historia y cambio” (1973) were not selected by 
Cadenas to be reprinted in his Obra entera. The first significant essay that directly 
addresses the themes heretofore developed is his three-part Realidad y literatura, written 
in 1972 but published in 1979. Before advancing to Memorial, the collected poems that 
Cadenas composed between 1970 and 1975 and published in 1977, we will pause to 
briefly discuss the key concepts of this essay that state in a direct fashion many of the 
concepts we have already gleaned from his poetry. 
 Realidad y literatura, like Cadenas’s following essays, comes with the author’s 
disclaimer that his essay is elliptical, non-methodological and non-dogmatic. His purpose 
in writing this piece is to explore the “posibilidad que tiene el ser humano de establecer 
una relación directa, no basada en la ideación, con los seres y las cosas” ("Realidad y 
literatura" 467), and he turns to examples in literature to illustrate how primacy may be 
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restored to reality itself, and not Man. Cadenas includes at the end of his essay a 
bibliography that provides insight into the line of thought his writing is inspired by. In 
addition to poetry or prose selections by Keats, Rilke, Huxley, Wordsworth, Whitman, 
San Juan de la Cruz, Tennyson, Traherne, Blake, Hampole, Lawrence, Valéry and Basho, 
Cadenas draws on several theoretical sources, many of whom are the very authors we 
have consulted throughout this entire study: Heidegger, Suzuki, Krishnamurti and a host 
of their commentators. Cadenas openly declares his independence from any one line of 
thought— “No creemos en ninguna tradición espiritual, en ninguna idea, como idea, en 
ningún símbolo, ningún culto, ningún cielo” (468)— but his opinions do parallel closely 
those philosophers of his inspiration.  
Cadenas opines that the gravest danger for the human being is the “extravío sobre 
el cual hemos fundado nuestra vida, el de no darle a ella la primacía que le corresponde” 
(470). In this essay, as in latter works, Cadenas writes of modern Man as an 
epistemological category —“al referirnos al hombre no especificamos su multiforme 
división en clases, países, razas” (470)— because his existential stance towards the world 
is defined by the same parameters. A second matter of lexicology in this essay begs to be 
addressed from the start, as the loose terms Cadenas employs here will be repeated 
liberally in other texts. The word “vida” from the previous quote is used interchangeably 
with “realidad” (half of the binomial of the book’s title), “universo” (468) and “nada” 
(512) to form a broad constellation of meaning that refers to the world in its unmediated, 
natural, anonymous and living presence. Under this umbrella, we could add Heidegger’s 
Being, Suzuki’s “absolute subjectivity” (which entails the dissolving the categories of 
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both subject and object), Krishnamurti’s “Truth” and “pure Being” (“life and the 
understanding and possession of that fullness of life that is happiness, that is perfection” 
(Shringy 50)).  
Following Heidegger’s cues, Cadenas writes of Man as a subject who has set 
himself up and against the universe through his thoughts, memory and actions, thus 
removing himself from a state of integration with the unfathomable “real.” Cadenas’s 
goal is the renewed “enthronement” of life, “una vez que el usurpador, el centro que 
somos, es apartado, y su lugar pasan a ocuparlo unos sentidos despiertos frente al milagro 
de la realidad, una mente que ya no se agita en busca de respuestas […] y un corazón 
embriagado, no con pensamientos sino con su propia quietud” (480). In the third part of 
the essay, Cadenas outlines what he perceives to be the habitual pattern in which Man 
relates to the world: his sensations, which are most attuned to reality, are converted and 
reduced by the mind into signs and perceptions. These, in turn, become concepts and 
abstractions that are stored by the mind as memories. The mind, and its accumulation of 
past impressions, memories and schema, becomes the governing center and intermediary 
of all experiences, reinforcing the “yo” and preventing “fresh” encounters with the real: 
“[e]l proceso sería: sensación-percepción-pensamiento” (515). Cadenas writes that Man’s 
aggressive desire, “en el fondo, es manejar la realidad” (493) as a means to “fortalece[r] 
su delusoria condición de centro” (525). 
Cadenas’s explanation of modern Man’s approach to the world is not as complete 
or sophisticated as Heidegger’s articulation of the technological mode of human 
existence, Ge-stell (Enframing). Nevertheless, both share the concern that the manner in 
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which Man represents reality to himself and acts from his thought habits, constitutes an 
attempt to gather together and set-upon the real and the self, such that other courses for 
experience being are restricted. Heidegger writes that the true danger of Enframing for 
Man is “the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original 
revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth” ("The Question 
Concerning Technology" 28), the same concern Cadenas voices. Krishnamurti, another 
indispensable source for this essay, similarly addresses what he perceives to be the 
underlying conflict between the self and the environment (one’s reality), in which Man 
thinks “If I can conquer environment, overcome it, dominate it, I shall find out, I shall 
understand” (18). As this attitude is predominant, Krishnamurti agrees that: “It is one of 
the most difficult things to be really free of a bias, of a temperament, of a twist; and to 
approach environment with a fresh openness, a directness, demands a great deal of 
perception” (36).  
Reality and Literature asserts that the “yo” governs the self tyrannically and that 
the human being’s essence is actually “un vacío, que sería el verdadero núcleo de ese ser 
sin núcleo que es el hombre” (512). Cadenas suggests that in order to recover a “direct 
perception” of the real, the bastions of the “yo” must be dismantled: his thoughts, 
memory and the common employment of language. When thoughts are silenced, 
memories are disbanded, and language is restricted to refocusing one’s present attention 
to the real, then, Cadenas believes, the self disappears and the world is revealed in its 
fullness. This true perception of reality, he writes, “no establece diferencias, pues todo le 
pertenece” (518), making irrelevant divisions of true and false by nature of all things 
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simple being. Here lies one of the contradictions of this essay: Cadenas continually 
delimits the authentic and inauthentic characteristics of the human being, and he treats 
him and the things of his production as if they were separate from the “real.” It is thus 
that Cadenas opines that “la palabra tiene un carácter negativo que impide verle el lado 
por el cual se vuelve transparencia” (512). He condemns most uses of the word as the 
expansion of Man’s domain: “palabras desconectadas, exangües, fatuas, ocultadoras, 
soberbias, palabras-disfraces, palabras-olvido, palabras-velos, palabras que forman la 
pirámide de la ilusión para el que las maneja, que se siente dueño de un poder” (505-06). 
In these judgments Cadenas adopts positions that differ from his sources, although 
the practical application of his opinions follows those authors of his inspiration. 
Heidegger, for example, emphasizes the integral role of the human being together with 
the “earth, sky and gods” in the “fourfold,” whose interplay allows the disclosing of each 
element in the fullness of itself, and whose round-dance of concealing and revealing is 
the letting-presence of Being. For Heidegger, one of the human being’s most essential 
roles is to provide the open for language to speak, by placing a claim on him and 
entrusting him with hearing its peal. Instead of falsifying or distancing Man from the real, 
certain uses of language, and poetry in particular, re-appropriate him to Being, and allow 
the things of the “real” to come into its own, as both presence and absence. Cadenas does 
not renounce all use of language and, in fact, the literary experiences that illustrate his 
text intimate the suspension of mental processes, the attuning of attention to the real and a 
particular naming of things in order to “acercarnos a la cosa y dejarnos frente a ella como 
cosa, con su silencio, su extrañeza, su gravedad” (525). For Cadenas, poetry’s “tarea es 
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elíptica” (524), an opinion that could be Heidegger’s as well: poetry emerges in speech 
from silence, and its speaking should lead the reader back to the unspoken. 
The poetic selections that enrich Realidad y literatura reinforce and expand the 
ars poetica that Cadenas outlined at the end of Intemperie. Inspired by the same letter by 
Keats27 that Girri also commented upon in his conception of the “hacedor” (see Chapter 
2, section 2.5), Cadenas asserts that the poet should lack a personal identity, so as to be 
open and awake to experience reality (471-73). In availing himself for the real to 
presence, Cadenas insists that the poet respect the marvelous enigma of the world, and 
not seek to intellectually penetrate and grasp it, following in the path of Zen Buddhist 
poets like Matsuo Basho (476). Correspondingly, the poet must be able to peacefully 
“float” in the midst of uncertainties, mysteries and doubts without attempting to anchor 
himself and his world through his will, ego or identity. In writing, Cadenas shuns the 
imagination, fantasy, prophetic visions, past memories and private mythologies, as they 
stem from the arrogant notion of the poet as subject and the creative center of gravitation 
and distract the human being from an awareness of the simple brilliance of the present 
reality. For this reason, Cadenas insists on stripping poetry of all artificiality and 
embellishments, placing his minimal verses at the service of the purity of what is. In 
cultivating this no-frills aesthetic, Cadenas, like Girri, believes that prose is a necessary 
antidote to traditional poetry — “[l]a prosa podría contribuir a desmontar tantas 
                                                
27 Cadenas is particularly intrigued by the following lines: “A poet is the most unpoetical of anything in 
existence, because he has no identity: he is continually in for, and filling, some other body. The sun, the 
moon, the sea, and men and women, who are creatures of impulse, are poetical, and have about them an 
unchangeable attribute: the poet has none, no identity. He is certainly the most unpoetical of all God’s 
creatures” (“Realidad y literatura” 472). 
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falsedades, a destruir “ideales”, autocomplacencias, alucinaciones en el individuo, a fin 
de entregárselo a la vida” (524). Cadenas’s directives for poetry are to unmask Man’s 
postures, his falsifications and self-complacencies and to shake him free of his 
distractions, allowing the opening of his attention to the world. Cadenas quotes Aldous 
Huxley saying, “Our business is to wake up” (512). Although he has no illusions about 
the sphere of literature’s influence —“sigue siendo asunto de minorías” (526)—, this is 

















3.2 To Breathe Through the Pores of Language   
3.2.1 THE ZONES OF THE SELF 
In 1977 Cadenas released two books of poetry, Intemperie and Memorial, after a 
ten-year hiatus during which time only several minor essays were published in 
Venezuelan magazines. Memorial is a collection that gathers three different groupings of 
poems that were composed during this decade: “Zonas” (1970), “Notaciones” (1973) and 
“Nupcias” (1975). Together, the collection creates a cohesive arc that spans and furthers 
the ideas we have developed up to here. For José Balza, “Memorial es, por completo, el 
desarrollo de una teoría poética” (70). This poetic theory begins with “Zonas,” in the 
quotidian “realms” of modern existence, revisiting the existential struggles of the human 
being to be free of the innumerable masks of the self, and examining the tragic 
repercussions of Man-centered being when taken to its extreme. As Ángel Rama has 
astutely observed, “<<Zonas>> aún sigue manejando las formas narrativas anteriores, 
aún apela a los personajes fabulosos o al verso grandilocuente, aún compone escenarios 
sobrerreales” (62).  
Of the entire book, only the first poems of “Zonas” seem to fit the title of this 
collection, Memorial, for they once again attempt to reconstruct the idealized “island” of 
the past that inspired Una isla and Los cuadernos del destierro. A verse from “Nuevo 
mundo,” the first poem, summarizes this poetic stance —“Memoria que sale a buscar 
cosas huidizas” ("Memorial" 162)—, one in which the “I” still attempts to maintain its 
sovereignty and the poetic word acts as an “Intoxicación de cobres salvajes./ Avanza, 
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avanza./ Droga” (162). A recounting of the subject’s present state of uncertainty, routine 
and angst quickly overtakes the focus on the past. Poems such as “Temprano” (167), 
“Carro por puesto” (168), “Al despertar” (169) and  “Insomnio” (172) are among the 
most referential of this book, situating the speaking narrator in a modern city replete with 
billboards, highways, barking dogs, books, papers, marketplaces, seagulls, morning fog, 
cups of coffee, buses and deliverymen. Instead of a joyous celebration of the present, 
these details as a composite form the landscape of a monotonous, oppressive, simulated 
existence, which he calls his illness, or “Mal” in a poem of this title: “Detenido, no sé 
dónde, mas es un hecho que estoy, detenido. Llevo años en el mismo lugar, al fondo. 
¿Vivo? Funciono, y ya es mucho” (179). This manner of going through the motions of 
life intuitively feels false, forced and fake. The speaker expresses his ability to 
“function,” intimating that this is the norm of the society to which he belongs. Cadenas 
cleverly captures this suspicion in a succinct poem, “As if” that reads: “Es como si 
amáramos. Es como si sintiésemos. Es como si viviéramos./ Esto fatiga. Hasta se ansía un 
error. Puede que al equivocarse los actores rocen la verdad” (183). The motions of Man, 
traced and retraced for the preservation of his centrality, are viewed as simulacra of life, 
and the poet yearns for the “actors” to slip, in the off chance that they might stumble into 
authenticity. 
These poems reinforce ideas we have already seen in earlier works, but Cadenas 
expands upon them in “Zonas” by problematizing Man’s dominant relationship with the 
real, when it is taken to its last consequences.  Eight consecutive poems explore how 
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Man’s mode of existence can result in cycles of death and destruction, when he stands 
over and against other human beings in his will to power. “Historia,” like previous poems 
we have examined, speaks of Man’s existence as a repetition, but this time multiplied as 
armies of death that gather specters and ghosts, year after year: “Los espectros serán los 
mismos otros, pero ella [la escena] no se alterará, no habrá modificación” (218). For 
Cadenas, the specific identities and causes of the perpetrators and their victims are 
irrelevant. They are all the “same others,” defined by their self-assured existential 
posture, their arrogant approach and reading of reality which is crafted “En sus moldes.” 
In a poem by this name, Cadenas comments, not without irony, that Man predisposes the 
world and language in order to serve him and to affirm his position, even if that includes 
his murderous destruction of others: 
En sus labios las palabras están como dispositivos ya montados. Salen armadas, 
no tienen que formarse sobre la marcha, todo está resuelto, el mundo va bien, el 
cielo y la tierra están de su parte y son felices (220). 
 
Cadenas does not single out a particular ideology, sect or faction as the blunt of his 
criticism, but rather takes issue with Man’s essentially subjective, self-evident 
representationalism that predetermines how anything manifests itself to him, facilitating 
his “blind” functioning in the world through “índices, anatemas, rótulos” (221). Cadenas 
vehemently repudiates such self-complacency and the predetermined judgments of Man 
that obstruct his vision and comprehension of the perfect bodies —life incarnate— that 
he blindly mows down.  
Cuerpos, dulces vasijas, horadados, irreconocibles, roídos. Cuerpos de cualquier 
bando, divinos, terrestres, caídos en cualquier calle. Cuerpos, suaves cántaros, 
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más perfectos que la más perfecta idea, destrozados en cualquier lugar de la tierra 
(221). 
 
Cadenas’s return to the body and physical phenomena is but another manner to attempt to 
extirpate the self that is fortified by the mind, and to return one’s awareness to the present 
reality. These final sentences of “Por alguna divisa” form a dirge, not only for the dead 
and their endless bodies, but also for the living, trapped by their mental armature of 
“truth” and the imperatives of the determining logos. In “Atisbo,” the poetic subject 
concludes: “De repente comprendí/ que matamos/ porque estamos muertos” (223). 
 In Cadenas’s opinion, the antidote to this manner of being is ubiquitous, which he 
explains when he writes, “Realidad, una migaja de tu mesa es suficiente” (177). The 
remedy lies in a “re-membering” or “dis-covering” of the real through the attentive and 
caring disposition of the human being, or Gelassenheit, to borrow Heidegger’s 
terminology. He becomes the “open” through the renunciation of willing, and the letting-
be of world, such that things or ontic beings can disclose themselves and come into their 
own. Man is redefined as the ontological realm that exists between Being and beings, and 
the experience of the revealing-concealing play of a “crumb” is “enough” to 
reincorporate the human being back into the folds of reality. The problem is that old 
habits die hard, and the human will and thought patterns perpetually assert their iron-grip, 
reinstating the subject.  
 In “Zonas,” as was seen previously in Intemperie, an internal battle is waged 
within the poetic subject to strip away those tenacious doublings and masks that provide 
asylum for the “yo.” Various poems are plagued with “enemigos,” “asaltantes,” 
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“robadores,” “jauría,” “fauna de claraboyas” “perseguidores,” “malignos visitantes” and  
“inquisidores” whose arms and strategies are “el miedo” (210), “las mudas de piel” (206), 
“viejas divisas, retratos, fechas” (203). The poetic voice is cognizant that these are facets 
of the “I,” that his own articulation and identity as a first-person subject is no different 
than the visitor that haunts him: “Si ambos fuésemos reales no nos desgastaríamos en esta 
persecución, pero nuestra servidumbre es la misma: somos personajes” (210). A maturity 
of understanding is evident in both the self-analysis and the calm, firm stance that he 
adopts, “Rehúso todo peso ilegítimo” (203). In line with the ideas advanced in Realidad y 
literatura, one of the “illegitimacies” he eschews here is language itself: “La palabra no 
es el sitio del resplandor, pero insistimos, insistimos, nadie sabe por qué” (209). Although 
this stance is later amended, for the Cadenas of “Zonas,” literature can hold no candle up 
to the direct contact of reality, which the human being should experience as sensations 
grounded in the physical realm, and far-removed from mental machinations: “Sólo he 
conocido la libertad por instantes, cuando me volvía de repente cuerpo” (208). Language, 
in its optimum transparency and honesty, can only lead one to the brink of a new 
awareness, but Cadenas insists that a radical redefinition of Man is possible only when 
the tyrannical self and the tools at its service —language included— are made still. More 
now than ever, Cadenas is conscious of the stakes of this ascetic process: “Todo el 
arrasamiento ha sido para desplazarme, para vivir en otra articulación” (161, my 
emphasis) and “He querido derribarme; ser omisión para renacer” (178).  
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3.2.2 NOTATIONS ON BEING PRESENT 
The second section of Memorial, “Notaciones” (1973), marks a leap from the 
“zones” of the self and exemplifies the consummation of Cadenas’s literary precepts, 
both thematically and stylistically. These poems are the most economic of linguistic 
flashes whose lightning insights belong to the eye, in its direct, instantaneous contact 
with the real, and not the mind’s ruminations. These verses capture the Zen-like attention 
of the poet qua poet, through which he is able to experience the unfathomable universe in 
its nature as simultaneous presence and absence. The poet’s eye acts as a boundless 
mirror, and the self is redefined through its gaze, becoming the void where anything, 
everything and nothing can rest. Guillermo Sucre has written that this is a  
[l]ibro de superficies: ya no existen el verso o el reverso de las cosas, o si existen 
es porque aparecen en la superficie, donde uno y otro se igualan, donde uno 
supone al otro. […] Quiere decir esto: el mundo es traslúcido: todo en él es 
visible, todo en él es cuerpo que se manifiesta, aun en ausencia (68).  
 
 The path to the transparent depthlessness of the here and now has been arduous, 
for it entails the complete transfiguration of the human being. “Voz,” the first poem, 
serves as an existential calendar or clock, whose twelve parts that mark the stages of the 
human being’s and his voice’s transformation. In the first eleven sections, the first-person 
poetic voice is noticeably absent, replaced by the second person, who is exposed in its 
various postures: from the initial use of language and thought to “[a]cuñar quimeras” 
(227), through the narrow passage of austerity described as an “[e]ntreoscuro corredor 
que conduce, muestra y abandona” (229), and finally to the moment “[c]uando en verdad 
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callas” (228). With the silencing of the self, another “voice” is finally audible, one that is 
not “el engaño/ de la palabra que sirve a alguien” (229), but a form of speech that is 
“emanado/ puntual/ fehaciente” (229), the natural welling forth of the word in 
correspondence to the real. When the first-person voice finally speaks in the last section 
of the poem, it is to disavow its own voice in favor of “atención,/ atención,/ atención” 
(230).  
 “Attention” is the silent clarion call of “Notaciones,” a commandment that is 
more visual than audible. Attention is incarnated and multiplied in the eyes that gaze 
from almost every page of this sequence, whereas sounds and the human voice are 
frowned upon as unnecessary distractions: “De un silencio/ vendrá la respuesta,/ la 
encendida honestidad” (251). Intuitively one senses an injunction against speaking aloud 
these poems, as if their utterance would bestow upon them false importance. The reader 
has the distinct impression that the sparse clusters of words that form each “notation” 
were printed abashedly; they are engulfed on the page, some a mere speck that the reader 
does not read as sequential words, but rather sees. One suspects that the author would 
have preferred to print an infinite book of mirror pages, renouncing words altogether out 
of fear that any linguistic articulation predisposes the reader’s mind and distances him 
from the real. One notation in particular serves as a disclaimer for the book —“El que 
enseñó a leer a los ojos/ borró el paraíso” (255)— and a longer poem, “Abdicación,” 
ironically spells out with more words, words’ essential futility: 
 Enmudezco 
 en medio de lo real, 
 y lo real dice con su lenguaje 
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 lo que guardo. 
 
 ¿Necesita palabras 
 un rostro? 
 ¿La flor  
 quiere sonidos? 
 ¿Pide vocablos 
 el perro, la piedra, el fuego? 
 ¿No se expresan con sólo estar? […] 
 
 Callo. No voy más allá de mis ojos. 
 Me consta este alrededor (262). 
 
Several lessons can be drawn from this poem that will aide in the interpretation of this 
section. First, the title clearly states the “abdication” of Man as the locus of language and 
the articulator of truth. The “real” in its infinite expressions —faces, flowers, stones, 
fire— speak their being by simply being present (“estar”). The human is being human 
when he is with, and in the company of the real, a state in which there is no “depth” or 
hidden meaning, for finally he simply is, as all things are — their common singularity 
resting in being. 
 It is thus that we return to the keyword of this collection, “Atención,/ redoma 
hechizada,/ néctar de estar presente” (246), a state that is only possible when the “I” has 
renounced its place and its monopoly of awareness. The poetic voice is now free to ask, 
“¿Qué hago/ yo detrás de los ojos?” (261), for there is no subject or point of view in 
genuine seeing, an effortless activity that solely attends to what is. The voice declares that 
“‘Tengo ojos/ no puntos de vista’” (260), a means of affirming that the self is an empty 
surface that impassively allows all images to come and go, without attempting to retain or 
limit particular presences and thus asserting a personal subjectivity.  Speaking of the self 
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in the second person, the author remarks: “Tú no estás/ cuando la mirada se posa/ en una 
piedra, un rostro, un pájaro,/ en esa suspensión sin espera/ en ese estar/ intenso” (232). 
Cadenas does not mean that literally the human being has disappeared, but rather that the 
his personal, subjective identity has been subsumed and transformed into the “gaze” that 
suspends the “self,” permitting an “intense being present.” D. T. Suzuki has written about 
the sense of sight in Zen Buddhist practices, and he describes the pure act of seeing in 
relation to the seer and the seen: 
The seeing is not reflecting on an object as if the seer had nothing to do with it. 
The seeing, on the contrary, brings the seer and the object seen together, not in 
mere identification but the becoming conscious of itself, or rather of its working. 
The seeing is an active deed, involving the dynamic conception of self-being (Zen 
Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki 160). 
 
Suzuki’s explanation sheds light on the “gaze” that predominates in Cadenas’s poems by 
demonstrating that the “seeing” is the unifying consciousness that simultaneously and 
evenly peers into the world and the human being. This dynamic gaze enfolds the self as it 
enfolds the rest of reality, indiscriminately, in the immediacy of being present. In another 
poem, Cadenas affirms his “self-being” as an impersonal, quiet, simple engagement with 
what is, such that he integrates himself and belongs entirely to his adherence to the real, 
defining himself by what he does: “Soy esta vigilancia./ Soy esta vacilante 
disponibilidad,/[…]/ Soy éste en que se extingue/ hasta la idea de hombre” (272). In a 
similarly constructed poem, the poet voice adds to his self-portrait by tracing the negative 
outline of his presence:  “No soy lo que llevo/ sino el recipiente./ Lugar de la presencia,/ 
lugar del vacío” (236). Shorn of all personal features, the self is recast as an open 
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receptacle, the place for presence and void. This is hardly the fist time we have 
encountered the conjunction of these seemingly mutually exclusive terms: for Heidegger, 
the void is the necessary opening for the mutual revealing of the fourfold; in Taoism, the 
void and the sum of all possibilities are ultimately all Tao, which does not distinguish 
between being and non-being; the satori of Zen also surpasses and subsumes these terms. 
It is in this line of thought that we should interpret Cadenas’s transformed subject.  
 The poet’s disposition as present awareness coincides with perspectives advanced 
by Taoism, Zen Buddhism and Krishnamurthi on a complete engagement with the “here 
and now.” These three wisdom traditions stress that there is no future time or place of 
revelation or enlightenment, nor was the moment of truth lost in some remote past. 
Satori, enlightenment, liberation —any one of these terms suffice to describe Cadenas’s 
plurality of expressions for the complete awakening of the human being to reality and 
life— is a matter of present, objectless, purposeless attention. The notion of a “goal” or a 
“destination” is a matter of distraction, a schematization that removes one from the now, 
artificially discriminates among the elements of the real, privileging and vesting 
something with exclusive authenticity. Cadenas realizes that no path must be traversed or 
journey accomplished when one’s attention is wed to the present: “El viaje,/ un 
peregrinar de ciego./ No tiene dónde./ Es aquí/ cada momento/ ¡final!/ ¿No oyes/ el 
último pájaro?” (248). The “hearing of the last bird” could just as well be the “seeing of a 
flower;” the author simply states that each moment is it, the goal, and that the genuine 
silencing of the self and attuning of one’s being to anything provides the opportunity for 
awakening. The human being, when he abdicates his centrality and turns himself over to 
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the present, finds plenitude in all things: “Sigo la ilación/ extraña/ de la vida./ Llama que 
vuelve novedad/ lo que toca./ Como mano de niño” (267). The poetic voice adopts the 
perspective that “Todo fluye” (268), and correspondingly, his awareness will rest on the 
waves of the present, in order to “Vivir/ en el sabor de ser,/ tomado” (238). 
 As Cadenas explains in Realidad y literatura, language is limited in what it is able 
to convey, and the poet’s aspiration is that the poem can lead the reader to contemplation 
and the brink of silence. Rarely, if ever, can words accompany the experience of cosmic 
consciousness. One poem that is especially eloquent in articulating the enlightened 
observation of the real is “Flor,” a short poem that reads: “Desde qué profundidad surges/ 
como llama/ para esconderla” (231). A simple flower is the producer of transcendental 
wonder and astonishment, because its being represents the marvel of all creation: from 
the depths of what is absent, hidden and undistinguished something surges. Like that of a 
flame or a light, its being hides darkness, makes absence into a presence and transforms 
the depths of the unfathomable into a bright immediacy. In his short collection of sayings, 
Dichos, Cadenas comments what we could call the flower’s lesson: “Lo absoluto parece 
encargarle a lo relativo que lo enmascare, que lo abandone, pues de otro modo no habría 
juego” ("Dichos" 658). The observer of the flower seeks no representational knowledge 
or definition of it, but he does allude to an experiential understanding of the fundamental 
oneness of being and non-being that underlies the entire universe.  
 Judging by other poems in “Notaciones,” it seems apparent that this insight into 
creation is but a fleeting instant that is constantly threatened to be overturned by the “I” 
and its legions: Man’s subjectivity, ego and will. The poetic voice expresses its 
 227 
awareness of these obstacles and declares its intentions to abolish the self and to embrace 
emptiness. D. T. Suzuki, in elucidating the doctrine of “no-mind” illustrates the pitfalls of 
seeking even meditative attention. The problem, he demonstrates, is that setting up even 
such a noble aspiration as true seeing, one unintentionally perverts and disables the 
possibility of this experience. Suzuki explains, by quoting and commenting on Hui-
neng’s (638-713) teachings, the sixth patriarch and the Chinese founder of Zen Buddhism 
who advises: 
‘neither to cling to the notion of a mind, nor to cling to the notion of purity, nor to 
cherish the thought of immovability; for these are not our meditation.’ ‘When you 
cherish the notion of purity and cling to it, you turn purity into falsehood…Purity 
has neither form nor shape, and when you claim an achievement by establishing a 
form to be known as purity, you obstruct your own self-nature, you are purity-
bound.’ […]However excellent are the merits of these spiritual exercises, they 
inevitably lead us to a state of bondage […] Even when we talk of ‘seeing into 
one’s self-nature’, this seeing has also a binding effect on us if it is construed as 
having something in it specifically set up; that is, if the seeing is a specific state of 
consciousness (Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki 161-62). 
 
The self-imposed imperatives that are interspersed in these poems seem to become their 
own greatest encumbrance to simply experiencing the real, creating a “binding effect” on 
the subject that is difficult to shake. Micro-poems such as “Crece/ el deseo de ver tu 
rostro,/ tu rostro sin mí” (266), “Vida/ redúceme a ser/ sólo una crudeza frente a ti” (273) 
and “Sé/ que si no llego a ser nadie/ habré perdido mi vida” (249) mark a division 
between present experience and being and an ideal that requires the modification, 
selection and suppression of certain elements, in a time and a place that is not the here 
and now. In Dichos, Cadenas summarizes the cunnundrum of his own character’s 
situation: “No buscamos ser sino sentirnos en algún estado ‘superior’. Estamos 
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adiestrados para perseguir siempre una ganancia, tal es nuestra barrera. La agonía de no 
querer ser lo que somos” ("Dichos" 656-57). These schematizations and projected desires 
become a predominant challenge that the protagonist of this book must face in the next 
section 
3.2.3 NUPTIALS WITH THE REAL 
 “Nupcias,” (1975) marks a prominent stylistic shift in Cadenas’s work, one that 
will be developed further in his next collection of poetry, Amante (1983). This third 
division of Memorial is itself grouped into three parts, “La diosa,” “Homenaje” and 
“Visitantes,” each of which can be read as an extended poem. The most singular feature 
of “Nupcias” is the deliberate and consistent assignation of personal pronouns, which 
become the “voices” throughout the section. “Tú” is the central focus of the poems, an 
allegorical being that is referred to as “La diosa,” but who cannot truly be named — 
“¿Quién puede nombrarte/ en verdad,/ quién entre los que se precian/ entre los gárrulos?” 
(278)— because “she” is reality itself, in its pure and indivisible state. Most of the poems 
are addressed to “you,” who is characterized as mother and lover. “El amante,” is the 
representation of the subject, who speaks mostly in the first person, but is sometimes 
referred to in the third person as “él.” He is ardent suitor of the “tú,” and calls himself her 
“hijo.”  Finally, anonymous “ellos” appear in certain poems, standing in for modern Man, 
as characterized in our previous analyses. 
 “La diosa” is a poem of love and devotion to the “you,” as well as the personal 
history of one subject’s dynamic relationship to the real. A distinct variation of traditional 
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mystical poetry, Luis Miguel Isava Briceño comments that in these poems, “La retórica 
amorosa está emparentada con la religiosa, y Cadenas aprovecha la doble vertiente, la 
doble ‘valencia’ de este lenguaje” (110-11). The goddess is immediately lifted from the 
category of definable entities, from the first verses of the poem, “En el espejo donde te 
miras/ no hay nadie” (275). The “tú” has no profile, no visible “self,” for she is “ajena al 
juego de las imágenes” (288).  The metaphors that most closely approximate her are the 
ardent “llama” (282) and “fuego” (284) that transform all forms of the physical world 
into undifferentiated energy: “tus manos/ desgarran/ queman,/ abandonan” (298). The 
“diosa” is an allegory of the sum of reality in its indivisible, insuperable being that 
Cadenas has striven to experience. The real of the present is “tu [the goddess’s] región 
sagrada” (277), which only those who embrace what is and who have no attachment to 
that which is not, can experience. Cadenas writes that “ésta es tierra/ donde el engaño no 
tiene cabida” (293). Here, the word “engaño” can be taken to mean any state that is not 
the undivided attention to the real. Krishnamurti explained in a talk that “attention is not 
something that you come to; it is attention now to everything […] When you are 
completely attentive there is no self, there is no limitation” (360). It is thus that we should 
interpret the poetic voice’s judgments: “Eres para raptos más vehementes” (296) and “Tu 
corona es para silenciosos/ desconocidos” (278). Only those who disavow the self, quiet 
their thoughts and give themselves over to the rapture of the present are “crowned” with 
the fullness of the “goddess’s” presence.  
 Many people are unable to meet these requirements because their insecurities and 
needs for self-confirmation take precedence over their devotion, and even more are not 
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even conscious of reality beyond themselves. Cadenas portrays Man through adjectival 
phrases like “los gárrulos” (278) and “los llenos” (279), which capture their self-
absorption. “They” do not know how to see or to listen to the world, as their sole focus is 
their own words and image, and they have no sensibility to the wonder around them: 
“Los llenos/ quitan los ojos de ti./ Tu brillo/ se les hace pobreza./ No se sienten 
reflejados” (279). When they do turn their attention outward, it is only to assert 
themselves by waging a battle against all that they are not, projecting their own image on 
the world they wish to master: 
 Esperas desde siglos 
 pero ellos no están preparados. 
 
 No podrían darte 
 el mirar que no conoce, 
 la incandescente nada que deja ser. 
 
 Traen sus curiosas armas 
 como para un combate 
 (y lo pierden). 
 
 He presenciado su desesperación, 
 ese incansable verse ellos 
 en lo que miran (287). 
 
In this poem, Cadenas portrays a patient, ever-ready “goddess” whose only condition is 
that her lovers match her transparent simplicity with their own. Man, however, is not 
prepared to renounce his arms, or his desperate need to see himself reflected and 
amplified in the things that surround him. He continuously “desea/ revestirse con tus 
prestigios” (293), not realizing that there is no battle to be fought or competition to be 
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won. As Cadenas summarizes in one of his dichos: “El misterio tiembla en todas partes, 
también en nosotros, pero no nos percatamos” (656). 
 The first-person poetic voice distinguishes himself from the others through his 
insightful observations about Man’s behavior and the candid and public evaluation of his 
own successes and failures. His shortcomings—intentional distraction, a lack of attention, 
fear of relinquishing a cultured identity, a feeling of inadequacy and the compulsion to 
search for plenitude elsewhere— are the derivations of Man’s legacy. Cadenas has 
observed repeatedly that, “La vida, ese hecho deslumbrante, inasible, tremendo, no es 
suficiente para el hombre. Él exige más, y por supuesto, nada puede aplacar su 
descontento” (“Dichos” 666, emphasis added), and he adds that “Cada instante es un 
regalo. Esto nos debería volver humildes y hacernos dar las gracias” (“Dichos” 657). As 
Man has erected himself as his own center through his forgetfulness of the wonder of his 
being and that of Being itself, Cadenas implies that his experience of suffering is a 
natural consequence. In a short section of “La diosa,” Cadenas writes: “A quien se tiene 
por tu hijo/ lo dejaste/ en poder de las Erinias” (301). The Erinyes of Greek mythology 
persecuted mortals who broke “natural” laws and exacted retribution to restore balance in 
the order of the world. In these verses, Cadenas is not portraying a vengeful goddess, as 
some critics would have it, but demonstrating the natural consequences of Man’s 
deviance from a posture of humble thanksgiving. The Erinyes represent the terrifying and 
inevitable process of dismantling Man, which is required to bring the human being back 
to his participatory role in reality’s fold. 
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As in the last poems we analyzed in “Zonas,” here again the poetic subject is 
trapped by his own hopeful anticipation to overcome the “I” and return to life’s mystery.  
He requests the goddess’s assistance —“Concédeme/ la humildad de extraviarme” 
(303)— and attempts to adopt a state of receptiveness: “me dispongo a esperarte/ ¡con 
qué paciente ardor!/ me encuentro yo otra vez” (283, my emphasis). His schema and 
thoughts of future fulfillment are obstacles in and of themselves for experiencing unity in 
the present. By yearning for an “original” state of unadulterated sensations —“el trémulo 
responder/ como de niño/ cuando se es cuerpo” (291)— and dwelling on some future 
encounter, he forgets that “todo momento es el tuyo” (290) and that who he is already 
and always has been, is enough:  
 Si soy indistinguible de la porción asignada 
 y a ella me ciño, sin comparación, 
 entonces ella es lo real, lo único, lo máximo (292). 
 
The second part of “Nupcias,” called “Homenaje,” corresponds to this former title 
more than “La diosa.” Composed of ten short poetic texts, “Homenaje” shares much in 
common with the Zen-inspired poems of “Notaciones.” From the first verses, the poetic 
voice redefines himself negatively: he knows not who he is, his name does not 
correspond to the being, he finds it strange that he was at one time born and that he is 
“here.” The new consciousness he expresses is without limitations of identity, time and 
space, or even attachments to the living body he inhabits: 
Ya no sé 
si puedo hablar en nombre de alguien. 
 
¿Quién es esta sangre, estos tendones, estos ojos, 
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esta extrañeza, esta antigüedad? 
Una fuerza  
me tiene en su mano. 
Entonces es ella 
la que puede decir soy, 
la que puede llevar un nombre, 
la que puede usar la palabra yo (312). 
 
In this poem, there is only one being and identity —that of the goddess— which knows 
no distinctions and whose name is reality, or the world. In Dichos, Cadenas elaborates 
that “Dios es un nombre que le damos al misterio, pero no hay modo de allegarse con 
nombres a lo innombrable” (669). Man cannot name reality’s holy mystery, and in these 
poems, he begins to comprehend experientially that his own nature is no different than 
that of the “goddess.”  
Through the “death” of Man, a new “flowering” is possible in the abyss of his 
disappearance, a collective, non-individuated surge of existence that brings to bear the 
non-manifest, limitlessness of Being. Two consecutive pages of concise verses outline in 
linguistic “flashes” the human being’s encounter with the “goddess”: “Intensidad./ 
Muerte y contestación/ a la muerte” (314) and then, “Florecemos/ en un abismo” (315). 
The last verses of  “Homenaje” clarify the nature of the writing of this section. Cadenas 
eschews the term “poetry” to refer to the manifestation of these condensed lines on 
almost empty pages, preferring to describe to them by their function: they are 
“respiraderos” (316), a word that can mean “vent, airhole, porthole, skylight or 
ventilation shaft.” All of these definitions convey a space of passage for light or air, a 
liminal area between the internal and external, an opening through which breath and 
language freely flow. By discarding the traditional notion of the poem, Cadenas 
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renounces authorship and self-expression, allowing his verses to “inhale” subjectivity and 
“exhale” pure presence. 
As this is a book of endless circling, —an internal “laberinto” (306), as Cadenas 
describes the protagonist’s lifelong relationship with the real— it should be no surprise 
that the final section of “Nupcias” finds the poetic voice once again navigating the terra 
incognita of himself, haunted by terrifying doubles and persecutors. “Visitantes” acts a 
troublesome coda in poetic prose that shifts the text from a visual to an audio order. 
Proper “seeing” was the metaphor of enlightenment in “Notaciones,” whereas in these 
texts a “Voz,” that of the “goddess,” takes precedence. The poetic subject is thrown back 
into chaos, where the “voces, teas, látigos” (319) of his pursuers drown, with the arms of 
Man, the voice that speaks reality. Cadenas writes, “La voz fue interrumpida por la 
quimera, por el desdén, por la ruptura. Nada quedó exento” (322). Although the 
protagonist recognizes that his accusers are facets of himself, he expresses frustration 
toward the “goddess” who, despite his devotion, “permanece inmóvil” (321) and 
immutable in the face of his suffering. A heightened desperation is pronounced in 
“Visitantes,” as if his temporary “nuptials” with the real make even more intolerable his 
present state of stagnation: “haces más enconado el acoso”  (318). The final poem is an 
appeal to a new entity, “Señor del cambio, hijo del mar” (325), to internally alter his 
composition and, as if by alchemic conversion, transform him altogether. Cadenas 
observes and, having witnessed cycle after cycle of the poetic subject’s peripeteias, the 
reader is apt to agree that, “Sin tu favor la tarea se vuelve interminable” (325).  
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3.2.4 REINTEGRATION OF THE SELF AND THE WORD 
 Cadenas’s next poetic collection, Amante, was published in 1983, the same year 
as Anotaciones, a short book of prose observations about poetry, language, the condition 
of modern Man and the mystery of the universe. Many of the author’s comments are 
variations on themes we have already touched upon, but some of the ideas furthered in its 
pages are reversals of what he proposed in Realidad y literatura, bringing him closer to a 
Heideggerian understanding of poetry, the poet and their respective roles in the world. In 
previous works, Cadenas had suggested that all uses of language and thought are, to some 
degree, falsifications that occult the real, whose silent presence is distorted and 
circumscribed by the mind and its words. Anotaciones reevaluates this position by 
abolishing any criteria of exclusion, used to establish categories of the “real real” and the 
“false real”:  
Hoy me resisto a dividir la realidad […] ¿Por qué una flor ha de poseer la 
dignidad de lo real, del misterio, pero un sueño, una fantasía o un pensamiento 
no? Ese trazar una raya entre lo que tiene rango y lo que carece de él me resulta 
extraño ahora. Lo que ocurre, sea lo que sea, tiene para mí status existencial, 
realeza ontológica (545).  
  
By bringing thoughts and words back into the category of the ontological, Cadenas is 
able to embrace his own writing as a direct experience of the real. As such, he can offer it 
to his readers as a means of preserving the mystery of being and making the human-being 
“más verdadero” (536).  
All thoughts and language, for their simple existence, may now be considered part 
of the enigma of the world, but not all modes of language are equally suited to bring the 
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things of the world to the Open, allowing them to stand in themselves. As an expansion 
of his “Ars poetica” at the end of Intemperie, Cadenas delineates the raison d’être of his 
writing and its aesthetic and ethical ramifications. He repeatedly rejects, as we have 
already noted, the term “poetry” because of a fundamental misgiving towards any 
“confección artística” (557) and the “obligación del poema, del género, de la 
clasificación” (556). All genres connote what Cadenas considers to be artificial 
specifications, standards and fetishisms, and even when an author seeks to modify a 
literary form, so often his “experimentalismo […] no obedece a una necesidad” (557). 
Throughout Anotaciones, Cadenas stresses that writing should be unwaveringly 
“fiel a mi necesidad” (557) and that it is “algo que se me impone, a lo que no debo 
ofrecer resistencia, contra lo que no debo luchar. Es mi habla” (551). This type of 
“speech” is what Cadenas calls an “inestilo” (560) because of his rejection of verbal 
acrobatics, loquacity and intellectual artifices and his strict adherence and attention to the 
exact words that demand expression. We may recall that Girri preferred the title 
“hacedor” to describe his trade. Cadenas takes this term one step further, and emphasizes 
the fact that he is much less an “hacedor” than an “hecho,” (548) a creation and presence 
of the universe. His writing seeks to reflect and pay homage to this provenance: 
“Recordar el origen sería el punto de partida de un pensar diferente, primigenio, sacral. 
Aquí viene a propósito una intuición de Heidegger, según la cual pensar es agradecer” 
(548-49). Cadenas is certainly recalling Heidegger’s Nachdenken, or commemorative 
thinking-thanks such that the human being is attendant upon Being through careful 
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listening. Cadenas’s thoughts of thanks generally take the form of notes, fragments and 
brief observations that are born of and register his daily experiences with the real and are 
recorded through “palabras llenas de lados, en un lenguaje próximo al de todos los días” 
(536). Cadenas believes that this form of writing is more faithful to language’s speaking 
because it is not based on pre-established norms, its brevity allows for less fantasy and it 
succinctly points out and says its truth. In concordance with Heidegger’s appreciation of 
literature, Cadenas ventures that poetry’s most essential gift is its preservation of the 
unconcealment of concealment that is experienced in language and is analogous to the 
nature of the presencing of things and the world. Cadenas writes,  
‘En Heidegger, la verdad no consiste en conocimiento, sino en las cosas mismas, 
tal como se manifiestan.’ En ellas está presente el misterio. […] Nos encontramos 
en el reino de la alétheia, el descubrimiento, la revelación, y lo que aparece en 
todo su poder es lo ignoto, inseparable de lo que existe. La verdad sería 
mostración de las cosas, que descansan en el misterio, siempre, y lo rezuman 
inconteniblemente (562). 
The language of poetry maintains present the inherent mystery of the real through the 
disconcerting force that originates from its un-plumbable speaking.  
In 1984, one year after the publication of Anotaciones, Cadenas further developed 
his passionate defense of poetic word in an essay titled En torno al lenguaje, principally a 
critique of modern society’s neglect of language and its repercussions. Cadenas begins by 
declaring his intentions: “Quisiera que este trabajo fuese testimonio de un recio amor, el 
amor a la lengua. […] Si este trabajo pudiera servir de pequeño arsenal para defender lo 
más amenazado, la lengua y la cultura, me sentiría contento” ("En torno al lenguaje" 567-
68). Unlike the linguistic purist or academician, Cadenas’s concern over the present state 
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of language stems from a belief in the ontological essence of the word. Like Heidegger, 
Cadenas leaves no room for ambiguity when he diagnoses the clear and present dangers 
currently threatening human existence, nature and language, which issue from Man’s 
Thanatotic compulsion to achieve “dominio sobre la naturaleza […] haciéndolos [Men] 
olvidar el fundamento” ("Anotaciones" 538). Man’s conquests have deep repercussions 
in language, and his habitual employment of words as mere tools for representation and 
definition reduce them to a “barbarous” and decadent poverty of slogans, clichés, 
newspeak and propaganda, which is multiplied in most speech acts. Cadenas writes that 
in modernity, “no es el silencio lo que nos quieren trocar por la palabra, sino el ruido” 
(“En torno al lenguaje” 644), an evaluation similar to Heidegger’s in Being and Time of 
Man’s idle chatter, Gerede. Cadenas wishes to demonstrate that human thought, 
perceptions and approaches to the real are truncated when language is robbed of its 
subtleties and nuances and mindlessly repeated as ready-made formulas. Instead of 
safeguarding the mystery of the world and functioning as the space for the human being 
to be immersed in its depths, modern society’s habitual employment of language 
cultivates deception in expression, dulls discernment and eradicates the historical 
richness of words that “[n]os sumerge en el pretérito o nos lo trae a nuestro hoy” (585). 
 En torno al lenguaje represents the author’s most pragmatic writing in that he 
analyzes particular statistics about Venezuelan literacy and education and concludes with 
specific, idealistic suggestions to better “attend” to language: the fomentation of reading, 
the careful study of classic works of literature, a reevaluation of educational priorities, a 
shift in the role and goals of teachers, a favorable re-estimation of leisure time as the 
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necessary condition for genuine reflection. Cadenas refers to a wide range of writers and 
thinkers —Karl Kraus, Herbert Read, George Steiner, Pedro Salinas, Nietzsche, Eliot, 
Pound, and D. H. Lawrence, among others— in support of his positions, particularly in 
establishing a direct connection between a depravity in language and that in thought and 
action. For purposes of this study, one of the more relevant outcomes of this essay is his 
further reassessment of the poet’s role in relationship to society. Conscious of the almost 
negligible reach of poetry today, Cadenas nevertheless defends it as a small but necessary 
bastion for language. The poet is one of the few with a commitment to the word, and he 
“la levanta, la hace expresar lo que ella puede y se la devuelve a quienes la han hecho, 
limpia, salvada, perdurable” (606). Without making distinctions between the genres, 
Cadenas considers literature to be “la depositaria de la lengua” because it “[a]tesora todo 
el esplendor” (632). 
 Part of the indivisible “esplendor” that Cadenas now embraces more fully is the 
human being and his creations. In Dichos, he had already written, “El prodigio de lo dado 
y el prodigio de lo que el hombre hace remiten a un mismo manantial” (666). This idea is 
reiterated in the introduction of En torno al lenguaje:  
Todo, absolutamente todo, forma parte de la realidad, que es, en última instancia, 
desconocida. Pero siendo desconocida, nos constituye, es nuestro fondo, por lo 
que también le pertenecemos, lo cual nos confiere una dignidad que no 
percibimos ni tampoco solemos honrar, pues ¿cuándo la tenemos presente con 
fuerza decisiva? 
Si un árbol es un milagro, no lo es menos un deseo, una palabra. ¿Por qué 
habríamos de otorgarle un puesto mayor al árbol? ¿Por qué no está ‘contaminado’ 
por el yo? ¿Por qué es trasunto de lo desconocido? ¿Quién nos autorizó para 
establecer divisiones? ¿No es falta de humildad hacer afirmaciones sobre lo que 
es o no es real?  
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Todo pertenece a una misma dimensión, todo o nada. Así, comencé a recuperar lo 
que la poderosa dialéctica de los místicos me había arrebatado (567-8, my 
emphasis). 
  
The message of this text is a deliberate counterpoint to Realidad y literatura, and it 
balances the “unilateral” (567) views of the earlier essay by suggesting that even the “I” 
belongs to the mystery of the real. Critic Gustavo Guerrero has read the above quote as 
marking a one hundred and eighty degree shift in Cadenas’s writing, from one of “other-
worldly” mysticism to a poetics of the here-and-now and a return to subjectivity, which 
he observes most prominently in the poetry of Gestiones (1992). Although many of the 
poetic elements of this final collection give greater play to concrete aspects of reality, I 
believe it is a mistake to interpret Cadenas’s previous works as seeking transcendence 
beyond this world.  His search to abolish the “yo” in Intemperie and Memorial was 
spurred by a desire to experience the fullness of reality, not to escape from it. Throughout 
his writing, including his most recent essay, Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la 
mística (1988), Cadenas consistently warns against the idolatry of the “I”/ ego at the 
same time that he advocates for a spiritual awakening to the immediacy of the present. In 
the above quote, when he writes of his “recovery” from the dialectics of mysticism, 
Cadenas is most likely referring to the mystics’ tendency to denounce the body and the 
creatures and things of this world in favor of a non-earthly union with God.  Where 
Cadenas had previously adopted a similar perspective of duality was in rejecting the 
self’s identity and the products of its mind as false, in favor of the “natural” real, to which 
he ascribed ontological status. Although the language of mysticism still holds enormous 
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sway over Amante, which we will presently examine, the dialectics common to writers 
like San Juan de la Cruz y Santa Teresa of Ávila have been overcome. 
3.2.5 A PERSONAL MYSTICISM 
 Although Cadenas published Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la mística in 
1998, 15 years after Amante, I believe the two texts should be read in synchrony. The 
latter in many ways corresponds to Cadenas’s personal take on mysticism, which is later 
developed in prose in his non-traditional essay whose writing Fabienne Bradu has 
classified as “titubeando o, mejor dicho, tropezando con los escollos de lo numinoso” 
(74). The “Notes” about San Juan are, by Cadenas’s own admission, not really about the 
saint; rather they form an informal, personal and interrelated interpretation of religion, 
God, the mystic via negationis, the “I” and the meaning and experience of illumination. 
My logic in first outlining some of the ideas presented in this text is to facilitate and 
condense our reading of Amante, a book of poems that represents a mystic experience, 
Cadenas-style. 
 In Apuntes, Cadenas draws on a number traditions and personal experiences in 
reference to the “mystical” — Dionysian bacchants, San Juan de la Cruz, Santa Teresa, 
Lao Tse, Eckhart, Sankara, Suzuki, Emerson, Whitman, Rilke, Thoreau, Lawrence and 
Joseph Campbell. Distancing himself from any specific tradition, Cadenas ventures that: 
“Lo místico es lo real, inexpresable simbólicamente. […] Lo místico es el mero acto de 
estar aquí, ahora, completo en sí mismo, deshecho ese perpetuo tic que tenemos de ir a 
buscar la realidad en otra parte” ("Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz y la mística" 682). 
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He adds that mysticism’s goal is to “tomar conciencia de ese mismo estado de unidad 
cósmica y totalidad” (690). Cadenas emphasizes the word “consciousness” because 
mysticism is not the product of “doing,” but rather is the unfettered, unified experience 
and comprehension of oneself and the world. This position differs from traditional Judeo-
Christian religious models and practices that set God above and apart from his creation 
and man: “En el cristianismo, Dios es lo absolutamente otro, concepto que 
inevitablemente produce un desencantamiento con el mundo” (693). Cadenas takes issue 
with this conception of God because it forces the positing of spiritual union in the 
afterlife, or only in a death-within-life mystical experience.  
With remarkable frankness and humility, Cadenas offers his own reading of God, 
which he calls interchangeably “realidad última, ser, presencia, lo innombrable, 
Brahman, Tao, lo desconocido, ello […], energía, fondo originario o primordial, vida” 
(684). Following the cues of Eckhart who affirmed the shared identity of God and man 
(680), and the theory Advaita by Sankara of no-duality between Atman, the soul, and 
Brahman, the creator (693), Cadenas is able to state in his own words:  
sólo podemos afirmar la realidad de la cual también formamos parte, aunque 
tampoco sabemos qué es […]Nuestro verdadero linaje es el enigma. Somos eso. 
Dentro de nosotros está también lo que anima […] La palabra Dios es un 
emblema del misterio absoluto, que nos constituye y que por eso mismo rehúso 
ver como lo totalmente otro (704-5). 
Remembering the Taoist cautionary adage that “the Tao that can be named is not the 
Tao,” (678), Cadenas does not attempt to define that which is beyond any definition, but 
he does insist that God can be “lo absolutamente desconocido sin que ello signifique lo 
otro” (684). All of creation is an expression of Being, which itself is not a being, but 
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sustains all that exists. If Cadenas is certain of one thing, it is that everything is sacred 
and belongs equally to the mystery of being, such that enlightenment —satori, nirvana, 
illumination, emptiness, silence or union— is of this world and indiscriminately includes 
the creatures of this world, the human being, his language and thinking. 
 It is on this basis that Cadenas cordially takes issue with the Catholic mystic 
tradition, although he respectfully acknowledges that only first-hand experience would 
allow him to speak with complete authority. In the writing of San Juan de la Cruz, 
Cadenas finds disturbing the unrelenting war waged against the self, the required 
disavowal of the creatures of the world, the violent asceticism to punish the body and the 
condemnation of language, which the saint so masterfully employs. We have already 
heard in various forms Cadenas’s counter-reasoning, the source of his “riña cordial con 
los místicos” which argues that the Spanish mystics “sacrifican mucho de la naturaleza o 
la cultura, y yo me avengo mal con exclusiones” because for Cadenas, “[t]odo forma 
parte del mismo torrente” (696). One “worldly” presence that he especially wishes to 
recognize as integral part of this “torrent” is the body whose pre-cognitive sensations 
maintain the most direct connection between the human being and the real. Cadenas 
writes: “El cuerpo vocea un secreto que no se oye: es naturaleza, en contraste con el yo 
que vive separado de ella […] ¿No debería el cuerpo ser el maestro del yo en vez de su 
esclavo?” (697).  
From the above quote, it should be evident that Cadenas upholds his long-
standing position that the “I”/ ego is the principal obstacle for the human being to 
experience a “mystic” consciousness, an opinion shared by San Juan de la Cruz. Cadenas  
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writes, a little tongue-in-cheek, that “El verdadero Dios de la gente en todas partes —no 
hay límites geográficos para él— ha sido el yo” (694). Cadenas believes that at the 
societal level, the “I-as-God” existential stance has allowed and cultivated the rampant 
evils of the world such as the abuse and exploitation of the environment, the fostering of 
radical nationalism, the disregard for other human life, the arms race and corruption. The 
very nature of the “I” is such that he “se atribuye todo el mérito, cuando se envanece, 
cuando olvida el origen sagrado de aquello que pone al servicio de su yo” (698). 
Mysticism’s insight, Cadenas contends, is the ideal ultimate antidote to the ego.  
The “process” for the attainment of “satori” commands Cadenas’s attention, and 
he contemplates various aspects of it in relationship to the Spanish saint. Of particular 
interest to our author is the oft-cited “noche oscura” of San Juan’s mystic process, in 
which senses and spirit are led to feel abandoned and desolate and habitual forms of 
prayer and worship are fruitless. This occurs precisely when the light of the divine 
presence is nearest, that which secretly instructs the soul in love’s perfection. Cadenas 
also remarks that in the mystic experience, words can only correspond to the period 
leading up to epiphany, but can never capture symbolically that incommunicable 
experience. Theoretically available for all to attain, it is, nevertheless a “don” (692) or a 
“gift” that is independent of one’s efforts and desire for fulfillment. For San Juan de la 
Cruz, there is only one path to enlightenment, and it rests on God’s grace, which may 
explain why so few people have successfully followed his example.  
For his part, Cadenas embraces a plurality of “paths” to the enlightenment San Juan 
writes of, but he also openly questions the very notion of a “route” to illumination —an 
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issue we already addressed in our analysis of Memorial. Here, in his own words, Cadenas 
lays bare the exacerbating paradox of the search for a true awakening: “buscar la 
iluminación es alejarla, ya que se trata de un deseo como cualquier otro. Se cae así en una 
especie de concupiscencia espiritual. ¿Entonces qué hacer? Nada tal vez; porque todo lo 
que hace el yo, incluida esta búsqueda, sigue en su mismo campo” (688, emphasis 
added). If the search itself feeds one’s desire and ego, adding distance to between oneself 
and the present real, then is it best to abandon the effort for a true shift in consciousness? 
Cadenas appears to hesitate in his answer. On one hand he responds that through effort, 
the human being can attain a greater “conocimiento de sí mismo, y sobre todo del peligro 
que representamos” (692); on the other, he sets his own example of offering his 
continuous but non-directed attention and availability to the real in his writing and daily 
activities, without fixating on a goal beyond the present. 
 Amante (1983), is the poetic precursor of Apuntes, and it embodies many of the 
facets of Cadenas’s personal perspective on mysticism that we have just examined. The 
three epigraphs that precede the text aid us in establishing the precise coordinates of this 
reading. The first, by William Carlos Williams asks, “Why do you try/ so hard/ to be a 
man./ You are a lover” ("Amante" 328). Interpreting the word “man” of Williams’s verse 
in the Foucauldian sense, it is clear that Cadenas wishes to redefine the human being in 
his capacity for love, care and attention to something beyond himself. What kind of an 
“amante” does Cadenas propose to place in Man’s stead? The next two epigraphs that 
follow, guide us to a greater understanding. First, C. Kohn, a commentator of Karl 
Kraus’s works, remarks how in the latter’s poetry, “le culte de la langue rejoignait dans 
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sa pensée le culte de la femme” (328), thus alluding to the similar overlap of semantic 
fields in Cadenas’s poetry: that of the traditional vocabulary of courtly love of a woman 
with its transposition in the expression of mystical experiences, and the almost 
unnamable devotion to the word as such. The third quote, this time by Kraus, rephrases 
Heidegger’s understanding of language as the house of Being, and the human being’s 
relationship to the poetic word: “Ich bin nur einer von den Epigonen/ die in dem alten 
Haus der Sprache wohnen” (328), roughly “I am but one of the epigones that live in the 
old house of language.” The protagonist of Amante, therefore, is already defined as a 
lover or custodian of language —his beloved— to which he belongs. Language is his 
sheltering home, and he calls himself one of its epigones, another means of stating that 
the words comprising the poems that we will presently read, actually issue forth from 
language itself. 
Amante is comprised of three uneven groupings of texts in verse that should be 
read as one long poem, reminiscent of “La diosa,” of Memorial. As with this earlier text, 
of particular interest here is the singular use of multiple speaking voices and symbolic 
characters: “ella, el amante, el anotador” (329). The “ella” of the text is the beloved, the 
female representation of language in its purest speaking. Fabienne Bradu has pertinently 
queried, “¿Qué sucedería si las palabras se volviesen transparentes, unívocas, redondos 
receptáculos de realidad, cabales moradas del ser? Sucedería lo que persigue Cadenas en 
su poesía: un contacto directo entre la palabra y la realidad” (75). The lover of this text is 
devoted to listening to the pure speech of Being, and he conceives his devotion to his 
beloved as the act of faithful transcription. The very poems that we read should be read as 
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a speaking that springs from her and whose enunciation returns both the scribe and reader 
to her silence:  
El amante custodia tu ara 
con las palabras que le concedes, 
las de todos los días, pero a otra luz. 
(No pueden venir sino de ti, 
en él adentrada.) (359).  
 
It is thus that “el amante” and “el anotador,” who alternate as the speaking voice28, are 
identified as different names for the same human entity. The last poem of the book 
confirms this interpretation: “No sé quién es/ el que ama/ o el que escribe o el que 
observa./ A veces entre ellos/ se establece, al borde,/ un comercio extraño/ que los hace 
indistinguibles” (384). 
In addition to the “strange commerce” between the identities of the lover and the 
scribe, Amante is the chronicle of the relationship between the human being and 
unmediated reality. In his commentary on Amante, Rafael Cordero writes, and I agree, 
that: “La condición de estar en el Aquí y en el Ahora, activamente conectado con la 
prístina energética de la vida, es precisamente la condición de amante que este libro 
trastocador nos propone” (114). To be “actively connected life’s pure energy” is but 
another description of Cadenas’s interpretation of the mystic experience, as we have just 
seen in Apuntes. In Amante, Cadenas also outlines the human state and consciousness that 
allows for enlightenment. Again it is emphasized that the “I” is the greatest obstacle to a 
union with the world and the self, but that the world and the self in and of themselves are 
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the mystery. One poem that illustrates the human being’s transformation reads: “Se creyó 
dueño/ y ella lo obligó a la más honda encuesta,/ a preguntarse qué era en realidad suyo./ 
Después lo tomó en sus manos/ y fue formando su rostro/ con el mismo material del 
extravío, sin desechar nada,/ y lo devolvió a los brazos del origen/ como a quien se amó 
sin decírselo” (342). From these verses, it is evident that when Man gives up his notions 
of possession, both of his lordship over the real and himself, he can be reincorporated and 
welcomed into its undivided mystery. Another poem summarizes the conditions that 
determine to whom enlightenment is and is not availed: 
Es a él 
que lo sagrado 
quiere encomendarse. 
 
Los oficiantes no pudieron sostenerlo. 
Estaban atados por prescripciones, 
hacían una raya divisora, 
tasaban lo desconocido— 
“hasta aquí, decían, llega el misterio 
que administramos”, 
como si fuese una heredad 
gobernable  
por mano de hombre, 
pero él nunca prescribió ni trazó linderos 
ni pensó que tenía autoridad (366). 
 
Those who seek to define what belongs to Being’s mystery, administrate the real and 
preside over it as Men are unable to “sustain” its presence, and they inevitably are not 
commended with its keep. 
                                                                                                                                            
28 See Luis Miguel Isava Briceño’s poem for poem division of the poetic voice’s identity in Voz de amante 
(Estudio sobre la poesía de Rafael Cadenas), p. 123. 
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 The experience of “lo sagrado” in Amante prefigures the opinion that Cadenas 
voices in Apuntes —that enlightenment is entrusted to those who experience themselves 
not as a “self,” but as indivisible from the beloved, understood here as that which grants 
reality and language. The mystical experience of Amante involves an awakening to one’s 
eternal belonging to that which is, a realization which is often delayed by Man’s seeking 
elsewhere. With the “mystery” always immediately present but hidden because of the 
subjects efforts to attain it, the “lover” passes through moments of excruciating loneliness 
and despair, much like San Juan’s “noche oscura.”: “¡Qué penuria/ en la mano misma del 
misterio!/ el misterio voceado en nuestra cara/ como viento arrasador,/ […]/ vena que 
todo lo recorre/ pulsando,/ a la mano como tu cuerpo” (381). As close to the human being 
as his own body, the Godly presence is nevertheless hidden, even in its destruction of 
Man’s best-intended “código[s]” (340) and “retórica del amante” (371). The poetic voice 
of the following verses, conscious of his own wandering, asks the “beloved” for 
forgiveness, realizing that he had always been “housed” in her present: “Perdona/ su 
extravío./ No te encontraba,/ y lo tenías/ en tu mano/ suspendido./ Tal vez/ los que tú 
levantas/ necesitan errar/ antes de sentirse./ Mas una vez/ alojados/ olvidan su rostro/ y 
viven” (457).  
When one does finally “forget one’s face and live,” the experience of unity is one 
of pure present, an immediacy that incorporates the body as well as consciousness. 
Enlightenment is not a promise to be kept in a different realm, the fantastic appearance of 
an “Other” endowed with otherworldly truth and holiness or the final accomplishment of 
a prescribed set of tasks to be successfully completed. Cadenas does not belittle the 
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“yoga” or exercises the human being performs in anticipation of this moment, for the 
process often reveals the inherent dangers of the ego, but he does insist that everything is 
and always has been, a matter of being present, —Nirvana is samsara— ideas which are 
stated more eloquently in one of the last poems of Amante, which I quote in full: 
Cuanto hiciste 
fue para propiciar 
el encuentro. 
 










un aquí embriagado 
en un ya de oro. 
 
Te encontrarás de bruces 
ante ella. 
 
La vida a quemarropa. 
Por fin. 
 
En tu cuerpo. 
 
La flor inmediata, 
la única, 
te esperó siempre (378). 
 
3.2.6 DWELLING ON EARTH 
Cadenas’s most recent poetic collection, Gestiones, is from 1992 and it was 
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rewarded the first Pérez Bonalde International Poetry Prize. The title word has been the 
source of critical discussions, but I agree with Christiane Dimitríades, who simply refers 
to the Diccionario de la Real Academia, that the most apt definition in relation to this 
book is a “contrato que se origina por el cuidado de intereses ajenos sin mandato de su 
dueño” (148). The “contract” of these poems is one of the author with the world and 
language, and the “interests” that he cares for are those of the mystery of the real within 
daily existence. Gestiones has been read in radically opposing fashions: Luis Moreno 
Villamediana criticizes the book as a conservative and pompous attempt to “levantar el 
acta que da cuenta de los destrozos dejados por los letristas, los incontinentes y los 
lunáticos y a prescribir los remedios” (152); on the opposite end of the spectrum, Gustavo 
Guerrero sees this work as a refreshingly clean break with the notion of poetry as a 
correlate of mysticism, and Cadenas’s first genuine “intento de fundar la poesía en la 
continuidad de nuestra experiencia ordinaria” (78-79). I would have to place my own 
reading somewhere between these two extremes, as I think the ideas at the root of this 
poetry are a clear continuation of those he has developed throughout his earlier works, 
although the execution and provenance of the poetic elements pertain to a broader 
spectrum. 
 Gestiones is the work of a mature artist who has clearly established his personal 
aesthetic and ethics and can now evaluate his own accomplishments and limitations with 
greater patience and less vehemence, and experience through other people and things, 
that which he desired to find in himself. Whereas Memorial and Amante in verse and 
Anotaciones, En torno al lenguaje and Apuntes sobre San Juan de la Cruz in prose 
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fervently advanced the position of an awakening within the “here and now,” rarely did 
Cadenas incorporate in his writing the actual things, places, relationships, memories, 
history and beings of the world, preferring almost koan-like verses to shake the reader 
into the his present, such as the poem that concluded the previous section. In Gestiones, 
however, Cadenas allows the daily things of this world to cohabitate within the poem, not 
only within the idea that the poem presents. Even the “I” is not scathingly banished from 
the poems, but is treated with almost affectionate irony, a presence no longer to be built 
up through rejection. Maintaining the same perspective about the function of poetry and 
the necessity of the human being to free himself of the dominion of the ego, Cadenas 
nevertheless appears to be more charitable and accepting of his own shortcomings, 
finding fulfillment in the examples of others before him. 
The two sections of Gestiones, “Convivencia” and “Mediaciones,” best illustrate 
the physical presence of the world as participating in the mystery and daily living as the 
realm for experiencing being: a crowded restaurant is the site for a reflection on what 
Man requires to be free from himself ("Gestiones" 394); a hotel stay is motive for 
pondering the roles and requirements of being a writer and husband (400); a childhood 
port revisited opens a window into time’s passage and memory, and the question of what 
it means to be the same (402). Another poem resembles those from previous books that 
insist on the present, but now the actual presence of that specific present is given space in 
the poem: “Me cerca ahora./ Ahora sin intermediarios,/ ahora en primera instancia,/ 
ahora como si fuera mi piel, —el disco que oigo,/ las voces en el comedor,/ un relincho 
en la granja tras el edificio—/ ahora, el espíritu santo de ahora” (412). In these verses, 
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the sounds of quotidian existence form the chorus of being, and the poet’s attentive 
listening invests the music, voices and whinnying with equal ontological status. The 
following poem performs the same movement, but this time through “proper” seeing: “El 
amanecer/ encuentra tu rostro,/ lo golpea con sus ramas amarillas./ Así, vaciado de 
repente, es mucho./ Lo hace digno de la vida: extraño” (413). A well-known face 
enveloped by light is infused with the strange dignity of presence in which individual 
identity is “emptied” to allow life’s simple being to shine through. This interchange 
between the singularity of things and existence has several variations in Gestiones, but is 
best captured by these delightful verses that could credibly be found illustrating 
Heidegger’s discussion of the play of Being and beings, or the idea of Tao: “Lo que miras 
a tu alrededor/ no son flores, pájaros, nubes,/ sino/ existencia./ No, son flores, pájaros, 
nubes” (406).  
In addition to physical beings in these poems, Cadenas opens his verses to cultural 
presences, further supporting his opinion that human creations equally belong to the 
mystery of the real. The life and creations of writers and artists such as Auden, Donne, 
Rubens, Osip Mandelstam, Archilochus and Rilke as well as a work of Polish theatre and 
the Greek trilogy Oresteia are brought into the fold of the present within Cadenas’s 
poems. Of the aforementioned authors, Rilke is the inspiration of a series of 16 poems 
that pays homage to his work, ethos, aesthetics and life’s mission. Whereas Cadenas 
remains hesitant about his own writing and questions his personal capacity to embrace 
the real’s mystery and quell the ego, he sees in Rilke the culmination of such an existence 
and his writing as the epitome of unmediated listening to Being, a reading that closely 
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follows Heidegger’s.  
Cadenas holds Rilke up as an exception in comparison to all others, himself 
included, to whom he refers simply as “nosotros.” Rilke is capable of the arduous 
undertaking of the consummate poet, that of breaking all of his ties and self-imposed 
limitations in order to: “estar/ ahí/ desabrigado/ sin exigir nada/ salvo/ el dictado hondo,/ 
su ráfaga/ anonadante,/ la voz/ sin sueño,/ el sonido que no pertenece a nadie” (451). 
“We,” on the other hand, are bound by our limitations, scared to let go of the false safety 
of our egos, and left asking who, if anyone, is truly up to the task of the poet: “¿Quién 
deja de oponerse?/ […]/ ¿Quién se vive en el vacío?/ ¿Quién hace del desabrigo refugio?/ 
¿Quién se disuelve en el percibir?/ […]/ ¿Quién accede a trocar su día por un rostro que 
no ha de ver?” (456). The gift of Rilke’s poetry is that through the attentive reading of his 
verses, one can be brought to the experience from which they sprang. Cadenas speaks for 
himself when he writes: “Me arrancas/ de mí/ para mostrarme/ la presencia,/ el inmóvil 
ahora” (448). Similarly, in perfect alignment with Heidegger’s discussion of restoration 
of the “thing” to its “thingness” through art, Cadenas describes how Rilke’s poems allow 
the entities of the earth stand in themselves in the Open of disclosure: “Él las [things] 
acogía transformándolas/ en lo que eran, devolviéndolas a su exactitud,/ bañándolas en su 
propio oro,/ […]/ Piedras, flores, nubes/ renacían/ en otro silencio/ para un distinto 
transcurrir” (443).  
Much to his lamentation, Cadenas recognizes that few people know how to 
continue Rilke’s legacy or even listen properly to his words. His assessment of the 
present is bleak, which he summarizes as “los arrasamientos del siglo veinte” (448), and 
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his evaluation of Man’s state is equally dismal: “Los hombres están atascados,/ hacen 
ruido para no escuchar,/ su corazón ya no los soporta./ Todo respira y da gracias,/ menos 
ellos” (454). In examining his own existence, Cadenas does not sugarcoat the reflection, 
he sees, and he freely discloses the persistent paradox at the heart of his life’s work: 
“Soy/ apenas/ un hombre que trata de respirar/ por los poros del lenguaje./ Un estigma,/ a 
veces un intruso,/ en todo caso alguien fuera de papel” (420). After an entire lifetime 
dedicated to poetry as a means to “conducir a otro comienzo” (447), Cadenas humbly 
admits that Man’s legacy is hard to shake and the chance to live and write from a 
different conception of the self is the constant challenge and opportunity of being. 
Cadenas’s last poem, “Moradas” is the recapitulation of this mature outlook, some of 
whose final verses conclude this chapter: 
Sentir es magnífico; escribir, exultante; habitar lo sumo. Pero ¿dónde está el lugar 
aplacado, el sitio de reunión, el punto del encuentro solvente? 





















The poetry and prose of Girri and Cadenas have been brought together in the 
space of these pages because their works insistently ask the question of how the human 
being understands his relationship with the world he inhabits, and how he apperceives 
himself. Initiating their literary careers during the second half of the 20th century, both 
authors were born into a system of knowledge and a manner of being a subject that long 
predated them. Planted squarely in what we have referred to here as the modern Western 
episteme, Girri’s and Cadenas’s earlier works are testimonies of the arduous but 
imperative task of testing, interrogating and becoming conscious of the pre-established 
conditions or “givens” that inform our conception of ourselves and others, our notion of 
time and origin, our use of language and the reach and nature of our thought. Both 
identify Man’s current position as the axis for being and thinking as non-essential and 
restrictive of other modes of knowledge and experiences of reality.  
The second “movement” in the trajectories of Girri’s and Cadenas’s writing is 
also notable for the commonalities in their individual responses, a singularity within the 
scope of Latin American poetry. Both seek a radically different understanding through a 
pendular motion such that by turning inward to quiet the mind and release the self from 
the limitations of the “I,” a new outward perspective, in which the human being is 
included, is afforded. This new vision is described by both poets as simple, depthless and 
pertaining to the present. It entails a disposition of openness and receptive listening and 
seeing. It promises a fullness of presence and the experiential knowledge of man and 
world’s mutual belonging. It safeguards Being and brings all beings into their ontological 
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dimension. Poetry, as an activity not rooted in or practiced as personal subjectivity, 
provides that open amphitheatre for Being and things to reveal themselves in their own 
dimension, and to call man into their presence.  
If initially Girri’s and Cadenas’s writing responds to their personal inquietudes 
and dissatisfactions, ultimately, their tireless probing and careful listening hold greater 
implications for human living on the earth. This deduction follows closely the thought of 
Martin Heidegger and various Eastern philosophies, whose ontological perspectives on 
the human being and his reality simultaneously give rise to an ethics of thought and 
action quite foreign to Man. One of the purposes of this dissertation was to heed in all 
seriousness the call that echoes and bounces from the last, prophetic lines of Les mots et 
les choses, to Heidegger’s tortuous and unsayable speaking of Being, from the koans of 
the Zen masters to verses by Girri and Cadenas such as these: “El dueño tiene miedo./ 
Los ojos sólo tienen realidad” (“Memorial” 256). The prolonged study of Girri’s and 
Cadenas’s works offered, in part, the opportunity to bring these voices of diverse 
provenance together that so often are ignored or dismissed. Sometimes, despite my best 
effort to allow each writer to speak, I perceive my hand in their orchestration. I 
nevertheless believe that beyond the pages of this text, they form a harmonic, if 
sometimes contrapuntal chorus whose calm insistence carries within an urgency and a 
promise that have rung true to me as a reader and co-inhabitant of this earth.  
The difficulty of their message is also the major obstacle in writing —particularly 
in an academic fashion— about this topic: a true eclipse of Man’s speaking must be 
something Man cannot say. Can such an undertaking be anything but solitary and silent? 
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Both Girri and Cadenas acknowledge and are forced to embrace the ultimate 
incommunicability of their task, as they rest in the Open as both “hacedores” and 
“hechos.” Does this invalidate their lifelong poetic projects or the present one? It is my 
hope, and one that I share with Girri and Cadenas, that from these apparent paradoxes 
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